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1This report finds that on some measures, sig-
nificant progress has been made in the
nation’s preparedness.  There are important
areas, however, where continued, concerted
action is needed.  From assuring an adequate
stockpile of pandemic influenza counter-
measures to having a public health workforce
large enough and trained enough to respond
to an emergency, federal and state policies
still fall short of their stated goals.  
Almost half the states do not provide suffi-
cient legal protection from liability for health
care volunteers who respond to the nation’s
call for assistance in an emergency.  In many
other areas, a lack of transparency makes it
hard for the American people and their elect-
ed representatives to know whether their gov-
ernment is protecting them. The variation in
preparedness among the states, while not as
great as in past years, does mean that where
one lives still determines how well one is pro-
tected.  Until all states measure up, the
United States is not safe.
Furthermore, just as the nation is beginning
to see a return on the federal investment in
preparedness, funding to states and localities
to maintain and improve their preparedness
is declining. Overall, federal funding for state
and local preparedness will have declined by
25 percent in 3 years if the President’s FY 2008
request is approved.  Further, unless Congress
and the President act, funding for states and
localities for pandemic influenza prepared-
ness will expire in 2008.  
Health emergencies pose some of the great-
est threats to the nation.  Acts of bioterrorism
and natural outbreaks of disease are chal-
lenging to detect and contain.  In addition,
natural disasters often cause health problems
that are difficult to predict and prepare for.
Since 2003, Trust for America’s Health (TFAH)
has issued the Ready or Not? Protecting the Public’s
Health from Diseases, Disasters, and Bioterrorism
report to examine the progress that has been
made to improving America’s ability to respond
to health threats and help identify ongoing
areas of vulnerability.  Some of the key areas of
concern TFAH has raised include the need to:
■ Increase accountability;
■ Strengthen leadership;
■ Enhance surge capacity and 
the public health workforce;
■ Modernize technology and 
equipment; and
■ Improve community engagement.
Introduction
Six years after the tragedies of September 11th and the proceedinganthrax scares of 2001, more than half of all Americans do not believe
the country is safer than before the attacks.1 Two years after Hurricane
Katrina, nearly 60 percent of Americans do not think their community would
be prepared to respond to a natural disaster.
2There has been increasing acknowledgement
among America’s leaders and current and 
former public health officials about the need
to modernize the public health system to
respond to a range of threats, including 
naturally occurring diseases and disasters, as
well as bioterrorism.  The aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, the potential for a pan-
demic flu outbreak, increased attention to
foodborne illnesses, and growing concern
about drug-resistant bugs such as methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) have
contributed to a better understanding of the
need for an all-hazards approach to public
health preparedness.  
In December 2006, the U.S. Congress took
steps to address many of these concerns 
when legislators updated and reauthorized
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Act, which became the Pandemic and 
All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA). 
In addition, the White House issued a 
number of presidential directives with 
components aimed at improving public
health emergency preparedness.  The most
recent was Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD 21, released in October 2007,
which establishes a National Strategy for
Public Health and Medical Preparedness.  
The next challenge is to ensure that the
measures in the legislation and directives are
carried out and translated into improved
public health preparedness, thereby keeping
communities throughout the country safer
and better protected.  This will require suffi-
cient funding from the president and U.S.
Congress to carry out federal preparedness
activities.  Another challenge is to address
funding levels for upgrading state and local
public health preparedness, which have
been decreasing yearly since 2004.  This has
adversely affected progress.
The 2007 edition of the Ready or Not? report
focuses on evaluating America’s public health
emergency preparedness in the context of
these measures by the U.S. Congress and the
Bush Administration to try to improve all-haz-
ards preparedness.  
Currently, the federal government does not
release preparedness progress or evaluation
reports to the public, so TFAH issues this
report in order to provide an independent
analysis to:
■ Inform the public and policymakers about
progress and vulnerabilities in the nation’s
public health preparedness; and
■ Foster greater accountability for the spend-
ing of taxpayer dollars on preparedness.
The U.S. Congress and the public are entitled
to know how well the country is being pro-
tected from health threats.  And, the public
health system and other government entities
involved in protecting the public’s health must
be held accountable for how well they are car-
rying out their responsibilities as defined by
legislation and federal directives.  
In addition, without information about the
status of progress and vulnerabilities, it is diffi-
cult to determine whether the resources and
funds devoted to preparedness are sufficient
for adequately protecting the public from
health threats.
A MODERN PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM TAKES ON
ALL HAZARDS
3READY OR NOT? 2007:  MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
The 2007 Ready or Not? report finds signifi-
cant progress among the states in those
areas where data are available.  Indeed,
overall scores for the states have risen from
prior years. This reflects a combination of
factors, including a major infusion of fund-
ing from the federal government to states
and localities and a higher priority on pan-
demic influenza preparedness among state
and local health departments.  
Not all areas of preparedness, however, can
be measured by the indicators included in
this report because data from all levels of
government is still insufficient.  Even within
these indicators, some important geograph-
ic disparities are identified that affect the
nation’s ability to protect Americans from
emergency health threats -- particularly with
respect to plans for the distribution of emer-
gency countermeasures from the Strategic
National Stockpile and providing liability
protections for volunteer health workers.  
Ready or Not? 2007: Key Findings
Indicator Finding
Mass Distribution -- 10 states do not have adequate plans to distribute emergency 
Strategic National Stockpile vaccines, antidotes, and medical supplies from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
Mass Distribution -- 7 states have not purchased any portion of their federally-
Antiviral Stockpiling subsidized or unsubsidized antivirals.
Public Health Laboratories -- 6 states and D.C. lack sufficient capabilities to test for 
Bio-Threat Testing biological threats.
Public Health Laboratories -- 1 state and D.C. report their public health laboratories 
Workforce Surge Preparedness do not have the capability to provide 24/7 coverage to 
analyze samples.
Biosurveillance 12 states do not have a disease surveillance system that is 
compatible with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) National Electronic Disease Surveillance
System (NEDSS).
Healthcare Volunteer 21 states do not have statutes that address one or both of 2 
Liability Protection critical legal elements to extend liability protection to 
healthcare volunteers during emergencies.
Emergency Preparedness Drills 50 states and D.C. held an emergency preparedness drill or 
exercise in 2007 with health department officials and the state 
National Guard.
Community Resiliency 13 states do not meet a minimum threshold for Medical 
Reserve Corp volunteers for every 100,000 citizens.
Public Health Progress -- Flu vaccination rates for seniors decreased in 11 states.
Seniors’ Seasonal Flu Vaccination
Funding Commitment 6 states cut their public health budgets between FY 2005-06 
and FY 2006-07.
■ Section A:  State-by-state public health
preparedness.  States are evaluated on 10
preparedness indicators, based on input
and review from public health experts;
■ Section B: The federal government’s
implementation of the 2006 Pandemic
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L.
109-417) which sets benchmarks and
deadlines for key actions.  Federal leader-
ship and preparedness funding and
accountability are also discussed;  
■ Section C: A survey of hospital emer-
gency preparedness;
■ Section D: A public opinion survey on
pandemic and all-hazards preparedness;
■ Section E: Discussion of some additional
preparedness issues, including public
health workforce, vulnerable populations
and emergency preparedness, caring 
for children during disasters, mental
health considerations, and drug resistant
bacteria; and
■ Section F: Recommendations for improv-
ing all-hazards emergency preparedness.
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CONTENTS OF THE READY OR NOT? 2007 REPORT
Some of the Federal Undertakings Since the Ready or Not? 2006 Report:
December 2006 Passage of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act.
February 2007 U.S. Government releases guidance for non-pharmaceutical 
interventions (NPIs) for mitigating the impact of a pandemic.
April 2007 U.S. Government approves the first pre-pandemic vaccine for 
humans against the H5N1 virus.
June 2007 Strategic National Stockpile contains more than 36 million 
treatment courses of antiviral drugs; 971,000 on order; individual 
states have stockpiled some 18 million treatment courses.
July 2007 U.S. Homeland Security Council releases a year-one evaluation 
of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan.
October 2007 White House issues Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD
21 establishing a National Strategy for Public Health and Medical
Preparedness.
Summary of Key Preparedness Landmarks and Concerns 
Federal Legislation Progress:
and Funding ▲ The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 was
passed, providing a blueprint for federal preparedness including
key deliverables and due dates.
▲ The Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 21 was
issued setting a National Strategy for Public Health and Medical
Preparedness and reaffirming the blueprint laid out in PAHPA.
Concerns:
▲ State, local, and hospital emergency preparedness funding has
been cut over the years and remains inconsistent, which 
hampers state and local preparedness initiatives and threatens
progress that has already been made.
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Accountability, Progress:
Oversight, and ▲ The federal government issued 2 important progress reports in 
Transparency 2007 -- the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza:
Implementation Plan and the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act Progress Report -- that provide the public with
information needed to assess federal progress on both fronts.
▲ CDC plans to issue the first of what will become annual reports
on state and local preparedness.  Scheduled to be published in
late 2007/early 2008, the CDC report will outline the progress
that has been made, challenges that still remain, and how CDC 
is working to address these challenges.  The report will cover 
disease detection and investigation; public health laboratory 
testing, and response; and, individual state and locality fact sheets.  
▲ In response to PAHPA, HHS reorganized and created the new
position of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
(ASPR) that has authority over the National Disaster Medical
System (NDMS), Hospital Preparedness Cooperative
Agreement, Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), Emergency System
for the Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals
(ESAR-VHP), Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), and Cities
Readiness Initiative (CRI).  The ASPR position is accountable for
all public health emergency preparedness programs, which
should improve leadership and oversight. 
▲ Federal agencies are in the process of developing new, out-
come-oriented performance measures that will begin to roll out
in 2008. 
▲ All 50 states and D.C. submitted revised pandemic plans in April
2007 based on criteria from HHS.
▲ HHS has refined its state pandemic planning criteria based on
feedback from states and will re-distribute those to state agen-
cies ahead of the next round of pandemic planning.
▲ HHS will begin to withhold funding from entities that fail to
achieve benchmarks or submit influenza plans. 
▲ HHS will require states and hospitals that receive public health
emergency preparedness funding to submit annual reports
meeting specific requirements to evaluate activities and assure
the proper expenditure of funds. 
Concerns:
▲ A 2007 GAO report found that, despite the creation of the
ASPR, clear leadership roles are still not defined in the National
Pandemic Influenza Strategy. 
▲ CDC only collects data on 6 of 23 current performance-meas-
ures, which focus too heavily on self-reported, non-objectively
verifiable data, and on planning and process versus implementa-
tion and outcomes. 
▲ CDC and ASPR have failed to provide any public evaluation of
preparedness or pandemic planning on a state-by-state basis.
The lack of transparency limits the ability to gauge progress and
identify vulnerabilities in the nation’s preparedness for all-haz-
ards public health emergencies. 
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Gaps in “Plans on Progress:
Paper” Versus Reality ▲ ASPR, in coordination with research organizations and 
of Preparedness universities, is developing new tools to assess state and local
preparedness using embedded assessments and full-scale drills 
and exercises. 
Concerns:
▲ There remains limited, non-systematic testing and exercising of
emergency health plans, and inconsistent mechanisms for 
incorporating lessons learned into future planning. 
▲ State and federal preparedness documents acknowledge the difficult
issues related to licensing and credentialing of emergency healthcare
volunteers but efforts to address these issues remain scattered. 
▲ Federal and state plans highlight the importance of reaching out to
at-risk populations, including the elderly and low-income minorities.
Surveys show, however, that these groups have the least 
confidence in the government’s ability to respond to a disaster.  
Laboratory Progress:
Improvements ▲ States continue to make progress in developing bio-safety level
3 (BSL-3) laboratory capacities by adding additional suites or
labs to meet testing needs.
Concerns:
▲ Adequate levels of trained personnel continue to limit laboratories’
ability to provide 24/7 coverage to analyze samples.
Public Health Progress:
Information ▲ States continue to develop components essential for 
Technology compatibility with CDC’s National Electronic Disease
Surveillance System (NEDSS), allowing for more integrated,
accurate, and timely national disease reporting. 
▲ States are linking public health surveillance systems with poison
control centers.
Concerns:
▲ HHS failed to meet the June 2007 due date to deliver its strategic
plan outlining steps to develop, implement, and evaluate a near
real-time electronic nationwide public health situational awareness
capability network. 
▲ Three years into its development, BioSense still lacks real-time
capability and is prone to issuing false alarms. 
▲ CDC reports that there are 6 IT system developers whose 
various products are used by the 50 state and 3,000 local health
departments nation-wide.  Integrating the disparate systems so
that data can be shared is a serious barrier to the development 
of a near real-time electronic nationwide public health situational
awareness capability. 
State Public Health Progress:
Funding ▲ A large majority of states increased their funding for public 
health from FY 2005-2006 to FY 2006-2007.
Concerns:
▲ Median state spending for public health is only $33 per person 
per year, representing only a $2 increase per person over last
year’s median spending amount ($31).
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Problems with Progress: 
Management ▲ CDC is using a new Technical Assistance Review (TAR) Tool to 
and Contents of the  determine a project area’s ability to respond to a public health 
Strategic National emergency that requires the use of SNS assets.  The State
Stockpile (SNS) TAR tool is used to evaluate a state’s ability to receive, stage,
store, and distribute SNS assets during a public health emergency.
The Local TAR tool is used to assess a city, county, or metro 
area’s ability to receive, manage and dispense SNS assets.  Both
review tools are based on a 100-point system. 
Concerns:
▲ The new CDC evaluation system still relies on an evaluation of
paper-plans instead of an actual assessment of a state’s ability to
distribute medicine and supplies in an emergency. 
▲ States still have not received clear information about the quantities
of medications and supplies that are in the SNS and how effective
the federal government would be in delivering supplies to states 
during a multi-state crisis. 
▲ The federal government has stockpiled only 6,000 treatment 
courses of pediatric antivirals for influenza.  There are 73.6 million
children in the U.S. 
▲ Beginning in 2008, several lots of the anthrax vaccine BioThrax
will begin to expire, which could cost the SNS $100 million in 
lost stockpile in FY 2008 and FY 2009.   
Extremely Limited Progress:
Surge Capacity for ▲ A majority of hospitals report they have either established plans 
Emergencies or been involved in state and local planning efforts to prepare for
a surge of excess patients by planning to use alternative care sites
such as schools, conference centers, hotels, and sports arenas. 
▲ Two major reports on surge capacity and hospital preparedness
were published in 2007.  In April CDC’s Injury Center published In 
a Moment’s Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings: Challenges
and Proposed Solutions, and in October PriceWaterhouseCooper’s
published Closing the Seams: Developing and Integrated Approach 
to Health System Disaster Preparedness. Both reports contain 
consensus-based recommendations for improving U.S. surge 
capacity. 
Concerns:
▲ According to the Center for Biosecurity, the minimum costs 
of developing and maintaining surge capacity during a severe 
pandemic for an average size hospital are close to a $1 million
one-time investment coupled with $200,000 in annual 
maintenance costs.  Current ASPR-funding levels are closer to
approximately $100,000 per year per hospital.  
▲ The public health workforce and healthcare workforce shortages
continue to worsen. 
▲ Ongoing concerns exist about policies and incentives designed 
to encourage healthcare workers to report for duty during an
emergency. 
▲ Volunteer medical workforce efforts are limited by concerns
regarding liability and licensing.
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Community Progress:
Resilience* ▲ Responding to “at-risk” populations was made a priority 
under PAHPA. 
▲ The federal government has developed and run several public
service announcements on emergency and pandemic prepared-
ness for individuals and families; September is now designated as
“National Preparedness Month.” 
▲ PAHPA singled out “risk communication and public preparedness”
as “essential public health security capabilities,” and it made state
and local preparedness awards contingent upon an explicit mecha-
nism, such as an advisory committee, “to obtain public comment
and input” on emergency plans and their implementation. 
▲ HSPD-21 identified community resilience as one of the “4 most
critical components of public health and medical preparedness,”
along with biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, and
mass casualty care.
Concerns:
▲ Public engagement in emergency planning remains low.   
▲ The National Advisory Committee on Children and Terrorism,
which the U.S. Congress established in 2002, expired after one
year.  Under PAHPA the needs of children are lumped together
with “at-risk” populations. 
▲ State and local preparedness grants place a priority on mass risk
communication capabilities rather than the time and labor-inten-
sive techniques for actively engaging local opinion leaders and
civic groups in preparedness (i.e., community engagement). 
Some Key 2007 Public Health Threats
February 2007 Salmonella contamination in peanut butter.
May 2007 CDC announces that patient with suspected extensively drug-
resistant-Tuberculosis (XDR-TB) travels to Europe and back, 
prompting an international public health scare.
August 2007 Massive recall after lead paint found in toys made in China.
September 2007 Cumulative bird flu deaths among humans top 200; case fatality rate
greater than 60 percent.
October 2007 ■ E.Coli contamination in frozen hamburger meat prompts third
largest hamburger recall in USDA history.
■ California wildfires force evacuation of some 350,000 from homes
and close 2 hospitals, which requires establishment of emergency
medical response capabilities at shelters and public health
response to diminished air quality.
■ CDC reports that methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
is responsible for more than 94,000 serious infections and nearly
19,000 deaths each year.  CDC identifies MRSA as “a major public
health problem primarily related to health care, but no longer 
confined to intensive care units, acute care hospitals, or any health
care institution.”2
* The U.S. government defines “community resilience” as the ability of a community to cope and recover
from a disaster or public health emergency. This requires residents, community-based organizations, local
businesses, and government to take meaningful action before a disaster or emergency. 
92006 PANDEMIC AND ALL HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS ACT
The December 2006 passage of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417)
made headway in addressing some of the concerns Trust for America’s Health has raised in
past Ready or Not? reports. 
Accountability
Past TFAH Recommendation: The federal government must establish measurable, basic
preparedness standards for which all states should be held accountable. The performance
measures should include objective assessments and be able to gauge improvement on an
ongoing basis.    
The PAHPA Legislation:
■ Directs the Department of Health and Human Services to establish concrete 
performance measures; 
■ Requires tabletop exercises including outcomes measures, lessons learned, and future 
planning; and  
■ Limits carry-over funding, and returns unspent state preparedness funds to the HHS Secretary,
who awards it to the Hospital Preparedness Program in the state it was returned from. 
Leadership
Past TFAH Recommendation: Increased leadership and oversight is needed for U.S.
bioterrorism and public health emergency preparedness.  TFAH has urged HHS to designate
one person accountable for all public health emergency preparedness programs.  TFAH has
also advocated for state preparedness funding to be linked to state performance measures.  
The PAHPA Legislation:
■ Establishes the newly created position of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
(ASPR) who has authority over the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), Hospital
Preparedness Cooperative Agreement, Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), Emergency System
for the Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP), and who should
exercise the responsibilities and authorities of the secretary with respect to the coordination
of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI); and 
■ Directs state grantees to submit to the HHS secretary regular reports regarding the annual
conduct of drills and grantees’ performance on said drills based on standards defined by the
secretary, in addition to other information.
Surge Capacity and Workforce 
Past TFAH Recommendation: Federal government initiatives must be taken to recruit a
new generation to the public health workforce, while expanding the volunteer healthcare
workforce that would be called upon during an emergency.  
The PAHPA Legislation: 
■ Authorizes a public health workforce demonstration project for a loan repayment 
program.  Eligible participants are health professionals who agree to serve in a state 
health department that services a significant number of health professional shortage areas
or areas that are at risk of a public health emergency.   
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Modernizing Technology and Equipment
Past TFAH Recommendation: Basic technology and tools of public health must be mod-
ernized.  This includes enhanced research and development of vaccines and new diagnostic
tests, improved laboratory testing capabilities, and modernized surveillance systems.    
The PAHPA Legislation:
■ Requires the HHS secretary to develop and publish a strategic plan to integrate biodefense
and emerging infectious disease requirements with advanced research and development; and
■ Establishes the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) under
HHS to facilitate collaboration among HHS, other federal agencies, industry, and academia
to promote and financially support countermeasures. 
Public Partnering
Past TFAH Recommendation: Federal planning efforts must do a better job of recognizing
the roles and concerns of the media, the general public, and the business community.  Risk
communication and emergency planning activities need to include all segments of the popula-
tion to ensure their voices are heard and incorporated.  
The PAHPA Legislation:
■ Addresses the needs of at-risk individuals and directs HHS officials to consider these vulnerable
populations when managing programs such as the SNS and preparedness grants to states; and 
■ Makes preparedness awards to state and local health agencies contingent upon an explicit
mechanism, such as an advisory committee, “to obtain public comment and input” on 
preparedness and response plans and their implementation. 
HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (HSPD 21)  
Issued on October 18, 2007, HSPD 21 establishes a National Strategy for Public Health and
Medical Preparedness. The directive is the most recent in a series of executive orders issued since
September 11, 2001, to protect the nation in the event of terrorist attacks or other catastrophic
health events.   The directive has 4 key parts: biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, 
mass casualty care, and community resilience.3 The strategy echoes many of the requirements
set forth in PAHPA and affirms the importance of the all-hazards approach to public health 
emergency preparedness.  In addition, it establishes the Public Health and Medical Preparedness
Task Force, which will prepare and submit to the president an Implementation Plan for the 
strategy within 120 days after the date of the directive (mid-February 2008).  The cabinet-level
government Task Force will also submit yearly status reports on the implementation plan and
suggest changes to HSPD 21.  
The White House issued HSPD 21 just days after updating the National Strategy for Homeland
Security for the first time since September 11, 2001.  The revised National Strategy for
Homeland Security, issued on October 9, 2007, acknowledges the danger posed not only by
terrorism but also by nature, and tries to build on the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.
"Indeed, certain non-terrorist events that reach catastrophic levels can have significant implica-
tions for homeland security. The resulting national consequences and possible cascading effects
from these events might present potential or perceived vulnerabilities that could be exploited,
possibly eroding citizens’ confidence in our nation’s government and ultimately increasing our
vulnerability to attack. This strategy, therefore, recognizes that effective preparation
for catastrophic natural disasters and man-made disasters, while not homeland
security per se, can nevertheless increase the security of the homeland."4
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ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH TO EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
The U.S. public health system is responsible for protecting the American people from a range of potential health threats. An all-
hazards public health system is one that is able to respond to and protect citizens from the full spectrum of possible public health
emergencies, including bioterrorism and naturally occurring health threats. An all-hazards system recognizes that preparing for
one threat can have benefits that will help prepare public health departments for all potential threats.
Under an all-hazards approach, the public health system prepares for and is able to respond to unique concerns posed by different
threats. For instance, threats may be: 
■ Isolated regionally or be national or global in scope; 
■ Of limited duration or occur in prolonged waves; and 
■ Preventable and treatable through vaccines and medications, or there may be no pharmaceutical interventions available. 
EXAMPLES OF MAJOR EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
■ Agroterrorism: The “deliberate introduction of an animal
or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing
economic losses, and/or undermining stability.”5
Agroterrorism can be considered a sub-category of
“bioterrorism” and foodborne diseases.  
■ Bioterrorism: The intentional or deliberate use of germs,
biotoxins, or other biological agents that cause disease or
death in people, animals, or plants. Examples include
anthrax, smallpox, botulism, salmonella, and E. coli. 
■ Blast Injuries: Explosions, whether deliberate or accidental,
can cause multi-system, life threatening injuries among indi-
viduals and within crowds.  Blunt and penetrating injuries to
multiple organ systems are likely when an explosion occurs.
Also, unique injuries to the lungs and central nervous system
occur during explosions.  
■ Chemical terrorism: The deliberate use of chemical agents,
such as poisonous gases, arsenic, or pesticides that have toxic
effects on people, animals, or plants in order to cause illness
or death. Examples include ricin, sarin, and mustard gas.   
■ Chemical incidents and accidents: The non-deliberate
exposure of humans to harmful chemical agents, with similar
outcomes to chemical terrorism.  
■ Foodborne diseases: Animal or plant diseases, which cause
harm to humans. CDC estimates there are approximately 
75 million pathogen-induced cases of foodborne diseases
each year in the United States, causing approximately
325,000 hospitalizations and 5,000 deaths. Examples include 
botulism, salmonella, E.coli 0157:H7, shigella, and norovirus.  
■ Natural disasters: Harm can be inflicted during and after nat-
ural disasters, which can lead to the disruption of regular
healthcare and leave portions of the population with ongoing
care needs. Examples include hurricanes (such as Hurricane
Katrina), earthquakes, tornados, mudslides, fires, and tsunamis.  
■ Pandemic flu: A novel, potentially lethal strain of the flu
against which humans have no natural immunity. According
to estimates from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), a severe pandemic could result in
1.9 million deaths and 9.9 million hospitalizations in the U.S.  
■ Radiological threats: Intentional or accidentally-caused expo-
sure to radiological material. A terrorist attack could involve
the scattering of radioactive materials through the use of explo-
sives (“dirty bomb”), the destruction of a nuclear facility, the
introduction of radioactive material into a food or water supply,
and the explosion of a nuclear device near a population center.  
■ Vector-borne diseases: Diseases spread by vectors, such
as insects. Examples include the West Nile virus, Rocky
Mountain spotted fever, and malaria.  
■ Waterborne diseases: According to CDC, over 1,000
persons become ill from contaminated drinking water and
over 2,500 persons become ill from recreational water dis-
ease outbreaks annually in the U.S.6
■ Zoonotic/Animal-borne diseases: Animal diseases that can
spread to humans, and in some cases can become contagious
from human to human. Examples include Avian flu, rabies,
and SARS. 
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WHAT DOES ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS LOOK LIKE?  
The goals of 24/7 public health emergency response include: 
■ Rapid detection of emergency disease threats, including those caused by bioterrorism. 
■ Intensive investigative capabilities to quickly diagnose a rising disease threat or identify the
biological or chemical agent used in an attack. 
■ Surge capacity for mass events, including adequate facilities, equipment, supplies, and
trained health professionals. 
■ Mass containment strategies, including pharmaceuticals needed for wide-scale vaccination,
antibiotic, or antidote administration and isolation and quarantining when necessary. 
■ Streamlined and effective communication channels so health workers can swiftly and
accurately communicate with each other, other front line workers, and the public about 1)
the nature of an emergency or attack, 2) the risk of exposure and how to seek treatment
when needed, and 3) any actions they or their families should take to protect themselves. 
■ Communications must also be able to reach and take into consideration at-risk populations. 
■ An informed and involved public that can provide material and moral support to professional
responders, and can render aid when necessary to friends, family, neighbors, and associates.
What it will take to achieve basic levels of preparedness:
■ Leadership, planning, and coordination: An established chain-of-command and well
defined roles and responsibilities for seamless operation across different medical and logisti-
cal functions and among federal, state, and local authorities during crisis situations, including
police, public safety officials, and other first responders. 
■ An expert and fully-staffed workforce: Highly trained and adequate numbers of public
health professionals, including healthcare providers, epidemiologists, lab scientists, and
other experts, in addition to back-up workers for surge capacity conditions. 
■ Modernized technology: State-of-the-art laboratory equipment, information collection,
and health tracking systems. 
■ Pre-planned, safety-first rapid emergency response capabilities and precautions:
Tested plans and safety precautions to mitigate potential harm to communities, public
health professionals, and first responders. 
■ Immediate, streamlined communications capabilities: Coordinated, integrated communi-
cations among all parts of the public health system, all frontline responders, and with the public.
Must include back-up systems in the event of power loss or overloaded wireless channels. 
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FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH JURISDICTIONS
The federal role: Includes policymaking, the financing of activities, overseeing national disease pre-
vention efforts, collecting and disseminating health information, building capacity, and directly man-
aging some services.7 Some public health capabilities, such as the Strategic National Stockpile
(SNS), are federal assets managed by federal agencies that are available to supplement a state’s and
community’s response to a public health emergency that overwhelms or may overwhelm their
capabilities.  Public health functions are widely diffused across 8 federal agencies and 2 offices.  
State and local roles: Under U.S. law, state governments have primary responsibility for the health
of their citizens. Constitutional “police powers” give states the ability to enact laws and issue regu-
lations to protect, preserve, and promote the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. In most
states, state laws charge local governments with responsibility for the health of their citizens. 
Some of the ongoing problems resulting from this diffused structure include: 
1. Lack of clear roles for the various state, local, and federal agencies. 
2. Differing responsibilities and capacities among the some 3,000 local health departments. 
3. Limited coordination among the levels of government, including determination of how 
federal assets would be deployed to states and localities, and across jurisdictions, such as
sharing assets and resources among states. 
4. No minimum standards, guidelines, or recommendations for capacity levels or services are
required of state and local health departments. This results in major differences in services
and competencies across state and local agencies. 
5. Lack of funding flexibility and comprehensiveness due to a federal funding structure that is 
largely based on categorical or program grants. These often restrictive grants also lack a 
system of accountability. 
6. Ineffective and random capacity to coordinate with nongovernmental organizations, 
community groups, and the private sector. 
Issues of Accreditation: In response to a 2002 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report that “called
on the public health community to consider how accreditation ultimately could prompt
improvements in the nation’s health,” the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials
(ASTHO) and the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), with
funding from CDC and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, created the Exploring
Accreditation Project.  In the fall of 2006, the project’s 25-member steering committee
released a new model for a voluntary national public health accreditation program.  Key rec-
ommendations included the development of accreditation standards to promote continuous
quality improvement and accountability for public health, including performance measures.8
Some states have taken the lead in public health accreditation.  For instance, in 2002, the
North Carolina Division of Public Health and the North Carolina Association of Local Health
Directors “undertook an initiative to develop a mandatory, standards-based system for
accrediting local public health departments throughout the state.”9 The program consists of
“an agency self[-]assessment, which includes 41 benchmarks and 145 activities; a 3-day site
visit by a multidisciplinary team of peer volunteers; and determination of accreditation status
by the North Carolina Local Health Department Accreditation Board.”10 As of July 2007, 30
local health departments in North Carolina have been accredited.11
In addition, the Multi-State Learning Collaborative II: Quality Improvement in the Context of
Assessment and Accreditation Programs began as a follow-up project to the Multi-State Learning
Collaborative for Performance and Capacity Assessment or Accreditation of Public Health
Departments.12 The project is funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and managed
by the National Network of Public Health Institutes and the Public Health Leadership Society.
In late 2006, 10 states -- Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington -- were selected from a field of 21 applicants
to assess quality improvement strategies to enhance the work of public health departments.
The Collaborative’s ultimate goal is to increase “the ability of public health agencies to protect
and improve the health of the people in the communities they serve."13
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State-By-State Health
Preparedness Indicators
And Scores
1S E C T I O N
BECAUSE THE STATES ARE THE SEAT OF MOST AUTHORITY FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
AND MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
DEPENDS, IN PART, ON THE PREPAREDNESS OF INDIVIDUAL STATES.     
— CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.14
“
”
All Americans have the right to expect fundamental health protections during public health
emergencies, no matter where they live.    
States and localities play the central role in protecting the public’s health, whether in
response to routine threats or emergencies, such as a bioterrorist attack or a natural 
disaster. Under the U.S. Constitution, each of the 50 states has primary legal jurisdiction 
and responsibility for the health of its citizens. Therefore, the chief focus of this report is 
the capacity of the states -- and the federal government’s important role in developing that
capacity.  The federal government also plays a crucial role by providing leadership, scientific
evidence, and critical resources to assure that every jurisdiction is adequately and equally
prepared.  (The federal role is discussed further in Section 2.)    
Members of the public deserve to know how prepared their states and communities are for
different types of health threats, particularly when their taxpayer dollars are being spent to
support preparedness efforts.  Currently, the American public is not equipped with enough
information to monitor and hold public officials accountable for whether their communities
are adequately prepared. 
Every State is Different, but There Are Basic Expectations Every State
Should Meet to Ensure Preparedness for All-Hazards
States differ in how they structure and deliver public health services.  In some states,
the public health system is centralized, and the state has direct control and supervision
over local health agencies.  In other states, local public health agencies developed sep-
arately from the state and are run by counties, cities, or townships, and usually report
to one or more elected officials.15
Each state has different strengths, weaknesses, and unique challenges that affect its
ability to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies.  This report assesses
how states are performing with respect to meeting their preparedness responsibilities.   
To help assess public health emergency preparedness capabilities, each state received a
score based on 10 key indicators, which TFAH derived from current publicly available
data. Low state scores reflecting weaknesses and challenges are not intended to be
punitive.  Rather, this report is intended to help identify where and how states can
improve or overcome obstacles to an all-hazards approach to public health prepared-
ness.  In addition, providing information about which states have particular strengths
allows others to know which states to turn to for best practices and models to guide
their own preparedness efforts. 
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State Scores 
Despite allocation of more than $7 billion in
federal public health preparedness funds to
states and localities over the past 6 years, reli-
able, valid performance measures to evaluate
emergency preparedness are lacking.  What lit-
tle data is collected on public health prepared-
ness generally is not made publicly available.    
TFAH, therefore, has annually developed 10
indicators focused on key areas of prepared-
ness using the limited data currently avail-
able for all 50 states and the District of
Columbia (D.C.). TFAH scored states on a
scale of 0 to 10 in which states received one
point for achieving an indicator or 0 points
if they did not achieve the indicator.  Zero
was the lowest possible overall score and 10
the highest.  Taken collectively, these indica-
tors offer a composite snapshot of prepared-
ness including strengths and vulnerabilities.   
TFAH has repeatedly called for the govern-
ment to develop national performance stan-
dards and to publicly release information on
a routine basis about the states’ perform-
ance in meeting these standards.  The indi-
cators in this report were selected based on:  
■ Reflection of a fundamental, systemic
public health need; 
■ Consultation with key experts about areas
important to serving basic public health
emergency needs; and 
■ The availability of state level data that
were verified through independent
means or in consultation with states.  
Scores focus on relative achievements in
areas of preparedness, and highlight areas
where increased prioritization and invest-
ment must be made to address problems.
TFAH is only able to assess states compara-
tively where there are data available for all
50 states and D.C.  Many states have taken
action in other areas of preparedness or
may be in the process of increasing certain
capabilities not reflected in this report. 
17
Number of Indicators Color
6
7
8
9
10
WA 
NV
AZ
CO
NE 
ND
MN
WI
IL 
KY VA 
NY 
HI 
MD 
DC 
DE 
NJ 
NH 
VT 
MA 
RI 
CT 
NC
LA 
AR 
MS AL 
SD 
KS MO 
TN 
GA 
SC
FL 
IN OH 
WV
PA 
ME 
MI 
IA 
OK 
TX
NM 
OR
ID 
MT 
WY 
UT
AK
CA
10  
(8 states)
Hawaii
Illinois
Kentucky
Nebraska
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Virginia
9  
(15 states)
Alabama
Colorado
Delaware
Georgia
Indiana
Kansas
Michigan
Missouri
New Hampshire
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Utah
Vermont
8  
(14 states) & D.C.
Alaska
Arizona
California
Connecticut
D.C.
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Minnesota
New Mexico
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Texas
West Virginia
7  
(8 states)
Arkansas
Florida
Idaho
Massachusetts
Montana
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Washington
6  
(5 states)
Iowa
Mississippi
Nevada
Wisconsin
Wyoming
SCORES BY STATE
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Has adequate Purchased a Has sufficient Has capability Has a  Has laws Held an Met or Increased or Increased or 
plans to portion of capabilities to provide disease that address emergency exceeded 14 maintained maintained 
distribute their share to test for 24/7 tracking one or both preparedness Medical seasonal flu level of 
emergency of federally- biological coverage to system to of 2 critical exercise Reserve vaccination funding for 
States vaccines, subsidized or threats analyze collect and legal elements in 2007 with Corp rate for public health 
antidotes unsubsidized samples monitor data to extend health volunteers adults over services from 
and  medical antivirals electronically liability to department for every age 65 FY 2005-06 2007
supplies from via the healthcare officials and 100,000 to Total 
the Strategic Internet volunteers the state citizens FY 2006-07 Score
National National
Stockpile Guard
Alabama ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Alaska ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Arizona ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Arkansas ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 7
California ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Colorado ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Connecticut ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Delaware ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
District of Columbia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Florida ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 7
Georgia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Hawaii ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10
Idaho ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 7
Illinois ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10
Indiana ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Iowa ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 6
Kansas ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Kentucky ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10
Louisiana ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Maine ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Maryland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Massachusetts ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 7
Michigan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Minnesota ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Mississippi ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 6
Missouri ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Montana ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 7
Nebraska ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10
Nevada ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 6
New Hampshire ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
New Jersey ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10
New Mexico ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
New York ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
North Carolina ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
North Dakota ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Ohio ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Oklahoma ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Oregon ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Pennsylvania ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10
Rhode Island ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 7
South Carolina ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
South Dakota ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 7
Tennessee ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10
Texas ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Utah ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Vermont ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 9
Virginia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 10
Washington ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 7
West Virginia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 8
Wisconsin ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 6
Wyoming ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 6
Totals 40+DC 43+DC 44 49 38+DC 29+DC 50+DC 37+DC 39+DC 44+DC
STATE PREPAREDNESS SCORES
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Some indicators reflect states’ use of funds
received through bioterrorism and public health
“cooperative agreement” grants from the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) at the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), other health capacity readiness pro-
grams, and state public health funds for health
emergency preparedness.  (For more informa-
tion see Appendix A: CDC and ASPR
Preparedness Grants by State and Indicator 10
for state public health budget information.)
Other indicators, however, illustrate the breadth
of all-hazards public health preparedness and
examine state laws and state collaboration with
planning partners.    
Data from these indicators were drawn from
a range of publicly available sources, includ-
ing CDC, a survey conducted by the
Association of Public Health Laboratories
(APHL), public announcements from states,
and interviews with government officials. 
Indicators  What the Indicators Measure 
1. Mass Distribution -- Strategic National Stockpile -- Does the This indicator assesses a state’s emergency response plan to quickly 
state have an adequate plan to distribute emergency vaccines, antidotes, provide medications to communities during emergencies. 
and medical supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)? 
2. Mass Distribution -- Antiviral Stockpiling -- Did the state This indicator assesses the state’s ability to provide antivirals to key 
purchase a portion of its share of federally subsidized or unsubsidized personnel (healthcare workers, first responders) and high-risk 
antiviral drugs to stockpile for use during an influenza pandemic? populations during an influenza pandemic.   
3. Public Health Laboratories --  Bio-Threat Testing -- Does the This indicator demonstrates states’ abilities to quickly identify a bioterror 
state lab director report having sufficient laboratory capabilities attack, substances that may be used in an attack, or a major infectious 
to test for biological threats?  disease outbreak.  Identification of an outbreak and individuals who have
been exposed or are symptomatic drives decisions about treatment and 
containment.  The need for bio-lab capabilities was evident during the
anthrax attacks of 2001.   
4. Public Health Laboratories -- Workforce Surge This indicator reflects whether states have planned for workforce 
Preparedness -- If needed in an emergency, does the state public surge capacity in the event of a bioterrorist attack or pandemic 
health laboratory have the capability to provide 24/7 coverage influenza outbreak.   
to analyze samples? 
5. Biosurveillance -- Does the state use a disease surveillance system This indicator demonstrates information about which states track health 
that is compatible with CDC’s national system, including integrating data threats in a manner compatible with the standards of CDC’s National 
from multiple sources, using electronic lab reporting, and using an Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).  This system makes it 
Internet browser? possible to quickly identify and track outbreaks and share the information in
a consistent way across health agencies and states. 
6. Healthcare Volunteer Liability Protection -- Does the state This indicator helps evaluate states’ abilities to call up a healthcare volunteer 
have laws that reduce or limit the liability exposure for healthcare workforce in the event of a public health emergency.  The lack of liability 
volunteers who serve in a public health emergency? protection is a serious deterrent to many volunteers who may want to offer
their healthcare services but are fearful of doing so without clear liability laws.  
7. Emergency Preparedness Drills -- Does the state health All state pandemic preparedness plans envision a role for the National 
department engage the state National Guard in public health Guard in the event of an outbreak.  This indicator illustrates whether 
emergency preparedness drills or training exercises? states have exercised this portion of their plans.
8. Community Resiliency -- Does the state meet a minimum threshold This indicator demonstrates states’ preparedness in 2 main ways.  First, 
of Medical Reserve Corps volunteers per 100,000 persons? volunteers have to meet certain federally defined criteria to be formally des-
ignated at MRC members.  Second, MRC designation suggests the impor-
tance of building and sustaining an infrastructure for citizen involvement.
9. Public Health Progress -- Seniors’ Seasonal Flu Vaccination -- Immunizing seniors against the seasonal flu is a public health priority, since 
Did the state increase its rates for immunizing adults aged 65 and older seniors are at a high risk for developing serious health complications as a 
for the seasonal flu? result of contracting the flu.  Seasonal flu vaccination efforts are also viewed
as a way to help communities better prepare for larger public health emer-
gencies, such as a pandemic flu outbreak, that would require mass or target-
ed vaccinations or distribution of medications.  This indicator helps measure
both public health concerns.  It examines a state’s progress over time. 
10.  Funding Commitment -- Did the state maintain or increase This indicator, adjusted for inflation, demonstrates states’ commitment to 
funding for public health programs for FY 2005-06 to FY 2006-07? funding public health programs, which support the infrastructure needed to
adequately respond to emergencies.
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INADEQUATE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH PREPAREDNESS  
For the past 5 years, TFAH has issued Ready or
Not? reports.  Although these reports also con-
tained 10 indicators for state public health emer-
gency preparedness, they are not the same indi-
cators from year to year. Indicators are adapted
annually to reflect changing expectations for pre-
paredness and changes in the state preparedness
data that are made publicly available annually.    
TFAH has repeatedly called for greater avail-
ability of data from both federal and state gov-
ernments to better inform the American people
about how prepared the country and their
states and local communities are to meet health
threats and hold public officials accountable.  
Although the federal government has set
broad goals and objectives for homeland
security, including public health emergency
preparedness, it has yet to develop specific,
outcome-oriented goals and objectives by
which to measure preparedness.  Instead, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) rely on 6 performance measures that
it collects and disseminates on an aggregate
basis, without sharing state-specific data.
These measures are heavily focused on
process-oriented objectives and not on out-
come-oriented objectives.  For example, one
of the performance measures evaluates the
“time to complete a draft of an After-Action
Report/Improvement Plan.”16 Although it is
important to have timely evaluations of drills
and exercises, a more useful, outcome-ori-
ented performance measure would be to
evaluate how well the state health depart-
ment performed on certain tasks during the
drill, for example “number of patients
screened and vaccinated for seasonal influen-
za during a drive-through vaccination clinic.”   
CDC has said that it is developing, in coordina-
tion with research organizations and universi-
ties, a series of new performance measures that
it plans to roll out in 2009.  These new meas-
ures will incorporate more drills and exercises
to ensure that states’ “paper plans” actually can
deliver in a public health emergency.  
In the absence of government-supported
and publicly available data, the report con-
centrates on 10 measurable performance
indicators from a variety of public sources
to help supply policymakers and the public
with information about the nation’s pre-
paredness for health emergencies.
Indicator 1: MASS DISTRIBUTION -- STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE
FINDING:  Ten states do not have adequate plans to distribute emergency vaccines, 
antidotes, and medical supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
40 states and D.C. scored 60 and above on
CDC’s new SNS evaluation tool OR previ-
ously achieved a “green” or “green minus”
status on the old SNS rating scale for 
delivery and administration capabilities 
(1 point)
Alabama* Iowa New York
Alaska Kansas North Dakota
Arkansas Kentucky* Ohio
Arizona Louisiana Oklahoma
California Massachusetts Oregon
Colorado Michigan Pennsylvania
Connecticut Minnesota Rhode Island
Delaware Mississippi Tennessee
D.C. Missouri Texas
Florida Montana Utah
Hawaii Nebraska Vermont
Idaho New Hampshire Virginia
Illinois New Jersey Washington*
Indiana New Mexico
10 states scored below 60 on CDC’s new
SNS evaluation tool OR previously failed
to achieve a “green” or “green minus”
status on the old SNS rating scale for
delivery and administration capabilities
(0 points)
Arkansas South Carolina
Georgia South Dakota^
Maine West Virginia
Maryland^ Wisconsin
North Carolina+ Wyoming
Sources:  Public records and State Health Officials  * State scored green + or -- under old SNS evaluation system. ^ State
was recently evaluated but its score was unavailable as of November 30, 2007 AND the state did not score green + or --
under the old evaluation system. + State will be evaluated in January 2008
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The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is a
national repository of antibiotics, chemical
antidotes, antiviral drugs, antitoxins, life-sup-
port medications, intravenous (IV) adminis-
tration, airway maintenance supplies, and
medical and surgical items. The SNS is
designed to supplement and re-supply state
and local public health agencies in the event
of a national emergency anywhere and at any-
time within the United States or its territories.
As a condition of federal public health pre-
paredness grants, states were required to
develop a plan and then exercise the receipt
and distribution of SNS contents.17
Until September 2006, CDC measured
states’ preparedness to distribute SNS
materiel using a “stop-light” color system,
for which green represented the highest
level of preparedness, amber the middle,
and red the lowest.18 CDC never released
specific criteria for achieving different SNS
color status levels. 
Beginning in September 2006, HHS/ASPR
commissioned RAND to develop a new sys-
tem to measure states’ SNS distribution pre-
paredness plans based on a 0-to-100 scale.
The evaluation relies primarily on a check-
list tool for evaluating SNS plans and sup-
porting documents.  The evaluation takes
place over the course of one day during an
on-site CDC staff visit.19 There are 13 func-
tions on which states are evaluated:20
1. Developing a stockpile plan;  
2. Management of stockpile; 
3. Requesting stockpile; 
4. Tactical communication; 
5. Public information and communication; 
6. Security; 
7. Receipt, storage, and staging of stockpile; 
8. Controlling stockpile inventory; 
9. Repackaging stockpile medications; 
10. Distribution of medications; 
11. Dispensing prophylaxis; 
12. Treatment center coordination; and 
13. Training-exercise and evaluation. 
Items on the checklist are combined into an
overall score that results in jurisdictions
being rated on a 0-to-100 scale.21 CDC has
not released the specific grading criteria it
uses for awarding points nor has it given the
public any basis for interpreting these new
scores.  In the absence of both, TFAH set a
threshold of 60 out of 100 points and award-
ed states that scored 60 or higher a point. 
The new scoring system assesses planning
and management of the stockpile.  It does
n o t reflect the actual capacity of the state to
deploy countermeasures and other supplies
from the SNS.  
CDC officials report that, as of November 20,
2007, 48 states and all 4 separately funded
cities have undergone the one day evaluation
using the new 100-point scale.22 Given that not
all 50 states had the opportunity to be evaluat-
ed under the new 100-point system by the time
the Ready or Not? 2007 report went to press,
states that previously achieved ‘green’ or
‘green minus’ status under the old stop-light
system also received a point for this indicator.   
TFAH reviewed public announcements
issued by states and, with the assistance of the
Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials (ASTHO), queried state health offi-
cials to determine the SNS status of states.  
Distribution of States’ Strategic
National Stockpile Technical Assistance
Review Scores 
>90  15 
80 to 89 13 
70 to 79 2 
60 to 69 8 
<59 3 
Note:  According to CDC, a total of 48 states and 4
major U.S. cities, including, D.C., were evaluated under
the new SNS TAR as of November 2007.  However,
only 43 states and D.C. reported this to TFAH.   The
tallies above represent the distribution of scores for the
40 states and D.C. reviewed under the new SNS TAR
who provided that information to TFAH.  Two other
states confirmed to TFAH that they recently had been
evaluated but did not yet have their scores.  
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THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (SNS)  
The SNS is positioned in undisclosed locations throughout the United States and configured to
provide a flexible response strategy.  Included in the formulary are a dozen 12-hour Push
Packages which contain over 50 tons of broad spectrum antibiotics and medical materiel.
These assets are pre-configured in deployable containers and strategically located to enable
rapid delivery to the site of a national emergency within 12 hours of the federal decision 
to deploy.    
The majority of the SNS formulary is maintained in managed inventory.  Like the 12-hour
Push Packages, these assets are also strategically located around the nation and provide the
ability to configure and deliver significant quantities of pharmaceuticals and medical materiel as
an initial response if the nature of the public health emergency is well defined, or as follow-on
to a “push package” delivery.  Delivery of assets from managed inventory are planned to begin
arriving within 24 to 36 hours after the federal decision to deploy them.  Quantities in the
SNS change based on national planning guidance and prioritization, modeling scenarios, and
standard inventory management procedures.  Some of the contents of the national 
stockpile include:23
■ Enough smallpox vaccine to protect 300 million people, or every man, woman, 
and child in America; 
■ Over 41 million regimens of countermeasures against anthrax;  
■ Therapeutic anthrax antitoxins to treat symptomatic patients; 
■ Countermeasures to address radiation exposure including over 460,000 combined doses of
Calcium-DTPA (Diethylenetriamine pentaacetate) and Zinc-DTPA; and 
■ 1.7 million doses of liquid potassium iodide (KI) in a formulation that is more suitable for
young children for use in the event of a release of radioiodines.  
The SNS also has been increasing its supply of countermeasures that could be used during an
influenza pandemic.  For example, the Department of Health and Human Services has allocat-
ed a total of $1.1 billion for the purchase of antiviral medications, $660 million of which have
been obligated as of May 2007.  Overall, as of September 20, 2007, the SNS contained the
following pandemic flu countermeasures:24
■ 30.8 million regimens of Oseltamivir capsules;  
■ 6.2 million regimens of Zanamivir;  
■ 104.4 million N95 respirators; and 
■ 51.5 million surgical masks.  
To help states develop their own antiviral drug stockpiles, HHS designated $170 million to
subsidize the purchase of up to 31 million treatment courses of Tamiflu (oseltamivir) and
Relenza (zanamivir) by CDC Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative
agreement grantees.  HHS will subsidize 25 percent of the cost, and grantees will pay the
other 75 percent.  Forty-three states and D.C. have made a good faith effort to purchase
some, if not all, of their allotment of federally-subsidized antivirals.  Eighteen states have 
purchased their entire allocation, while 15 states purchased unsubsidized treatment courses. 
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SNS and Children  
There are currently only 6,000 regimens of pediatric antiviral suspension in the Strategic
National Stockpile (SNS) to treat a potential pandemic flu for the nation’s 73.6 million chil-
dren.25 For planning purposes the federal government has assumed that antivirals would be
needed for at least 25 percent of the population.  However, they have not set any target for
stockpiling pediatric antivirals even though children and adolescents are known to often
be disproportionately affected by contagious respiratory illnesses. (See also Section 5
of this report regarding the care and special needs of children during a pandemic.) 
Government Oversight  
An October 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report identified a major issue of
concern with regard to anthrax vaccines in the SNS.  According to the report, beginning in
2008, several lots of BioThrax will begin to expire.  Annual replacement costs of the anthrax
vaccine are estimated at $100 million per year in lost stockpile.  Keith Rhodes, lead author of
the GAO report, testified before Congress that “ASPR lacks an effective strategy to minimize
waste. Vaccine valued at more than $12 million has already expired and is no longer usable.
Without an effective management strategy in the future, over $100 million per year could be
lost for the life of the licensed anthrax vaccine currently in the stockpile.”26
One remedy would be to collaborate with the Department of Defense (DOD), which routinely
inoculates troops against anthrax.  According to the GAO, DOD could use SNS stockpiled anthrax
vaccine before it expires.  DOD would replace what it uses with new purchases of vaccine.  DOD
demand for vaccine would keep the stockpile from expiring as good vaccines would be distributed
each year to new recruits while fresh stock would enter into the SNS.27 HHS and DOD have
been discussing this type of collaboration and expect to reach an agreement in the near future.
Other Concerns  
■ The 460,000 combined doses of Calcium-DTPA (Diethylenetriamine pentaacetate) and
Zinc-DTPA are far short of what would be needed to address radiation exposure from a
catastrophic nuclear event in any large U.S. city; 
■ The 1.7 million doses of liquid potassium iodide (KI) in a formulation suitable for young chil-
dren are stored in 12 disparate locations around the country.  If there were any sort of
radiological attack, parents and caretakers would need to administer this countermeasure
to children in a matter of hours. Will the government be able to mobilize the SNS in
enough time to reach the affected children? ; and 
■ The quantity of non-pharmaceutical interventions for pandemic influenza, such as N95 
respirators and surgical masks, falls far short of what is needed.  The U.S. stockpile 
contains 104.4 million N95 respirators and 51.5 million surgical masks, while France, 
with a population one-fifth that of the U.S., has stockpiled 300 million N95s and one 
billion surgical masks.28
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WHY PREPAREDNESS PLANS AREN’T ENOUGH  
"Exercises and drills test the ability of jurisdictions to execute their plans, and they detect
planning gaps.  Consequently, assessments of response capability rest not only on assess-
ments of planning, but also on assessments of exercise programs and integration of findings
into subsequent rounds of planning,” Congressional Research Service.29
There are 3 key reasons to measure public health emergency preparedness:  
1. Performance measures allow planners and policy makers to focus on the most critical
aspects of emergency planning;  
2. Performance measures hold officials accountable to the public; and  
3. Well-designed performance measures allow evaluators to identify and address deficiencies.30
Often, emergency plans are evaluated using written assessments that include surveys, check-
lists, and written reports.  According to Christopher Nelson, senior scientist at RAND, writ-
ten evaluations can not assess how well volunteers and public health officials would imple-
ment plans. “The distinguishing characteristic of written assessments is that they rely mostly
on self-reported judgments of those being assessed.”31 Written assessments are favored by
many preparedness officials because they tend to be inexpensive, especially when compared
to the cost of holding live exercises or drills.  A growing number of experts, however, both
within and outside of government, are urging federal, state, and local emergency planners to
incorporate drills and real-time exercises into their preparedness training and evaluation.
RAND is one of the research organizations working on developing new, drill-based perform-
ance measures in collaboration with HHS and CDC.    
The PAHPA legislation ties state and local preparedness funding to states’ incorporation of
drills and exercises to test emergency preparedness.  While many public health experts
applaud this, they caution that simply holding an exercise or drill does not mean the state or
local government would be able to respond adequately in a real emergency situation.  One
major flaw with the current drilling system is a lack of clear criteria for evaluating the quality
of performance.  At present, there are no evidence-based guidelines from the federal govern-
ment regarding conduct of an emergency preparedness exercise in terms of what outcomes
are expected from each drill.  
Until such guidance is developed, one way state and local planners can incorporate more drills
into their preparedness evaluations is to use so-called embedded assessments.  This type of
exercise makes use of ongoing public health activities, such as an annual flu clinic, to measure
a state’s or locality’s ability to vaccinate populations against smallpox or influenza.  Planners
can use the results of this embedded assessment to determine where bottlenecks occur or
whether other barriers to a successful deployment of vaccine exist.   
Embedded Assessments  
Lyon County, Kansas: The Flint Hills Community Health Department in Lyon County,
Kansas conducted a 9-hour pandemic flu exercise on October 11, 2007.32 The exercise
offered a seasonal flu shot for $15 to anyone in the community who wanted one and
gave healthcare workers, law enforcement, government officials, and other volunteers
the practice they need to prepare for a pandemic influenza or other infectious disease
outbreaks.  In the first hour alone, 313 people completed a background information
form for screening before being directed to one of the flu shot stations located in the
building.  The high volume of patients seeking treatment was a good experience for
planners who might need to treat a significantly higher amount of patients in a pandem-
ic.  By the end of the day, 1,584 people had been screened and vaccinated. 
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Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response.  * Note:  State purchases do not include antivirals purchased
by Los Angeles County, Chicago, and New York City.  These 3 entities received their own allocation of federally-subsidized antivirals
based on their population.  See Appendix B: Influenza Antiviral Drug Purchases by States and Entities  for a complete breakdown 
of state and entity purchases.  ** Note: The percent reflects total state antiviral purchases and may include unsubsidized state 
purchases, which is why some states exceed 100% of their federally-subsidized allocation.
Indicator 2: MASS DISTRIBUTION -- STATE ANTIVIRAL PURCHASES
FINDING:  Forty-three states and D.C. have purchased antivirals to stockpile for use during an
influenza pandemic.
43 states and D.C. have purchased a portion of 7 states have NOT purchased any portion of 
their shares of federally-subsidized or their shares of federally-subsidized or 
unsubsidized antiviral drugs to stockpile for use unsubsidized antiviral drugs to stockpile for 
during aninfluenza pandemic (1 point) use during an influenza pandemic (0 points)
State All Antivirals Percent of State All Antivirals Percent of 
Purchased by Allocation Purchased by Allocation 
Entity as of Purchased** Entity as of Purchased **
11/13/07 11/13/07
Alabama 499,967 106% Colorado 0 0% 
Alaska 39,740 58% Connecticut 0 0% 
Arizona 67,717 12% Florida 0 0% 
Arkansas 286,398 100% Massachusetts 0 0% 
California* 2,722,481 101% Mississippi 0 0% 
Delaware 121,164 141% North Dakota 0 0% 
D.C. 45,000 77% Rhode Island 0 0% 
Georgia 474,022 52% 
Hawaii 172,487 132%   
Idaho 8,567 6%    
Illinois* 512,228 50%
Indiana 650,912 100%    
Iowa 308,887 100%    
Kansas 286,084 100%    
Kentucky 216,224 50%    
Louisiana 471,804 100%    
Maine 137,457 100%    
Maryland 210,727 36%    
Michigan 1,076,950 102%    
Minnesota 117,287 22%    
Missouri 600,477 100%    
Montana 8,174 8%    
Nebraska 70,102 38%    
Nevada 135,514 58%    
New Hampshire 135,305 100%    
New Jersey 831,600 92%    
New Mexico 68,930 35%    
New York* 1,277,889 109%   
North Carolina 560,380 63%    
Ohio 1,277,770 106%    
Oklahoma 49,390 13%    
Oregon 13,300 4%    
Pennsylvania 974,081 75% 
South Carolina 349,499 80%    
South Dakota 80,310 100%    
Tennessee 47,124 8%    
Texas 906,140 39%    
Utah 50,668 21%    
Vermont 52,021 80%    
Virginia 816,312 106%    
Washington 293,073 46%    
West Virginia 110,095 58%    
Wisconsin 152,979 27%    
Wyoming 52,718 100% 
The U.S. government’s current goal is to
stockpile 81 million treatment courses of
antiviral drugs.  The Bush Administration
has stated that this goal will be a shared
responsibility among the federal and state
governments.  A major concern of top fed-
eral officials, however, including HHS
Secretary Michael Leavitt is that states are
not meeting their obligations.  “I worry
about local and state governments and pri-
vate entities relying on the federal govern-
ment instead of preparing themselves.  Our
national stockpiles are set up to cover gaps,
not to provide everything for everybody.”33
In order to encourage states to develop
their own antiviral drug stockpiles, HHS
designated $170 million to subsidize the
purchase of up to 31 million treatment
courses of Tamiflu (oseltamivir) and
Relenza (zanamivir) by CDC Public Health
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) coopera-
tive agreement grantees.  HHS will subsidize
25 percent of the cost, and states will pay the
other 75 percent, or $510 million.34
Forty-three states and D.C. have made a
good faith effort to purchase some, if not
all, of their allotment of federally-subsidized
antivirals.  Eighteen states purchased their
entire allocation, while 15 states purchased
unsubsidized treatment courses.  The 7
states that failed to purchase any antivirals
are: Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Dakota,
and Rhode Island.  
In addition to the 50 states and D.C., 3 U.S.
metropolitan areas, the U.S. Territories, and
the Freely Associated States of the Pacific were
allocated a portion of federally-subsidized
antivirals.  Of these entities, Los Angeles
County and Puerto Rico purchased their
entire allotment, while Chicago purchased
close to two-thirds of its allotment.  (See
Appendix B: Influenza Antiviral Drug
Purchases by States and Entities for a complete
breakdown of state and entity purchases.)
While public health emergency prepared-
ness is largely regarded as a partnership
among the federal government and the
states and local governments, there are seri-
ous concerns associated with sharing the
burden of antiviral stockpiling.  
First, not all states have the fiscal resources to
purchase their share of antivirals.  Second,
some elected state officials have determined
that antiviral stockpiling is not a priority.
Finally, state officials have indicated that bet-
ter inventory management, including the
storage, rotation, and shelf-life extension
strategies, are of critical concern to them.36
All 3 of these barriers are likely to lead to
geographic inequities in terms of antiviral
treatment during a pandemic. 
In addition, HHS is preparing a draft of new
recommendations on antiviral stockpiling.
Instead of aiming to stockpile enough antivi-
rals to treat 25 percent of the population, the
new draft recommendations call for much
broader use of antivirals.  This includes the
post-exposure prophylaxis treatment of house-
hold contacts of people who are infected with
the pandemic influenza virus, as well as pre-
exposure prophylaxis treatment of healthcare
workers and other essential personnel likely to
come into contact with infected persons.  
Given the states’ difficulties in meeting their
commitments under the current guidelines,
it is unlikely they will be able to meet future
commitments. Containment of a pandemic
must be a national priority.  Any differences
in capacity on a state-by-state basis place the
entire nation at risk. 
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Public health laboratories are responsible for
identifying naturally occurring and man-
made health threats.  Their identification
and diagnosis process is crucial for develop-
ing strategies to contain the spread of illness
and facilitate the rapid treatment of diseases.  
Forty-four states have adequate capacity to
conduct laboratory tests during a public
health emergency.  Among the 44 states
reporting adequate BSL-3 labs, 5 states
improved their biological testing capabilities
since 2006. The 5 states are Alaska, Colorado,
Connecticut, Maryland, and Ohio.
Six states and D.C. report they do not have
sufficient capacity to conduct laboratory tests
during a bioterrorism or infectious disease
emergency.  Among these respondents, 2
states reported having BSL-3 capabilities in
the 2006 survey.  Massachusetts and Oregon
both experienced a downgrade in BSL-3
capacity.  State public health lab directors
cited renovations, decreasing laboratory
space and increasing test demand as the rea-
sons for this change in status.  Oregon will
open a brand new lab in January 2008 with
ample BSL-3 space, while Massachusetts
reassessed its BSL-3 facilities and determined
that its current BSL-3 capacity is insufficient
to manage the state’s current needs, much
less a large-scale outbreak. 
Source:  APHL November 2007 survey
Indicator 3: PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES -- BIO-THREAT TESTING 
FINDING:  Six states and D.C. report that they do not have adequate bio-threat response 
laboratory capabilities (facilities, technology, and/or equipment).
44 states report that they do have
adequate bio-safety level 3 (BSL-3)
laboratories to meet anticipated pre-
paredness and response needs as out-
lined in their state’s emergency pre-
paredness plan 
(1 point)
Alabama Nebraska
Alaska Nevada
Arizona New Hampshire
Arkansas New Jersey
California New Mexico
Colorado New York
Connecticut North Carolina
Delaware North Dakota
Florida Ohio
Georgia Oklahoma
Hawaii Pennsylvania
Illinois South Carolina
Indiana South Dakota
Kentucky Tennessee
Kansas Texas
Maine Utah 
Maryland Vermont
Michigan Virginia
Minnesota Washington
Mississippi West Virginia
Missouri Wisconsin
Montana Wyoming
6 states and D.C. report they do
NOT have adequate bio-safety level 3
(BSL-3) laboratories to meet antici-
pated preparedness and response
needs as outlined in their state’s
emergency preparedness plan 
(0 points)
D.C. 
Idaho 
Iowa 
Louisiana 
Massachusetts 
Oregon 
Rhode Island 
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LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK (LRN)  
Instead of bolstering lab capacity in each state, a Laboratory Response Network (LRN) was
established in 1999 to provide “surge capacity” support to states.  Overseen by CDC, the
LRN is an integrated network of approximately 160 labs encompassing federal, state, local,
veterinary, military, environmental, food testing, and international labs.39
The LRN provides emergency assistance and support through the pooling of resources and
personnel based on cooperative agreements.  During the anthrax attacks of 2001, the nation’s
public health laboratories conducted over one million separate anthrax tests.  Since then, pub-
lic health laboratories have routinely tested samples to rule out bioterrorism in support of law
enforcement and public health agencies.  According to the Association of Public Health
Laboratories, between August 31, 2005 and August 30, 2006, state public health laboratories
received more than 2,300 undetermined samples for all-hazards screening in addition to some
2,400 samples to test for potential agents of biological terrorism.40
The LRN has also played an important role in disease surveillance including the development
and deployment of a new test that can detect the H5N1 avian flu virus.  The new test
received FDA approval in February 2006 and has been distributed to LRN labs nationwide.41
Despite the reversal of 2 states, overall much
progress has been made since 2003, when
44 states did not have sufficient bio-safety
level 3 (BSL-3) capabilities.  
Bioterrorism lab capacity includes having
enough equipment and staff to safely han-
dle “infectious agents that may cause serious
or potentially lethal disease as a result of
exposure” via inhalation.36 Labs with this
capacity are designated with a BSL-3 rating.  
The nation’s public health laboratories
encompass a “loose network of federal, state,
and local laboratories that work in undefined
collaboration with private clinical laborato-
ries.”37 The 2001 anthrax attacks demonstrat-
ed the need to upgrade and continue to
maintain public health labs as they were
quickly overwhelmed with samples from
around the country.  In many cases, they were
left to conduct tests with inadequate equip-
ment, facilities, and expert staff, leaving the
nation more vulnerable and slower to
respond.  Response time would have been
faster if lab capacity had been upgraded.38
FEDERAL FUNDING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LABS  
The CDC budget for FY 2007 included $27 million for upgrading state and local public health
laboratory capacity.  The funds were used to:  
■ Respond rapidly and effectively to a terrorist event or public health emergency; 
■ Purchase new instrumentation, adopt new technologies and develop electronic reporting; 
■ Recruit and retain laboratory personnel; 
■ Maintain outreach programs to hospital and clinical laboratories and first responders; and
■ Assure a coordinated response effort with federal partners.  
The president’s FY 2008 budget request for state and local public health laboratory upgrades
remained at $27 million, while the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) said it would
need $47 million in order to preserve state and local capacity constructed in recent years.42
In addition, APHL identifies several areas where more funding is needed, including:  
■ Expanded chemical terrorism detection; 
■ Funds for reagents, the diagnostic materials that are required to analyze suspect 
samples for biological agents; and 
■ Funding to improve public health laboratory capability to investigate or confirm radiation
sickness or genetic mutations. 
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PUBLIC HEALTH LABS -- CHEMICAL TESTING  
In light of threats posed by terrorist use of chemical agents, the LRN expanded in 2003 its
scope of work to include preparedness for acts of chemical terrorism.  The chemical LRN is
made up of 62 state, territorial, and metropolitan public health laboratories.  Only 10 of these
labs, however, are characterized as Level 1 laboratories within the chemical LRN.43 These 10
Level 1 labs are equipped to detect an expanded number of chemical agents in human speci-
mens (blood, saliva, urine), plus run analyses for mustard agents, nerve agents, and other toxic
chemicals that could be used in chemical warfare, a process known as ‘biomonitoring.’ 
Of these 10, half are ‘new’ labs that need to be brought “to analytical parity with existing
Level 1 laboratories,” a process that is expected to take 3 years.44 The 5 existing Level 1 labs
are in California, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, and Virginia.  The 5 new Level 1 labs will
be located in: Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.45 The total
number of labs capable of biomonitoring activities has remained unchanged since 2005.    
In the event of a chemical terrorist attack, labs will not only need to be able to test clinical
specimens, but also environmental samples, such as water, air, soil, or food, to determine the
source, route, and potential extent of contamination.  Very few public health laboratories,
however, are able to test for chemical warfare agents in environmental samples.  In 2006, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began developing the environmental arm of the LRN
(eLRN) which will include equipment standards, testing protocols, and training modules for
laboratory workers.  Without adequate funding, however, it is unclear how many states will
be able to upgrade their public health labs.  
According to CDC, there are over 80 chemical agents that can kill or seriously injure a 
person.46 Of these, 60 or so are toxic substances that could be used as chemical weapons 
by terrorists.  Many of these are common commercial and industrial chemicals that can be 
easily weaponized. 
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Source:  APHL November 2007 survey
Indicator 4: PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES -- SURGE PREPAREDNESS
FINDING:  Only 1 state and D.C. report that their public health laboratories do not have the 
capability to provide 24/7 coverage to analyze samples.  
49 states report that their public
health laboratories have the capability
to provide 24/7 coverage to analyze
samples (1 point)
Alabama Montana
Alaska Nebraska
Arizona Nevada
Arkansas New Hampshire
California New Jersey
Colorado New Mexico
Connecticut New York
Delaware North Carolina
Florida North Dakota
Georgia Ohio
Hawaii Oklahoma
Idaho Oregon
Illinois Pennsylvania
Indiana Rhode Island
Iowa South Carolina
Kansas South Dakota
Kentucky Tennessee
Louisiana Texas
Maine Utah
Maryland Vermont
Massachusetts Virginia
Michigan Washington
Minnesota Wisconsin
Mississippi Wyoming
Missouri 
1 state and D.C. report that their
public health laboratories do NOT
have the capability to provide 24/7
coverage to analyze samples 
(0 points)
D.C. 
West Virginia
Bioterrorism lab capacity includes having the
capability to call on staff 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week to analyze samples from bioterrorist
attacks, natural disasters, or disease outbreaks
that do not necessarily occur during the 9 to
5, Monday through Friday workday schedule.
Forty-nine states have the capability to 
provide 24/7 coverage to analyze samples.
One state and D.C. do not have this capabil-
ity and cite the lack of additional trained
personnel as a major limiting factor to 
providing 24/7 coverage.  
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Indicator 5: BIOSURVEILLANCE
FINDING:  Twelve states do not have an electronic disease surveillance system that includes an inte-
grated data repository, electronic lab reporting, and Internet-browser system that is compatible with
CDC’s system.
Delivering effective public health services
depends on timely and reliable information.
Health departments can not protect people
from existing or emerging health threats,
such as a new disease outbreak, like a pan-
demic flu, or a bioterrorist attack, without cor-
rect and pertinent information.  The lack of
timely and comprehensive data can delay the
identification of and response to serious and
mass emergency health problems.  In addi-
tion, federal, state, and local health depart-
ments and private healthcare providers must
all work together to effectively track informa-
tion about and respond to health threats.    
The National Electronic Disease Surveillance
System (NEDSS) was developed to integrate
and standardize the tracking of infectious dis-
eases.  It promotes standards-based, electronic
reporting for more rapid, accurate, and inte-
grated information.  It is one of 4 components
of the overarching Public Health Information
Network (PHIN) at CDC, which includes: 
■ Disease data entry directly through an
Internet browser-based system, thereby cre-
ating a database accessible by health inves-
tigators and public health professionals;
■ Electronic Laboratory Results (ELR)
reporting, which allows labs to report
cases to health departments; 
■ Integration of multiple health information
databases creating a single repository; and
■ Electronic messaging capabilities, allow-
ing states to share information efficiently
with CDC and other health agencies. 
Source:  CDC, ASTHO, and State Health Officials
38 states and D.C. report that they use
a disease surveillance system that is
compatible with CDC’s National
Electronic Disease Surveillance System
(NEDSS) (1 point)
Alabama New Jersey
Colorado New Mexico
Delaware New York
D.C. North Carolina
Florida North Dakota
Georgia Ohio
Hawaii Oklahoma
Idaho Oregon
Illinois Pennsylvania
Indiana Rhode Island
Kentucky South Carolina
Louisiana South Dakota
Maine Tennessee
Maryland Texas
Massachusetts Vermont
Michigan Virginia
Missouri Washington
Montana West Virginia
Nebraska Wisconsin
Nevada 
12 states report that they do NOT
use a disease surveillance system that
is compatible with CDC’s National
Electronic Disease Surveillance
System (NEDSS) (0 points)
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Connecticut 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
New Hampshire 
Utah 
Wyoming
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According to CDC, to be considered
NEDSS-compatible, states must have systems
that meet requirements for 1) an Internet
browser-based system; 2) electronic labora-
tory results (ELR) reporting; and 3) an inte-
grated data repository.  An upgrade to the
messaging component is under develop-
ment system-wide, and is, therefore, not
included among the criteria.  
In order to determine FY 2008 grant alloca-
tions, CDC’s Division of Integrated
Surveillance Systems and Services queried
State Health Departments on the status of
their Public Health Information Networks.
According to CDC’s 2007 Assessment of
States NEDSS Status, 38 states and D.C. are
NEDSS-compatible.  Twelve states are iden-
tified as non-compatible with NEDSS.  The
majority of the non-compatible states meet 2
of the 3 criteria.  These states are making
steady progress towards meeting the 
third requirement.  
The number of NEDSS-compatible states
has increased steadily since 2004 when only
18 states earned this qualification.  The
number rose to 27 in 2005 to 38 in 2006 and
38 states plus D.C. in 2007.  The District of
Columbia, Indiana, North Carolina, West
Virginia and Wisconsin became NEDSS-
compatible in 2007, however, CDC down-
graded Arizona, Kansas, New Hampshire,
and Wyoming.  In the case of Arizona, while
the state is already testing receipt of ELR
data from national labs and has made sig-
nificant progress toward implementing
ELR, it remains a component of their system
architecture that is not yet completed,
although it seems likely that this will be
operational in 2008.  Kansas halted ELR
from the state lab for several months to
allow for a system upgrade, while New
Hampshire experienced difficulties with its
IT contractor.  In Wyoming, staffing chal-
lenges have delayed ELR implementation.  
While the FY 2008 CDC preparedness guid-
ance does not require NEDSS compatibility,
NEDSS provides a basis for national consis-
tency and compatibility and is the predomi-
nant system used by CDC.  It is currently one
of the few data points about state prepared-
ness activities that is collected and made
publicly available by CDC.
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PUBLIC HEALTH DISEASE TRACKING AND SURVEILLANCE  
The Public Health Information Network
(PHIN) is a CDC initiative to ensure all public
health jurisdictions -- federal, state, and local --
have access to information technology (IT) sys-
tems that can communicate and share data with
one another.  The 2001 anthrax attacks illustrat-
ed the necessity for IT systems to be consistent
and interconnected across the country in order
to accurately and rapidly communicate informa-
tion among health departments.  PHIN provides
the underlying technology needed to create fully
integrated IT systems across the public health
infrastructure.    
PHIN technology enables the U.S. public
health system to:    
■ Perform early event detection; 
■ Execute routine public health surveillance
and outbreak management; 
■ Connect laboratory systems; 
■ Track countermeasures and response
administration; and 
■ Issue partner communications and 
health alerts.47
The National Electronic Disease
Surveillance System (NEDSS) is the PHIN
component responsible for routine public
health surveillance.  This CDC-led initiative
“promotes the use of data and information
system standards to advance the develop-
ment of efficient, integrated, and interopera-
ble surveillance systems at federal, state and
local levels.”48 The main objective behind
NEDSS is to streamline data collection and
analysis of information that is already available
electronically.  By doing so, NEDSS aims to:  
■ Monitor and assess disease trends; 
■ Guide prevention and intervention programs; 
■ Inform public health policy; 
■ Identify issues needing public health
research; 
■ Provide information for community and
program planning; and 
■ Protect confidentiality while providing
information to those who need to know.  
NEDSS is due to replace several existing
electronic disease surveillance systems
including the National Electronic
Telecommunications Survey for Surveillance,
the HIV/AIDS reporting system, and others.
By offering the NEDSS platform, CDC has
encouraged local and state health depart-
ments to switch from paper-based case
reporting to electronic case reporting.  
While NEDSS is used to track case reporting
and lab results, BioSense is the PHIN com-
ponent used to perform early-event detec-
tion.  BioSense collects information such as
patients’ symptoms, quantities and types of
drug prescriptions, and the number of emer-
gency room visits, among other data, from
350 of the nation’s urban hospitals as well as
veterans’ hospitals and defense department
facilities.49 This type of surveillance, known
as syndromic surveillance, relies on infor-
mation available well before an official diag-
nosis or confirmed lab result.  Early-event
detection can be used to alert health officials
to possible disease outbreaks or other emer-
gency health problems such as bioterrorism.  
The major strengths of syndromic surveillance
systems, include:50
■ The ability to detect community-wide
seasonal outbreaks of influenza; 
■ Timeliness of data availability, often within
12 hours of initial activity; 
■ Completeness of data; 
■ Role in alleviating community concern
when outbreaks are occurring elsewhere; 
■ Additional case finding when an outbreak
has been identified; and 
■ Flexibility in being able to rapidly conduct
surveillance for new and emerging issues.  
Despite the promise of syndromic surveillance --
and some success at local health departments --
many public health officials say BioSense has
failed to deliver on its promises.  Three years into
its development and some $230 million later,
BioSense still “lacks real-time capability and has
issued a stream of false alarms that would be
comical were the stakes not so high.”51
A third PHIN component is the Health
Alert Network (HAN), which provides
CDC with the ability to alert state and local
public health agencies and other partners
about potential or real public health events.
All 50 states and D.C. are connected to
HAN.53 According to CDC, the partner com-
munication and alerting systems in state and
local health departments are developed to
the extent that CDC no longer measures the
percent of counties and jurisdictions that have
an internet connection. 
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Indicator 6: HEALTHCARE VOLUNTEER LIABILITY PROTECTION
FINDING:  Twenty-one states do not have statutes that address one or both of 2 critical legal elements
that extend liability to healthcare volunteers during emergencies. 
*Indicates that the state maintained statutes that meet both key criteria.
29 states and D.C. have statutes that
address one or both of 2 critical legal
elements that extend liability to
healthcare volunteers during emergen-
cies (1 point)
Alabama Minnesota*
California Missouri*
Colorado* Nebraska*
Connecticut* New Hampshire*
D.C.* New Jersey*
Georgia New York*
Hawaii North Carolina*
Illinois Oregon*
Indiana Pennsylvania
Iowa* South Carolina*
Kansas* South Dakota 
Kentucky* Tennessee*
Louisiana Utah
Maine* Virginia
Michigan* West Virginia 
21 states do NOT have statutes that
address one or both of 2 critical legal
elements that extend liability to
healthcare volunteers during emer-
gencies (0 points)
Alaska New Mexico
Arizona North Dakota
Arkansas Ohio
Delaware Oklahoma
Florida Rhode Island
Idaho Texas
Maryland Vermont
Massachusetts Washington
Mississippi Wisconsin
Montana Wyoming
Nevada
All 50 states and D.C. have some form of 
a “Good Samaritan” statute contained in
their laws.  These state laws create liability
shields for “Good Samaritans,” that is,
health care professionals or other individu-
als who come to the aid of another at the
scene of an emergency.    
There are some major limitations, however,
to existing Good Samaritan laws.  They often
only provide liability for emergency assistance
rendered at the scene of an emergency. As a
result, once assistance passes beyond the
immediate emergency stage or the scene of
assistance moves outside an emergency loca-
tion, the shield may end.  This narrow scope
presents a major challenge to public health
emergency response planners who often
need to rely on volunteers for extended peri-
ods of time, such that the help may be ren-
dered hours, days and even weeks after the
initial emergency, and often in a different
location from the scene of the incident.
Hurricane Katrina, which displaced hun-
dreds of thousands of people from the Gulf
Coast region to cities across the country, is
an example for which healthcare volunteers
treated patients away from the scene of the
public health emergency and long after the
hurricane came ashore on August 29, 2005.   
The threat of liability may keep many poten-
tial healthcare volunteers from deploying in
the event of an emergency.  Given that all
state and local preparedness plans rely on vol-
unteers to help treat patients and distribute
vaccines and medicines, among other things,
failure to address the liability issue could
severely affect a state’s disaster response.
In view of the limitations of the Good
Samaritan doctrine, this indicator focuses
on 2 critical elements that serve to separate
state statutes from longstanding Good
Samaritan doctrine:    
1. The existence of an authorized process to
allow medical and other health profes-
sionals to become designated as voluntary
health care workers acting under specific
emergency response protocols; and 
2. A shield that is tied to a declared emergency.
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TFAH awarded one point to states whose
statutes addressed either one or both of
these elements.  States that failed to address
either in a sufficiently clear manner
received 0 points.    
Seventeen states and D.C., designated with
an *, maintain statutes that meet both key
criteria. That is, the laws in these states pro-
vide both for immunity of health care vol-
unteers during emergencies and anticipate
the establishment of a formal prospective
designation process.  An additional 12 states
meet only one of the criteria. That is, these
state laws allow for the extension of immu-
nity for health care professionals during
emergencies. However, nothing in these
laws indicates the existence of a prospective
designation system. Such a system would
need to be specified in regulation or
through an authoritative state ruling.     
Twenty-one states provide no clear legal pro-
tections. That is because the states’ statutory
schemes either are silent on the issue of pro-
tections for voluntary health care workers
during emergencies or are sufficiently
ambiguous so that no such prospective
immunity arrangement can be inferred in
the absence of comprehensive implement-
ing regulations or a ruling from an authori-
tative state official.    
State laws extending prospective and com-
prehensive protections for health care vol-
unteers during periods of declared emer-
gencies vary significantly in statutory scope
and clarity.  Statutes also vary with respect to
the scope of the immunity granted (i.e., cov-
ering all conduct or only conduct that is not
grossly negligent, willful and wanton, or
intentionally injurious).  
For a more detailed write up of the review
and the results, including the methodology,
please refer to Appendix C: Liability Issues
for Healthcare Volunteers. A web link to the
chart State by State Comparison Table --
Healthcare Volunteer Liability Protection also can
be found in Appendix C.
UNIFORM EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT  
The Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act (UEVHPA) addresses 3 issues of
importance to healthcare volunteers who respond to a public health emergency:   
■ Licensing and accreditation; 
■ Liability protection; and 
■ Workers compensation.  
Adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in
2006, the law “responds to a serious problem caused by lack of uniformity in state laws that
was revealed during the horrific hurricane season of 2005.”53 Healthcare professionals from
outside the affected Gulf Coast states who volunteered their services “were seriously delayed
and, in some cases, prevented from providing services because they were unable to quickly
and clearly obtain authorization to practice within the affected states.”54
Although all 50 states have adopted the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC), this only applies to state government employees and not private sector volunteers.
In a large scale public health emergency, such as a natural disaster or a pandemic flu, response
efforts will rely on both public and private sector volunteers.  UEVHPA provides a simple, uni-
form method to get licenses recognized from one state to another and relies on established
registration systems such as ESAR-VHP, Medical Reserve Corps, and the American Red Cross.
UEVHPA also clarifies the scope of practice so that healthcare volunteers are only licensed to
do what they already hold a license for in their home states. 
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EMERGENCY LEGAL PREPAREDNESS  
In addition to liability protection for healthcare volunteers, there are 2 other areas where lia-
bility exposure should be limited in an emergency.  
1. Liability protection for non-healthcare volunteers.  For example, 17 states have legisla-
tion for good-faith immunity for architects or engineers who inspect infrastructure and build-
ings after a disaster.55
2. Liability protection for entities and organizations that deploy the non-health care volun-
teers in an emergency and/or provide facilities (such as a warehouse as a point of distribution)
for use during an emergency.  Iowa is the only state that has passed legislation that specifically
offers immunity to organizations.56
The importance of liability protection for these 2 groups was underscored during tabletop
exercises as part of the City Readiness Initiative.  Planners realized that in order to dispense
supplies from the SNS in 48 hours they would have to rely on public-private partnerships.  
According to the Department of Homeland Security, however, these “public-private partner-
ships are vulnerable to risks and challenges which can lead to their termination or change of
course.  Some risks can be addressed; others can not. The risks may include: Concern by the
private sector regarding potential liabilities associated with sharing information with govern-
ments, and for voluntary actions taken to assist in recovery from disasters. Many businesses
would like to collaborate, but are deterred by real or perceived liability issues.”57
Although the federal government provides immunity to vaccine manufacturers, if a private
entity were to take part in any sort of influenza vaccine or antiviral distribution they might be
liable were any adverse side effects to occur.    
There are more mundane concerns, as well.  For example, if a state power company were
asked to participate in the distribution of supplies from the SNS and a power company
employee slipped, fell and broke his leg in the process of the distribution, would the power
company be liable?  Would the state?    
The American Red Cross (ARC), the largest volunteer organization in the country, has said that
it will not deploy its volunteers in the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak for fears that it
could be held liable if Red Cross volunteers contracted influenza while volunteering.  The ARC
will not “commit Red Cross workers to local public health overflow facilities without appropri-
ate worker protections, including liability coverage and worker safety measures.”58
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HHS guidance on emergency preparedness
planning directs state and local govern-
ments to reach out to all sectors of the law
enforcement community, including the
National Guard.60 All fifty states and D.C.
have conducted some type of joint exercise
involving members of the state health
department and state National Guard.   
Recent events have highlighted the daunting
challenges associated with securing and
defending citizens against the spectrum of
diverse and uncertain threats domestically.
The Department of Defense’s responsibility
for domestic defense has greatly expanded
since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
A number of sentinel national security docu-
ments released over the past few years have
articulated an important and expanding role
for the military and National Guard Units to
assist civil responders in both mitigating the
effects and managing the consequences of
catastrophic events.  In fact, National Guard
units have been deployed to support a grow-
ing number of requests from civil authorities,
such as those made during Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, during which 50,000
Guardsmen were deployed to support
response efforts, and the wildfires in
California. The role of Guardsmen during a
Indicator 7: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILLS
FINDING:  Fifty states and D.C. held some sort of emergency preparedness drill or exercise in 2007
that involved both members of the State Health Department and the State National Guard. 
Source: State Army and Air National Guard bureaus and State Health Officials
50 states and D.C. held an emergency
preparedness drill or exercise in 2007
with health department officials and
the state National Guard (1 point)
Alabama Montana
Alaska Nebraska
Arizona Nevada
Arkansas New Hampshire
California New Jersey 
Colorado New Mexico
Connecticut New York 
D.C. North Carolina
Delaware North Dakota
Florida Ohio
Georgia Oklahoma
Hawaii Oregon
Idaho Pennsylvania
Illinois Rhode Island
Indiana South Carolina
Iowa South Dakota
Kansas Tennessee
Kentucky Texas
Louisiana Utah
Maine Vermont
Maryland Virginia
Massachusetts Washington
Michigan West Virginia
Minnesota Wisconsin
Mississippi Wyoming
Missouri
0 states did NOT hold an emergency
preparedness drill or exercise in 2007
with health department officials and
the state National Guard (0 points)
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pandemic will be crucial, as evidenced by
states’ pandemic preparedness plans which
discuss the role the National Guard will play
in the event of a pandemic.  
Federal and state laws and policies -- Title 10
(Federal Service under President) or Title
32 (State Service under Governor)-- regu-
late the missions of National Guard units
based on their activated status.  Given the
growing challenges facing the National
Guard in allocating its scarce resources
between domestic and overseas missions,
and the present ambiguity delineating civil-
ian and military response roles, it is impor-
tant to foster collaborative relationships and
promote civil-military integration to facili-
tate collaborative response efforts, build
surge capacity during emergency response,
and ensure that National Guard units are
organized, trained, and equipped to best
meet their growing responsibilities in home-
land defense and disaster preparedness to
communities.  (See Appendix D: Emergency
Preparedness Drills for the methodology.) 
EXAMPLES OF PANDEMIC AND ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS DRILLS  
Arizona and California held a drill on July 24, 2007 to simulate how to efficiently meet the
needs of survivors in the aftermath of a major earthquake.60 Emergency planners believe that
if a major quake were to hit California, many residents would self-evacuate from Los Angeles
and San Diego along interstates into Arizona.  The exercise, called “Golden Phoenix,” brought
together more than 50 military and civilian agencies who would be involved in disaster relief.   
Butlerville, Indiana hosted the largest and most complex military and civilian disaster
response drill of its kind in May 2007.61 One of the scenarios over the 11-day exercise was
centered on the detonation of a 10-ton nuclear bomb in downtown Indianapolis which killed
14,000 people and injured 21,000 people.  Other scenarios included a simulated major hurri-
cane and multiple terrorist attacks on military bases.  The state exercise -- “Hoosier Sentry” -
- brought together thousands of local, state, and national forces, including members of the
National Guard and active-duty U.S. troops.  The exercise focused on communication and
resource management support of first responders. The state emergency operation center and
mobile command center were tested as part of the exercise.  
Cheyenne, Wyoming conducted a mass medication distribution drill in February 2007 to
prepare for a public health emergency requiring the distribution of medication.62
Representatives from every county worked under the scenario that the population of
Cheyenne had to be treated within 48 hours.  The drill allowed public health personnel to
treat large numbers of patients.  Responders also had the opportunity to practice with a radio
system and videoconference technology.  Department of Health Director Brent Sherard said
he would rather be proactive than reactive.  “It’s a lot easier to get your ducks in a row
before a disaster happens than after,” he said.  “A disaster of any proportion could happen
anywhere at anytime. We all need to be prepared to protect the public.”63
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Indicator 8: COMMUNITY RESILIENCY
FINDING:  Thirteen states do not meet the minimum threshold of 14 Medical Reserve Corps 
volunteers per 100,000 persons.
Source: Medical Reserve Corps, Office of the Surgeon General
<http://www.medicalreservecorps.gov/FindMRC.asp> (accessed October 22, 2007).
37 states and D.C. meet the minimum 13 states do NOT meet the minimum 
threshold of 14 Medical Reserve Corps threshold of 14 Medical Reserve Corps
volunteers per 100,000 persons  (1 point) volunteers per 100,000 persons (0 points)
State Total # of MRC State Total # of MRC 
MRC Volunteers MRC Volunteers 
Volunteers per 100,000 Volunteers per 100,000
Alabama 3342 73 Arkansas 158 6 
Alaska 330 49 Iowa 181 6 
Arizona 2841 46 Louisiana 228 5 
California 6562 18 Maine 42 3 
Colorado 845 18 Michigan 618 6 
Connecticut  5605 160 Mississippi 291 10 
D.C. 874 150 Missouri 469 8 
Delaware 214 25 Montana 79 8 
Florida 3600 20 Nevada 243 10 
Georgia 2437 26 South Dakota 0 0 
Hawaii 452 35 Washington 753 12 
Idaho 2643 180 Wisconsin 326 6 
llinois 4160 32 Wyoming 68 13 
Indiana 3991 63
Kansas 581 21 
Kentucky 2539 60    
Maryland 6833 122    
Massachusetts 13948 217 
Minnesota 4496 87    
Nebraska 637 36    
New Hampshire 248 19    
New Jersey 4754 54    
New Mexico 449 23    
New York 11356 59    
North Carolina 1281 14    
North Dakota 2859 450    
Ohio 5961 52    
Oklahoma 3572 100    
Oregon 540 15    
Pennsylvania 1785 14    
Rhode Island 537 50    
South Carolina 687 16    
Tennessee 21706 359  
Texas 9131 39    
Utah 516 20    
Vermont 207 33    
Virginia 8809 115    
West Virginia  1252 69  
During a major public health emergency,
such as a pandemic disease outbreak, gov-
ernment health services and other resources
will be quickly overtaxed.  In addition to col-
laborating with the private sector and com-
munity groups, federal, state, and local gov-
ernments will rely on volunteers to deliver
essential care and services.  The ability of
trained volunteers to come to the aid of their
fellow community members is part of the
White House’s National Strategy for Public
Health and Medical Preparedness:65
"Where local civil leaders, citizens, and families are
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educated regarding threats and are empowered to mit-
igate their own risk, where they are practiced in
responding to events, where they have social networks
to fall back upon, and where they have familiarity
with local public health and medical systems, there
will be community resilience that will significantly
attenuate the requirement for additional assistance.” 
One way federal, state and local governments
foster community resilience is through the
recruitment of volunteers to Medical Reserve
Corps (MRC) units.  The MRC program is
managed by the Office of the U.S. Surgeon
General in coordination with the Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response (ASPR).  According to the Medical
Reserve Corps website, “MRC units are com-
munity-based and function as a way to locally
organize and utilize volunteers -- medical
professionals and others -- who want to
donate their time and expertise to promote
healthy living throughout the year and to
prepare for and respond to emergencies.
MRC volunteers supplement existing local
emergency and public health resources.”
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
more than a quarter of Americans volun-
teered through or for an organization at least
once between September 2005 and
September 2006.65 This may range from one
hour of service at a homeless shelter or a one-
day trash-pick up effort to more significant
volunteering on a weekly basis for a pro-
longed period.  Of this group, 9.4 percent vol-
unteered in either a health setting (such as a
hospital or nursing home) or for public safe-
ty.66 Based on these data, emergency response
planners and public health officials could aim
to recruit 9,400 Medical Reserve Corps volun-
teers per 100,000 persons.   
The Bureau of Labor Statistics also notes, how-
ever, that 46 percent of American volunteers
served 49 hours or less over the course of one
year.67 These short-term volunteers are unlike
Medical Reserve Corps volunteers, who are
often asked to train with their units and partici-
pate in state and local preparedness drills; and,
who, if called upon, can be expected to serve
over a prolonged period of time. Setting a
threshold of 9,400 volunteers per 100,000 per-
sons was, therefore, deemed far too rigorous.    
Although the body of evidence-based research
on public health emergency preparedness
and response is growing, there is still no scien-
tifically-sound data on what number of health-
care volunteers per 100,000 persons is needed
to respond to a mass casualty event.  In the
absence of federal guidelines and evidence-
based best practices, TFAH set the threshold
for this indicator at the 25th percentile, mean-
ing 75 percent of states received a point for
having met or exceeded 14 Medical Reserve
Corps volunteers per 100,000 persons.    
Thirty-seven states and D.C. met or exceeded
the threshold of 14 volunteers per 100,000
North Dakota led the group with a total of
2,859 volunteers or 450 per 100,000 persons,
followed by Tennessee with 359 volunteers
per 100,000 and Massachusetts with 217 per
100,000.  Thirteen states had fewer than 14
volunteers per 100,000.  South Dakota failed
to register a single volunteer and is listed as
having 0 volunteers per 100,000, while Maine
only had 3 volunteers per 100,000 and
Louisiana had 5 per 100,000.
Medical Reserve Corps volunteers represent
one segment of emergency response volun-
teers.  In addition to the Medical Reserve
Corps, administered by the Office of the U.S.
Surgeon General, there is the Community
Emergency Response Team (CERT) initiative
run by the Office of Community Preparedness,
Department of Homeland Security, and the
Emergency System for Advance Registration of
Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP),
administered by the Office of Preparedness
and Emergency Operations, Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness and Response.    
These groups join non-governmental groups
such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation
Army, and others in supplying volunteers to
assist in emergency response and recovery.
Using only Medical Reserve Corps numbers,
therefore, does not give as complete a picture
of community resiliency as one would like.
Although the federal agencies that administer
these programs were unable to provide TFAH
with an accurate breakdown of ESAR-VHP vol-
unteers and CERT volunteers on a state-by-
state basis, both programs told TFAH that they
expect to begin collecting the actual number
of individual volunteers registered and/or
trained in early 2008.  (See Appendix E:
Community Resiliency for the methodology
and a detailed spreadsheet of Medical Reserve
Corps volunteers by state.) 
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PRIVATE SECTOR AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC
HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS  
Given the increasing importance of public-private partnerships in times of non-emergency, it is
not hard to imagine that more is going to be asked of the private sector during a major public
health emergency.  The federal government has published several preparedness checklists for
businesses and community groups, which are posted on the www.pandemicflu.gov website.
In addition to following the steps in these checklists, business groups and community leaders
are encouraged to meet with local, state, and federal planners to ensure that their expertise
and capabilities are incorporated in pandemic and all-hazards preparedness response plans.68
Business and community groups face twin challenges.  They must plan to take care of their
own employees and employees’ families, while also developing a plan to coordinate with the
federal and state preparedness efforts.   
Businesses
Most companies take the threat of pandemic flu seriously.  A 2006 survey of U.S. employers
found that 72 percent believe planning can help protect their business from a pandemic’s
impact.69 In spite of widespread acknowledgement that pandemic flu represents a serious
threat, only 52 percent of respondents report having adequately planned to protect their staff
and business interests in the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak, and more than half of
respondents lack confidence in their company’s ability to manage an aggressive influenza out-
break among employees.70
To promote private sector preparedness, in 2007 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce held a
series of round table discussions around the country bringing together businesses, public offi-
cials and emergency planners to discuss pandemic preparedness.  Too often, however,
many of the public-private partnerships that exist are driven by personal connec-
tions and do not include a representative sample of the businesses operating in the
community. A highly contagious strain of influenza will not discriminate among employees
based on whom the CEO or owner knows.  It is essential, therefore, that pandemic and all-
hazards preparedness events include representatives from a broad spectrum of organizations.   
Further steps state and local planning officials should take to boost private sector emergency
preparedness include:   
■ Share state and local preparedness plans with the entire business community; 
■ Dedicate a staff member to serve as the business community liaison in the state pre-
paredness office; 
■ Hold training events/workshops/exercises/etc. with the private sector; and  
■ Establish with whom and how public health officials should communicate with the busi-
ness community in the event of an emergency.  
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP  
Business Executives for National Security (BENS): Georgia Business Force  
The BENS Georgia Business Force is a consortium of companies partnering with the state
to help deter and respond to terrorist attacks.71 In October 2007, the group took part in
the Community Continuity Atlanta Partnership (CCAP) exercise along with the Georgia
Division of Public Health, the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, Emory University
Rollins School of Public Health, and local health departments.72 Close to 250 employees
from 28 local companies participated in the week-long series of exercises.  The final exer-
cise was a mass anthrax countermeasure delivery drill, where business volunteers were
given one hour of training to distribute the anthrax antidote and health information to volun-
teers acting as patients.  According to Dr. Stuart Brown, Director of the Georgia Division of
Public Health, “the use of private sector personnel in this manner leverages the public health
workforce tremendously, brings in private sector expertise and benefits all of Georgia.”73
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COMMUNITY GROUPS  
Community and faith-based organizations can play an important role in pandemic and all-hazards
preparedness and response, particularly in communities wary of direct government intervention.
They can help vet communication messages to ensure delivery in easy to understand, culturally
sensitive terms.  Messages coming from trusted community leaders are more likely to inspire
responsiveness.  After a disaster has occurred, community groups can transmit information from
the ground back to emergency response teams to ensure that citizens’ needs are met.  Finally,
community groups can play a role in response and recovery by delivering food supplies, check-
ing in on sick or injured neighbors, and helping vaccinate members of the community.      
Emergency planners need to reach out and engage with key community stakeholders in the
planning stages. Too often, however, U.S. homeland security and public health emergency
planners tend to overlook this sector of society.74 Many New Orleans residents failed to evac-
uate in advance of Hurricane Katrina despite government warnings to do so because planners
had not considered that many residents lacked the necessary funds or personal automobiles
necessary for self-evacuation.  Failing to include community groups in preparedness planning
can lead to government designed plans that fail either because the message does not reach all
the people it intended to reach, or because the planners fail to fully consider the cultural prac-
tices or socioeconomic conditions of the population.75
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT SUCCESS STORIES  
Lincoln County, Wyoming:  Community Food Supply Outreach76
The Lincoln County, WY Public Health Department and a local grocery store worked
together to promote and facilitate emergency food and water stockpiling.  The grocery
store agreed to sell non-perishable goods at lower prices and allowed the Public Health
Department to place posters with lists of individual preparedness items throughout the
store.  Customers who did not normally have the means to stockpile large amounts of
food could buy and store preparedness products at lower prices and educate them-
selves with the associated materials.  The project also helped grocers understand their
role in providing critical food supplies during a pandemic.   
New Mexico:  Tribal Outreach in New Mexico77
The New Mexico Department of Health has led a community outreach project among 22
American Indian tribes in the state.  Tribal preparedness is a significant component of
overall preparedness, especially in the American Southwest and Plains states.  One com-
ponent of the outreach included a presentation to tribal members on pandemic and avian
flu.  The presentation contained culturally relevant information for the tribes, including the
safety of eagle feathers obtained through the Fish and Wildlife Service repository. 
39 states and D.C. increased or maintained 11 states DECREASED rates for vaccinating 
rates for vaccinating adults aged 65 and older adults aged 65 and older for seasonal flu 
for seasonal flu (comparing 2003-2005 to (comparing 2003-2005 to 2004-2006) 
2004-2006) (1 point) (0 points)
State 2003-2005 2004-2006 Increased State 2003-2005 2004-2006 Decreased 
rates rates (statistically rates rates (statistically 
significant) or significant)
maintained 
(where 
decreases are 
noted, they are 
not considered 
statistically 
significant)
Alaska 63.9% 62.5% -1.3% Alabama 65.7% 63.0% -2.8%
Arizona 65.9% 64.7% -1.2% California 69.7% 67.9% -1.9%
Arkansas 68.3% 67.5% -0.8% Florida 62.2% 60.7% -1.5%
Colorado 75.7% 76.3% 0.6% Idaho 66.8% 65.1% -1.7%
Connecticut* 72.8% 71.8% -1.1% Iowa 74.4% 73.1% -1.3%
Delaware 68.3% 68.5% 0.1% Minnesota 78.9% 76.7% -2.2%
D.C. 57.6% 56.9% -0.8% New Mexico 70.9% 69.3% -1.6%
Georgia 64.1% 63.4% -0.7% Oklahoma 74.6% 72.9% -1.7%
Hawaii 74.3% 73.9% -0.4% South Carolina 65.4% 63.2% -2.1%
Illinois** 61.1% 62.6% 1.4% South Dakota 77.0% 75.8% -1.3%
Indiana 64.8% 64.5% -0.3% Washington 69.7% 68.8% -0.9%
Kansas 68.3% 68.9% 0.6%
Kentucky 65.3% 64.2% -1.1%
Louisiana* 66.6% 65.2% -1.4%
Maine 71.6% 70.6% -0.9%
Maryland 63.9% 63.3% -0.6%
Massachusetts 71.8% 71.1% -0.7%
Michigan** 67.2% 68.4% 1.3%
Mississippi 65.8% 64.6% -1.2%
Missouri 66.9% 67.7% 0.8%
Montana 71.5% 71.4% -0.1%
Nebraska 74.0% 73.9% -0.1%
Nevada 57.2% 56.5% -0.7%
New Hampshire 71.6% 71.0% -0.6%
New Jersey 66.1% 65.8% -0.3%
New York 65.3% 64.2% -1.1%
North Carolina 67.1% 67.3% 0.3%
North Dakota 72.5% 71.9% -0.5%
Ohio 66.7% 66.8% 0.1%
Oregon 70.1% 70.4% 0.3%
Pennsylvania 64.0% 63.8% -0.2%
Rhode Island 72.1% 71.6% -0.5%
Tennessee 65.5% 66.1% 0.6%
Texas 65.4% 65.0% -0.4%
Utah 73.2% 72.4% -0.9%
Vermont 69.0% 68.6% -0.4%
Virginia 68.3% 68.2% -0.2%
West Virginia 66.9% 65.9% -0.9%
Wisconsin 72.7% 72.7% 0.0%
Wyoming 73.1% 72.5% -0.6%
Source: BRFSS.  Data include 3 year comparisons.  Please note that each state has a different sample size so the rates of increase
and decrease are not comparable across states — each state has a different range to reach statistically significant changes.  
*Puerto Rico had a statistically significant decreases in vaccination rates (p<.10)   
*Connecticut and Louisiana had marginally statistically significant decreases in vaccination rates (p<.10)  
**Illinois and Michigan were the only 2 states with marginally statistically significant increased in vaccination rates (p<.10)
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Indicator 9: PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRESS -- SENIORS’ SEASONAL FLU VACCINATION
FINDING:  Flu vaccination rates for seniors decreased in 11 states.
Routine vaccinations have helped prevent
countless illnesses and deaths, and are
extremely cost-effective, sparing the health-
care system the expense of caring for those
who might otherwise become ill.    
According to CDC, 5 to 20 percent of
Americans contract the seasonal flu, more
than 200,000 people are hospitalized 
from flu complications, and approximately
36,000 people die from the flu each year.78
Certain people, such as the elderly, the 
very young, and those with compromised
immune systems are more vulnerable to
complications from seasonal flu.79
Complications of flu can include bacterial
pneumonia, dehydration, and worsening of
chronic medical conditions, such as conges-
tive heart failure, asthma, or diabetes.
CDC’s Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) recom-
mends that individuals at high-risk for com-
plications and their caregivers receive sea-
sonal flu vaccinations at the beginning of
each flu season.  
This indicator measures how well states are
vaccinating one key high risk group, adults
aged 65 and older.  Since seasonal flu vacci-
nation efforts are also viewed as a way to
help communities better prepare for larger
public health emergencies, such as a pan-
demic flu, this indicator also measures that
aspect of preparedness.    
The data from this indicator are from CDC’s
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS), an annual cross-sectional tele-
phone survey of more than 350,000 adults
over 18 years old (averaging more than
4,000 interviews by state) conducted by the
health departments of all states and D.C.
BRFSS is the primary source of health infor-
mation for states.  According to CDC, it is
the largest telephone survey in the world
and generates confidence intervals of less
than plus or minus 3 percent.  
CDC provides information from BRFSS to
policymakers, including the U.S. Congress
and state officials, and to the public.  BRFSS
data are then used to inform decisions
about health policies, funding and activities.
(For more information, see Appendix F:
Methodology for Flu Vaccination Rates).
There were no statistically significant
increases in vaccination rates, although 39
states and D.C. statistically maintained their
previous rates.  These 39 states and D.C.
received a point for this indicator.  Flu vac-
cination rates for seniors showed a statisti-
cally significant decrease in 11 states. 
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FLU VACCINE EFFECTIVENESS IN SENIORS  
CDC currently recommends flu shots for people at high risk for influenza-related complica-
tions and severe disease, including:  children aged 6 to 59 months, pregnant women, and per-
sons aged 50 years of age and older.80
The effectiveness of the vaccine in seniors (aged 65 and older), however, has been called into
question by several studies.81,82 First, studies note that while seasonal flu vaccines have “con-
vincingly been shown to be effective in preventing influenza infection in healthy adults...no
[randomized control trial] data conclusively show a similar benefit in those aged 70 years or
more, the age group that accounts for nearly all influenza deaths.”83
In addition, some researchers are questioning whether the flu vaccine helps prevent deaths
among seniors 65 and older.  They believe that differences in underlying health status
between vaccinated and unvaccinated seniors are the likely cause of any measurable reduction
in risk of death.84
While acknowledging that the flu vaccine is less effective among the elderly than in younger people,
other scientists argue there are long-term benefits associated with flu vaccination among those 65
years of age and older.85,86 After analyzing the effect of flu vaccination during 10 flu seasons,
researchers found that vaccination was associated with an average reduction of 27 percent in the
risk of hospitalization for pneumonia or influenza during influenza seasons, and with a 48 percent
decrease in the risk of death from any cause.    
Both sides support expanding the vaccination of schoolchildren, the group most likely to
spread the flu virus.87 It is unfortunate that influenza vaccination rates among children are
even lower than among the general public with only 18 percent of children aged 6 to 23
months vaccinated.88
Despite the debate over the efficacy of flu shots in seniors, even those who argue against any
effect recommend that seniors receive yearly flu vaccines because they do not have evidence that
it causes any harm.  In addition, there is a consensus for more research studies comparing new
and potentially better vaccines for the elderly -- perhaps vaccines that combine live and killed
viruses or larger doses of current vaccine formulations.  There is also widespread advocacy for
protecting seniors through increased vaccination of children and healthcare workers.   
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Indicator 10: FUNDING COMMITMENT -- PUBLIC HEALTH BUDGETS
FINDING:  Six states cut funding for public health from FY 2005-06 to FY 2006-07. 
Source: Research by TFAH of publicly available state budget documents and interviews with health and budget offi-
cials in the states.
NOTES: Biennium budgets are bolded.  
1 May contain some social service programs, but not Medicaid or CHIP. 
2 General funds only. 
3 Includes federal funds. 
4 Budget data taken from appropriations legislation. 
5 Missouri’s percent change based on FY 2005-06 and FY 2006-07 actual expenditures. 
6 Georgia’s budget data for FY 2006-07 taken from appropriations legislation. 
7 North Dakota’s budget data for the 2007-2009 biennium taken from appropriations legislation. 
44 states and D.C. increased or main-
tained level funding for public health
services from FY 2005-06 
to FY 2006-07 (1 point)
State and percent increase 
(adjusted for inflation)
Alabama (2.3%) Mississippi (39.8%)2
Alaska (9.5%)2 Missouri (26.2%)5
Arizona (28.1%) Nebraska (2.0%)4
Arkansas (7.8%) New Hampshire (0.7%)
California (18.7%) New Jersey (19.7%)
Colorado (29.8%) New Mexico (15.7%)
Connecticut (9.6%)2 North Carolina (5.1%)2
Delaware (27.0%)2 North Dakota (42.9%)7
D.C. (13.7%) Ohio (1.5%)4
Florida (12.7%)2 Oklahoma (8.8%)1
Georgia (0.2%)6 Oregon (32.5%)
Hawaii (11.1%)2 Pennsylvania (5.8%)2
Idaho (2.2%) Rhode Island (9.7%) 
Illinois (7.1%) South Carolina (0.3%) 
Iowa (8.5%) South Dakota (0.8%) 
Kansas (22.8%) Tennessee (16.8%) 
Kentucky (3.8%) Utah (5.9%) 
Louisiana (20.1%) Vermont (17.5%)3
Maine (1.1%)2 Virginia (9.3%)4
Maryland (8.0%)2 Washington (16.3%)4
Massachusetts (8.0%)4 West Virginia (6.9%) 
Michigan (2.4%)4 Wyoming (43.8%)
Minnesota (10.7%)2
6 states DECREASED funding for public
health services from FY 2005-06 
to FY 2006-07 (0 points) 
State and percent increase 
(adjusted for inflation)
Indiana (-3.0%) 
Montana (-13.4%) 
Nevada (-3.0%) 
New York (-2.3%) 
Texas (-9.1%) 
Wisconsin (-0.6%)4
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This indicator, adjusted for inflation, 
illustrates a state’s commitment to funding
public health programs that support the
infrastructure needed to adequately respond
to emergencies.  
Presently, the bulk of public health emer-
gency preparedness funding comes from
the federal government.  The PAHPA legis-
lation states, however, that beginning with
FY 2009, public health and hospital pre-
paredness grant awardees must contribute
non-federal funds to support the coopera-
tive agreements.  States are required to
match 5 percent of the total federal funding
for FY 2009, and 10 percent of the total
amount thereafter.89 Non-federal funds may
come from state public funding or private
donations and may be in cash or in kind.
Those states with stagnant or decreasing
state public health budgets may be chal-
lenged to identify funds required for the
state match.    
Every state allocates and reports its budget in
different ways.  States also vary widely in the
specificity they provide.  This makes compar-
isons across states difficult.  For this analysis,
TFAH examined state budgets and appropri-
ations bills for the agency, department, or
division in charge of public health services for
FY 2005-2006 to FY 2006-2007, using a defini-
tion as consistent as possible across the 2
years, based on how each state reports data.
TFAH defined “public health services” broad-
ly, including most state-level health funding.  
Based on this analysis, 6 states experienced
cuts in their public health budgets.  (For
additional information on the methodology
of the budget analysis, please see Appendix
G:  Methodology for State Public Health
Budget Indicator.)
Several states that received points for this
indicator may not have actually increased
their spending on public health programs.
The ways some states report their budgets,
for instance by including federal funding in
the totals or including public health dollars
within healthcare spending totals, makes it
difficult to determine “public health” as a
separate item.  
Few states allocate funds directly for bioter-
rorism and public health preparedness as
part of their public health budgets.  Instead,
most rely on federal funds to support these
activities.  The infrastructure of other public
health programs, however, also supports
their underlying preparedness capabilities.  
While this indicator examines whether state
budgets increased or decreased, it does not
assess if the funding is adequate to cover
public health needs in the states.  This also
does not take into account ongoing hospital
needs and funding. 
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Federal Preparedness
In this section of the report, TFAH examines federal preparedness activities. 2S E C T I O N
Important new legislation was signed into law,
and policy directives were issued relative to
implementation of such legislation in the past
year.  This represents significant progress in
the nation’s preparedness as discussed below.
However, TFAH finds that the federal govern-
ment continues to lag in several key areas: 
■ The U.S. Congress has failed to deliver a
sustained financial commitment towards
preparedness -- especially at the state and
local level -- where many of the essential
preparedness and response activities occur; 
■ While federal agencies are slowly begin-
ning to adopt measurable goals and out-
come objectives for preparedness, they
have failed to systematically collect data on
all but a few of those performance meas-
ures and provide state-by-state reporting of
the results.  This lack of transparency limits
the ability to gauge progress and identify
vulnerabilities in national preparedness for
all-hazards public health emergencies; and   
■ The federal government has failed to align
its own policies with the recommendations
and guidance it set forth for individual and
household preparedness.  
Issues addressed in this section include:    
1. Implementation of the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) of 2006; 
2. Pandemic Influenza planning and pre-
paredness activities; 
3. Funding for pandemic and all-hazards pre-
paredness; and  
4. Additional federal issues, including the
lack of an emergency health benefit and
deficiencies in sick leave policies and the
shelf-life extension program for medica-
tions and vaccines.
The Department of Health and Human
Services has invested over $7 billion to pre-
pare states and local public health depart-
ments and hospitals for public health emer-
gencies and acts of bioterrorism since 9/11,
and since FY 2006, an additional nearly $6
billion specifically for pandemic influenza
preparedness, of which $600 million has
gone to state and local health departments.
This investment demonstrates the serious-
ness with which national leaders view these
threats.  The 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417) further
strengthens the nation’s preparedness and
response planning.  Merely passing the legis-
lation, however, is not enough.  Accordingly,
PAHPA set out a series of benchmarks for
federal agencies to meet over the next 5
years.  Seven of these deliverables were due
no later than 180 days after the enactment of
PAHPA, or by the end of June 2007.  Another
set of 4 deliverables are due no later than
December 2007, or 12 months after enact-
ment.  Others come due over the 5-year span
of the Act.  (For more details on deliverables
and due dates under PAHPA see Appendix
H: Key Deliverables and Due Dates under
PAHPA (P.L. 109-417)).  
In November 2007, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response published the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act Progress Report to
update federal agencies, members of the
U.S. Congress, state officials, the business
1.  The Implementation of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
50
PAHPA requires the Secretary of HHS with-
in 180 days of enactment to develop and
apply measurable evidence-based bench-
marks and objective standards to measure
the preparedness of state and local
grantees, including annual test and exercise
requirements.90 Where appropriate, howev-
er, the law allows the use of “existing objec-
tive standards.”91 Currently, HHS is using
existing CDC Preparedness Goals which
detail 23 proposed performance measures.
Of these 23 assessments, states are required
to collect data and report on only 6 of these
to CDC.92,93 The data from these 6 measures
are then reported on an aggregated basis,
without a breakdown of individual states’
results.  Americans can not, therefore,
appropriately assess their states’ progress or
document how states have used taxpayer-
supported preparedness funds.  The inabili-
ty of states to quantify what federal pre-
paredness dollars have achieved over the
past 5 years is a serious weakness with the
current system.
HHS and CDC are in the process of devel-
oping, in coordination with research organ-
izations and universities, a series of new per-
formance measures that officials are aiming
to roll out in 2009.  These new measures will
incorporate more drills and exercises to
ensure that states’ paper plans can deliver in
a public health emergency. 
Performance Measures, Data Collection and Reporting
RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
AND RESPONSE  
PAHPA directs the secretary of HHS to consult with schools of public health and research
organizations to “define the existing knowledge base for public health preparedness and
response systems, and establish a research agenda based on federal, state, local, and tribal
public health preparedness priorities.”94 The Institute of Medicine (IOM) has agreed to con-
duct a fast-track study and issue a report that will “delineate a set of near-term research pri-
orities for emergency preparedness and response in public health systems that are relevant to
the specific expertise resident at schools of public health.”95 The IOM committee will meet
over 4 days from December 18-21, 2007 and deliver its final report to CDC no later than
February 25, 2008.  The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
(ASPR) and CDC’s Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
(COTPER) will consider the IOM recommendations when developing the research funding
announcements for CDC’s Centers of Public Health Preparedness.
community, non-profits, the research com-
munity and the American public as to how
HHS is meeting its commitments under the
new law.  The report found that significant
progress had been made over the 10 months
since the law’s enactment.  TFAH com-
mends ASPR’s progress in executing a
majority of its 6 month benchmarks, espe-
cially in light of staffing and funding con-
straints, but recognizes that much remains
to be done, specifically in respect to:  
■ Developing new, outcome-oriented per-
formance measures; 
■ Collecting, reporting, and publishing
data on federal and state preparedness;
■ Enhancing real-time disease detection
and surveillance; and 
■ Advancing research and development of
countermeasures.  
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PAHPA requires the Secretary of HHS within
180 days of enactment, to submit to the U.S.
Congress a strategic plan outlining steps to
develop, implement, and evaluate the near
real-time electronic nationwide biosurveil-
lance network and develop program elements
and required activities.
Delivering effective public health services
depends on timely and reliable information.
Health departments cannot protect people
from existing or emerging health threats, such
as a disease pandemic, like influenza, without
the right information.  The lack of timely and
comprehensive data can cause delays in iden-
tifying and responding to serious and mass
emergency health problems.   
As of November 2007, HHS had failed to sub-
mit a strategic plan to the U.S. Congress, as
specified under PAHPA. According to the
Progress Report, however, “HHS has taken steps
towards developing a strategic plan for situa-
tional awareness by identifying existing infor-
mation technology and reporting systems
that track trends in public health and med-
ical data and by piloting new systems that
have the potential to improve situational
awareness.”96 In addition, HHS is examining
ways to integrate different surveillance sys-
tems and the disparate technology platforms
they run on into an “overarching system that
will improve situational awareness.”97
Near Real-Time Electronic Nationwide Public Health Situational Awareness Capability
REAL-TIME DISEASE DETECTION  
PAHPA (Section 201H) authorized $35 million in CDC preparedness grants to states to fund one new
program, Real-Time Disease Detection.98 All 50 states and D.C. received FY 2007 funding for this
new program and, under the CDC cooperative agreement, are required to establish real-time disease
detection programs through the Poison Control Center Partnership (PCC Partnership).  This
partnership is intended to supplement the ongoing disease surveillance carried out in states.  
Every state and territory is served by a professional organization in the field of poison control, a state
PCC, or a regional PCC.  A 2005 study on PCCs and syndromic surveillance found that “PCC data
might provide a useful addition to surveillance data reported to public health agencies for the early
detection of foodborne disease outbreaks,” and suggested that collaborative surveillance systems --
such as the PCC Partnership -- be developed to improve disease monitoring and tracking.99
Under the PCC Partnership, state health departments collaborate with a poison control cen-
ter “to improve the early detection, surveillance, and investigative capabilities of poison con-
trol centers for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events.”100
This collaboration can take on several forms, such as:101
■ Establishing systems to collect and submit near real-time poison center data relevant to
rapid disease and detection of a chemical, radiological, or biological “event” electronically
for review and analysis by a professional organization in the field of poison control and rapid
reporting of suspicious events back to the relevant state health departments and CDC; 
■ Establishing priority health conditions and syndromes and points of contact at state health
departments, the American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC), and CDC; 
■ Developing protocols to investigate reports of priority health conditions and syndromes;
■ Planning to provide surge capacity in the event of chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear threat or exposure;  
■ Expanding existing telecommunication equipment to enhance the available number of
workstations at each regional poison control center; or  
■ Improving the capabilities of poison control centers to provide information to health care
providers and the public with regard to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear threats or
exposures, in consultation with the appropriate state, local, and tribal public health entities.  
This program is not a substitute for a strategic plan for the development, implemen-
tation, and evaluation of a near real-time electronic nationwide public health 
situational awareness capability.  Collaboration among different surveillance systems,
however, such as poison control centers, food safety labs, and clinical and university
labs, is key to an effective nationwide public health surveillance system.
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PAHPA requires within 180 days that the HHS
Secretary: “develop and make public a strate-
gic plan to integrate biodefense and emerging
infectious disease requirements with the
advanced research and development, strategic
initiatives for innovation, and the procure-
ment of qualified countermeasures and quali-
fied pandemic or epidemic products.”102
On July 7, 2007 HHS Secretary Michael
Leavitt published a draft BARDA Strategic
Plan for Countermeasure Research, Development,
and Procurement, to “guide and facilitate the
research, development, innovation, and
procurement of medical countermeasures
and build upon established national strate-
gies and directives.”103 The draft plan
includes language on the importance of
addressing both bioterrorism threats and
emerging infectious disease threats.104
National Strategy for Research and Development 
BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(BARDA)  
PAHPA directed HHS to establish the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development
Authority, or BARDA, and authorized funding of advanced development of medical counter-
measures, such as vaccines, drugs, and diagnostic tools for public health emergencies.105
BARDA is the umbrella organization within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness
and Response that provides an integrated, systematic approach to the development and purchase
of the medical countermeasures, treatments and diagnostic tools for public health medical emer-
gencies.  Upon its creation, BARDA assumed responsibility for 2 existing separate, but comple-
mentary projects:  the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE)
and Project BioShield.  
PAHPA included authorization for approximately $1 billion for BARDA to support advanced
research and development for FY 2007 through FY 2008.  The U.S. Congress, however, did not
appropriate money for BARDA in FY 2007 as the bill was signed into law after the FY 2007
spending bill was passed.  Instead, a separate act, the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care,
Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28) transferred $99
million from National Institutes of Health accounts to fund BARDA.106
To date, $55 million from that pool of funds have been allocated in the form of HHS contracts
to 4 companies that are working on the advanced development of anthrax antitoxins, thera-
peutics and antibiotics for use against plague and tularemia.107 The president’s FY 2008 budget
includes $189 million for BARDA.    
There is some expectation between researchers and government officials that the establishment of
BARDA and its oversight of Project BioShield may improve the chances of success during the
development phase.  According to the Congressional Research Service, “one of BARDA’s roles is
to support the advanced research and development of promising countermeasures.  In theory,
funding this part of the development process through such a dedicated mechanism could allow
countermeasures to further mature through the development process longer before competing
for a Project BioShield contract.  This could reduce the risk that a countermeasure will fail while
under a Project BioShield contract.”108
Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE)  
PHEMCE is a coordinated interagency effort by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and includes three primary HHS internal agencies:  the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  The mission of PHEMCE is to:109
■ Identify high threat areas and the appropriate medical countermeasures for such threats;
■ Set goals for research, development and acquisition of medical countermeasures that are
deemed necessary for high priority threat areas; and 
■ Plan deployment and use strategies for medical countermeasures held in the Strategic
National Stockpile (SNS).  
PHEMCE’s mandate extends beyond chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats to
encompass naturally emerging infectious diseases and pandemic threats, including pandemic influenza.110
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PHEMCE Developments in Acquiring Critical Medical Countermeasures  
■ Smallpox Vaccine: On June 4, 2007, HHS awarded a contract to Bavarian Nordic A/S of Copenhagen, Denmark to
manufacture and deliver 20 million doses of a Modified Vaccinia Ankara (MVA) smallpox vaccine.  The MVA vaccine is to
be administered or distributed to people with compromised immune systems, such as patients on chemotherapy, who
cannot receive the live vaccine that makes up the bulk of the SNS supply.111
■ Anthrax Vaccines: On September 26, 2007, HHS purchased 18.75 million doses of BioThrax (Anthrax Vaccine
Adsorbed (AVA)) from Emergent Biodefense Operations of Lansing, Michigan.  The BioThrax vaccine is intended to be
used following an anthrax attack and, together with existing stockpiles of anthrax vaccine, allows HHS to maintain a
stockpile of at least 10 million doses through 2011.112
■ Radiation Exposure Countermeasures: On September 27, 2007, NIH released 2 separate funding opportunity
announcements for different medical countermeasures to treat people exposed to radiation.  One request for applica-
tions seeks to accelerate the development of medical countermeasures to enhance platelet regeneration after radiation
exposure from radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks.113 The second funding announcement seeks a company interest-
ed in developing effective countermeasures for radiation exposure induced burns, wounds, trauma, or infections.114 Both
application close dates are in January 2008 with an announcement of the winning bid expected in June 2008.   
Project BioShield  
Project BioShield was created in 2004 to jump-start the research, development, purchase, and availability of effective medical
countermeasures against CBRN agents.  One of its central features is “it provides countermeasure developers with a guaranteed
government market for their products.”115
In addition to serving as a secure funding source for the purchase of critical countermeasures, the BioShield Act gives NIH the
power to expedite research and development of these medical countermeasures, and allows FDA officials to invoke an
“Emergency Use Authorization” for medical countermeasures.  This type of authorization grants a manufacturer permission to
distribute a critical biomedical treatment to the public without the more rigorous testing and evaluation new drugs and treat-
ment normally undergo before hitting the market.  
In the past year Project BioShield has undergone government scrutiny. According to a report by the Congressional Research
Service (CRS), HHS has awarded $1.8 billion worth of Project BioShield contracts, which focus on 3 priority threat areas:
anthrax, botulinum toxin (a naturally occurring neurotoxin protein that is one of the most poisonous naturally occurring sub-
stances in the world), and radiological and nuclear agents.116
Although close to 80 percent of Project BioShield funding awards have been for research and development on anthrax-related
countermeasures, anthrax vaccine development has not progressed as anticipated.  
The largest Project BioShield contract HHS and ASPR awarded went to a small biotech company, VaxGen, in November 2004.
The $877.5 million procurement contract for VaxGen was for the manufacture and delivery of 75 million doses of its rPA
anthrax vaccine to the SNS.  Two years later, however, on December 17, 2006, ASPR terminated VaxGen’s contract for failure
to meet a critical contractual milestone.  
According to an October 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, there were 3 major factors behind HHS’s deci-
sion to cancel the Project BioShield contract with VaxGen.117
1. ASPR awarded the contract to VaxGen, a small biotech firm with no experience manufacturing anthrax vaccine.  The contract
required 25 million doses of vaccine in 2 years; a milestone that would be difficult for a large vaccine manufacturer to meet
and completely out of reach for VaxGen.  
2. VaxGen took unrealistic risks in accepting the contract given the size of the company and the lack of in-house experience and
knowledge.  
3. FDA requirements for a new generation anthrax vaccine were not published at the time of the contract, which led to confusion
about product design.  
In testimony before the U.S. Congress, Keith Rhodes, an author of the GAO report, stated that “the failure of this procurement
effort raised larger questions regarding the country’s ability to develop a new anthrax vaccine and a robust and sustainable
biodefense medical countermeasure industry by building a partnership between pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms and the
government.”118 He also noted that “the biotech industry has raised concerns about whether the government can clearly define
its requirements for future procurement contracts.”119
To avoid making the same mistakes in future BioShield procurements, GAO recommends that the secretary of HHS direct
ASPR, NIH, FDA and CDC “to ensure that the concept of use and all critical requirements are clearly articulated at the outset
for any future medical countermeasure procurement.”120
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The White House issued the National Strategy
for Pandemic Influenza in November 2005,
which was followed up with the National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Implementation
Plan in May 2006.  The Implementation Plan con-
tains more than 300 specific actions for federal
departments and agencies and serves as a
roadmap towards pandemic preparedness.  A
one-year summary of the implementation plan
found that significant progress had been
made.  According to the report, “approximate-
ly two-thirds of the 324 actions in the National
Plan were targeted for completion within one
year of the national Plan’s release.”  Of these
“one-year” actions, nearly 90 percent have
been completed.121 Upon issuance, TFAH
commended the federal government’s
progress in executing a majority of its 12
month benchmarks, but recognized that much
remains to be done, specifically in respect to:  
■ “Real-time” disease detection and clinical
surveillance; 
■ Mass casualty care or surge capacity; 
■ Swift distribution of needed medical
countermeasures; and  
■ Legal and feasibility issues associated with
community mitigation strategies.
In fact, these 4 areas are of crucial impor-
tance to pandemic preparedness and, if unad-
dressed, would significantly limit the effec-
tiveness of the national pandemic response.
In addition, TFAH strongly recommends that
the National Plan be updated as scientists
learn more about pandemic influenza and
how to control its spread as well as to reflect
lessons learned from planning and exercises
associated with pandemic preparedness.  
A GAO review of the national strategy to
combat influenza cited several other prob-
lems, including the:122
■ Lack of clarity regarding coordination
between HHS and DHS regarding leader-
ship roles and responsibilities during a
pandemic crisis; 
■ Absence of national exercises or drills to
test a multi-sector, multi-jurisdictional
response to a pandemic outbreak; 
■ Lack of clear links between performance
measures and intended results; and  
■ Failure to call for specific investments and
resource development needed to imple-
ment the actions called for in the National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza.
2. Pandemic Influenza Planning
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Five years ago, only 13 states had a final or
draft pandemic plan publicly available.123 As of
October 2007, all 50 states and the D.C. had a
version of their pandemic plan available
online at www.pandemicflu.gov.  A review of
these plans by TFAH in the Fall of 2007, how-
ever, revealed that many states have outdated
plans posted online.  In addition, the type of
publicly available document varies from a
comprehensive pandemic flu plan to free-
standing annexes to emergency management
plans, to mere summaries of a state’s pan-
demic preparedness plan.
The unique challenges of preparing for and
confronting a pandemic flu merit special
consideration. 
■ It is likely that nearly all 50 U.S. states and
the District of Columbia will be affected
at roughly the same time; and 
■ Experts predict a pandemic will occur in
multiple waves of 6 to 12 weeks, resulting
in multiple periods of surge demand for
healthcare and treatment nationwide.  
To ensure continuity among state and feder-
al pandemic planning, PAHPA requires the
Secretary of HHS within 180 days of enact-
ment, or no later than June 2007, to develop
criteria for state pandemic influenza plans.124
The HHS, in coordination with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
provided a template with review criteria, scor-
Review of State Pandemic Plans 
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ing schema, and review group information to
the states in a letter dated January 26, 2007.
According to ASPR’s Progress Report, a revised
set of state pandemic planning criteria will be
developed and disseminated to states.125
Providing states with revised criteria should
help standardize and strengthen individual
state pandemic preparedness plans.  
In order to evaluate state preparedness,
HHS asked all 50 states and D.C. to submit
abstracts of updated pandemic flu plans to
CDC by April 16, 2007.126 As of November
2007 the most up-to-date versions of the
state pandemic plans submitted to HHS
were unavailable to the public, and HHS has
not publicly released the results of its state-
by-state review.  HHS and other federal
agencies, however, reviewed the state plans
and “HHS compiled the results into state-
specific draft interim assessments,” which
they shared with states.127
Earlier reviews of state pandemic prepared-
ness plans, such as a 2006 report 
by Research Triangle Institute, found con-
siderable variation among state plans, and
gave 2 reasons for the differences:  1) weak
federal direction, and 2) lingering questions
about the epidemiology and control of 
pandemic influenza.128
A Congressional Research Service (CRS)
report that analyzed all state pandemic
plans available as of July 2006 identified the
following areas as needing improvement:129
■ Prioritization of limited medical assets
such as vaccinations and antivirals; 
■ Early detection and ongoing disease 
surveillance;
■ Legal liability and civil rights issues asso-
ciated with disease control measures; and 
■ Lack of clear leadership roles and coordi-
nation among different actors.  
The CRS report also found a wide range of
variability among state plans.  While some
variability is to be expected given the autono-
my of states and their differing needs, the
CRS report authors believe planning for a
pandemic requires a more standardized
approach.  They acknowledged, however,
that what exactly the standard operating pro-
cedure should be during a pandemic
remains unclear.  “For example, uncertain-
ties about the ways in which flu spreads, the
lack of national consensus in matters 
of equity in rationing, and a long tradition of
federal deference to states in matters of pub-
lic health, all complicate efforts to set uni-
form planning requirements for states.”130
Although the federal government has made a
substantial investment in public health and
pandemic preparedness, the funding has
been inconsistent and unpredictable.  The
Bush Administration’s FY 2008 budget
includes a $146 million cut in programs dedi-
cated to bioterrorism and public health pre-
paredness capabilities, specifically programs
intended to upgrade state and local capabili-
ties and hospital readiness.  This represents a
more than 25 percent cut from the public
health preparedness funding level in FY 2005.   
A report by the National Association of
County and City Health Officials (NACCHO)
found that federal funding cuts resulted in:131
■ 28 percent of local health departments
cutting staff time on preparedness, which
led to either delays in completion of pre-
paredness plans or delays/cancellations
of workforce training; 
■ 40 percent of local health departments
delaying or canceling acquisition of
equipment and supplies; and 
■ Difficulty hiring needed and qualified staff.
Funding is also a concern for the Hospital
Preparedness Program (HPP).  As one
grantee noted in a January 2007 conference
call with HHS, “we need...some reassurance
about the availability of funding that would
be available to the Department of Health.
Otherwise our staff will start looking for
positions elsewhere because of insecurity
and uncertainty of what the future holds.”132
3.  Federal Preparedness and Pandemic Funding
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PANDEMIC INFLUENZA FUNDING  
Federal funding for HHS for pandemic influenza planning totaled $5.62 billion dollars in FY
2006.  For FY 2007, only $108 million in additional funds were appropriated for activities at
CDC, FDA, and NIH.133
Of the $5.62 billion, $600 million were to be allocated toward state and local pandemic
influenza preparedness.  In August 2007, $75 million of this funding was distributed to state
health departments through the Hospital Preparedness Program Cooperative Agreement for
a one-time pandemic influenza response planning grant.  
The $75 million in supplemental funding will be used to:134
■ Establish or enhance stockpiles of critical medical equipment and supplies;  
■ Continue development of plans for maintenance, distribution and sharing of those resources;   
■ Plan for and develop pandemic alternate care sites; and  
■ Conduct exercises to prepare for or approximate a surge in health needs.  
FY 2008 
The president’s $1.2 billion budget request for pandemic flu preparedness for FY 2008 includ-
ed $870 million for one-time funding for vaccine and antiviral purchases and the development
of rapid diagnostics, as well as $322 million for ongoing pandemic preparedness activities at
CDC, FDA, NIH, and the Office of the Secretary of HHS.  The president’s budget did not
include any money for state and local pandemic flu preparedness.
Under PAHPA, entities that receive cooper-
ative agreement emergency preparedness
funds are required to submit annual reports
to the HHS secretary describing funded
activities and the entities’ performance with
respect to program goals and objectives,
appropriate budget information, and other
reporting requirements.135
According to ASPR’s Progress Report, HHS
is in the process of establishing guidelines
for standardized reports from awardees.136
Tracking of Federal Preparedness Dollars
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USE OF PREPAREDNESS FUNDS AND PUBLIC HEALTH CAPABILITIES  
■ Congressional Research Service (CRS):  A 2007 report found and listed several
reasons why tracking federal funding for pandemic preparedness is difficult.  Among
them, pandemic flu funds do not reflect the true amount of money being spent on pan-
demic preparedness since many activities that support pandemic preparedness also
support public health preparedness in general or seasonal flu preparedness.  But, most
importantly, pandemic flu funding is difficult to track because “federal agencies may not
prepare budget information...in a consistent fashion.”137
■ Government Accountability Office (GAO):  After the response to Hurricane
Katrina demonstrated the failure of U.S. emergency preparedness planning, members
of the U.S. Congress asked GAO to investigate whether the federal government is
adequately prepared to lead the nation in planning for and responding to a pandemic
flu.  A 2007 GAO report found that clear leadership roles are still not defined in the
National Pandemic Influenza Strategy.  The GAO report also criticized the plan for “lack
of a clear linkage between the performance measures and intended results” which
makes assessing and evaluating progress on pandemic preparedness difficult.138
In the event of a pandemic flu, the expected
demand on the U.S. health care system would
be extraordinary.  The HHS Pandemic
Influenza Plan projects that a pandemic
could result in 45 million additional outpa-
tient visits, with 865,000-9,900,000 individuals
requiring hospitalization, depending on the
severity of the pandemic.
With nearly 16 percent of Americans lacking
health insurance coverage, the financial impact
on the country’s public health and health care
systems could be disastrous, if hospitals, com-
munity health centers, and primary care facili-
ties treat large numbers of uninsured.139 If
these facilities turned away the uninsured, treat-
ing and containing the further spread of a pan-
demic would be nearly impossible.     
The percentage of people by state without
health insurance ranges from a high of 24.5
percent in Texas to a low of 8.6 percent in
Rhode Island.  According to the Center for
Biosecurity at University of Pittsburgh, U.S.
hospitals could lose as much as $3.9 billion
in uncompensated care and cash flow losses
in a severe pandemic.140 This strain could
force hospitals to close down during or
immediately after a pandemic, with long-
term negative consequences for the health
care delivery system.141 (Please see Appendix
I:  Estimated Mortality and Morbidity for a
Severe Pandemic and Impact on Uninsured
Population for more information.).   
To save lives, contain any pandemic to the
degree possible, and ensure a functioning
health care system throughout and after
such a catastrophic emergency, the federal
government should act now to create a
framework for emergency health coverage
and reimbursement.  
A public health emergency benefit would
have to address 2 separate concerns for
providers and patients.  It would have to
guarantee providers some level of compen-
sation for the services they provide during a
pandemic, while encouraging individuals to
come forward for diagnosis or treatment. 
For the health care system, the emergency
benefit would mitigate the economic impact
of providing such a high level of emergency
care (much of which may be uncompensat-
ed), while also forgoing revenue generating
activities (such as elective surgeries), which
could place hospitals and other health care
providers in financial jeopardy.  
4. Additional Federal Issues
A. Emergency Health Benefit
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The benefit would also encourage the unin-
sured or underinsured who fall ill with
influenza to access primary care services for
prompt diagnosis and treatment and not be
delayed due to concerns about their inability
to pay for services.  Delayed diagnosis may
eliminate the potential value of isolation or
quarantine measures, thereby allowing 
infection to spread.  Similarly, delayed diag-
nosis might render useless potential treat-
ment with antivirals, since such treatment
must begin early after infection.  
The federal government could act to lessen
the problem.  For instance, the creation of a
stand-by emergency authority could, upon
appropriation of funds by the U.S. Congress,
permit the secretary of HHS to declare a
public health emergency and provide tem-
porary emergency health benefits to individ-
uals who are uninsured or underinsured.  An
emergency fund would be established to pay
for these services at Medicare rates.  The
benefits would last for 90 days or fewer,
although the secretary could extend them
for an additional 90 days if necessary.  
It is best to create these mechanisms prior to
an emergency, rather than in the heat of 
the moment when any delay would be count-
ed in lives lost.  In addition, prior planning
may enable the government to be more cost-
effective in using scarce resources.  The bene-
fits described here could be expanded beyond
preparing for and enduring a possible pan-
demic.  As was the case during Hurricane
Katrina, unusual demands on the health care
system can occur through various types of cat-
astrophic emergencies.  The secretary could
have the authority to trigger the availability of
these benefits during other catastrophic
national and/or regional emergencies. 
Controlling the spread of a pandemic flu will
depend on keeping infected persons away
from the uninfected as much as possible.
Doing so includes getting the infected and
their families to stay home from work.  CDC
guidance issued in February 2007 includes the
recommendation that sick people stay home
from work for 7 to 10 days and that family or
household members of those sick remain at
home for 7 days.142 This stay-at-home policy
will limit the contact of sick people, and their
potentially infected families, with others when
they are contagious.  These recommendations
raise a troubling issue, however, because 48
percent of private-sector workers in the U.S.
lack paid sick leave benefits and 94 million
Americans do not have a single paid sick day
they can use to care for a sick child.143
According to an October 2007 public opinion
survey that Greenberg Quinlan Rosner
Research conducted for TFAH, nearly 9 out of
10 Americans indicate that they would abide
by a voluntary quarantine and stay home in
the event of an outbreak of a pandemic flu.144
Among the 10 percent who report they would
not adhere to the government’s request of a
voluntary quarantine, most indicate they
could not stay at home due to fears of losing
needed income (64 percent) or losing their
jobs altogether (39 percent). Fifty-four per-
cent of those who would not remain at home
indicate they work as essential personnel and
would still be required to work.  
A 2006 Harvard University survey found that
while the vast majority of Americans would
follow social distancing guidelines, such as
avoiding public events (92 percent), avoiding
malls and shopping centers (91 percent),
and limiting use of public transportation (89
percent), though far fewer would stay home
from work (57 percent).145 Of those who
indicated they would have difficulty staying
home from work in a pandemic, 48 percent
cited lost pay and resulting money problems
as a reason.  Twenty-seven percent said they
would likely lose their jobs or business if they
stayed home for 7 to 10 days.  This disincen-
tive to stay home from work during a pan-
demic could be a serious obstacle to control-
ling the spread of disease and resulting 
illness and fatalities.    
B. Emergency Sick Leave 
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An existing program, the Disaster
Unemployment Assistance Program, is a U.S.
Department of Labor effort administered by
states as agents of the federal government.  It
provides financial assistance to individuals
whose employment or self-employment has
been lost or interrupted as a direct result of a
major disaster declared by the president of the
United States.  It is unclear, however, if the
Disaster Unemployment Assistance program
as it is currently set up would cover workers
without sick leave who quarantine themselves
or their families.  The federal government or
the U.S. Congress should move to clarify this.  
Proposed legislation that seeks to address
this need includes the Healthy Families Act
(HR 1542/S 910).  This legislation would
require employers with 15 or more employ-
ees to offer 7 paid sick days each year, to be
used to deal with individual medical needs
or to care for sick family members.  While
some argue that this legislation is good for
public health in general, others point out
that 7 days of paid sick leave may not be
enough to minimize the spread of disease
during a public health emergency such as a
potential pandemic flu outbreak.  Nor does
the legislation conform with the CDC rec-
ommendation for possible self-quarantine
for up to 10 days.  TFAH, however, encour-
ages the U.S. Congress to expand paid sick
leave to ensure economic stability and mini-
mize health risks during a pandemic or
infectious disease outbreak. 
The Shelf Life Extension Program (SLEP) is
administered jointly by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD).  The
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) also par-
ticipates in the program.146 DOD and SNS
both maintain large stockpiles of medica-
tions and vaccines in order to ensure that
both military and civilian populations have
access to needed antidotes, and treatments in
the event of a medical emergency. In order to
save federal dollars, FDA and DOD devel-
oped a system of extending the shelf life of
these drugs and vaccines beyond the manu-
facturer’s expiration date.  While the pro-
gram has resulted in substantial savings at the
federal level, states’ stockpiles of antivirals --
purchased through a HHS-subsidized pro-
gram as part of states pandemic prepared-
ness -- are not eligible.
HHS designated $170 million to subsidize
states’ purchases of up to 31 million treat-
ment courses of Tamiflu (oseltamivir) and
Relenza (zanamivir).  HHS will subsidize 25
percent of the cost, and states will pay the
other 75 percent.  Forty-three states and
D.C. have made a good faith effort to pur-
chase some, if not all, of their allotment of
federally-subsidized antivirals.  Eighteen
states purchased their entire allocation,
while 15 states purchased additional unsub-
sidized treatment courses.    
In 2006, the Association of State and
Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) sur-
veyed its members regarding the stockpiling
of antivirals.  At the time, states indicated
that inventory management, including the
storage, rotation, and shelf-life extension
strategies, were of critical concern.147 State
public health budgets are stretched thin
already.  Without a federal compromise on
the SLEP, many states will be unwilling to
commit scarce dollars to buy antivirals that
will expire in only 7 years. 
C. Shelf-Life Extension Program
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Among the federal guidelines for individual
and household preparedness is the need for
Americans to stockpile enough of their
essential prescription medications for 2
weeks.148 Many Americans, however, rely on
government health insurance plans such as
Medicaid, Medicare, and S-CHIP in order to
buy prescription drugs.  These people are
unable to buy extra medicine to stockpile in
case of a public health emergency.  
The federal government should clarify existing
policies or enact new legislation that is in line
with its own preparedness recommendations. 
D. Aligning Federal Policies with Federal Preparedness Guidelines
According to a 2007 GAO report, “the fed-
eral oversight of food safety is fragmented,
with 15 agencies collectively administering
at least 30 laws related to food safety.”149 As
a result, federal food safety oversight makes
poor use of available resources and is now
listed as one of the government’s “high risk”
programs.  In addition to inadequate lead-
ership and coordination within the U.S., the
U.S. food safety system lacks appropriate
priorities for the sophisticated and globally
connected world of food production. The
focus should be on reducing foodborne dis-
ease in the U.S. and maintaining public con-
fidence in food safety and the food supply.
E. Federal Food Safety Reforms
The 4 agencies with the largest roles include
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
(USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS), the Food and Drug Administration’s
(FDA) Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition (CFSAN), the FDA’s Office of
Regulatory Affairs, and the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC)
Food Safety Office.  
FSIS and CFSAN are the 2 agencies currently
with lead authority for food safety policy and
standard setting.  While FDA’s Office of
Regulatory Affairs inspects and enforces stan-
dards for FDA-regulated products, and CDC
performs an independent illness surveillance
function.  Neither FSIS nor CFSAN, however,
has the statutory authority or practical man-
date to forge an integrated strategy that puts
the research, regulatory, and educational
tools of government to work in a coherent
way to minimize risks.
Food safety problems occur in part because
responsibilities are still divided among 
several agencies, and each of these agencies
operates independently with different regu-
latory approaches.  
Inadequate Leadership and Coordination
61
As lawmakers address new threats, they typi-
cally amend existing laws or enact new ones
without updating previous statutes.  Many of
today’s food safety laws are antiquated and
have not been updated to address newer
threats or deemphasize threats that have
been diminished due to modern farming
practices and technology.  The current orga-
nizational and legal patchwork results in
divided jurisdictions for specific food items
among different agencies, which then have
different authorities and responsibilities.150
For example, food safety historically was
under the auspices of USDA because it was
seen more as a veterinary and animal health
issue.  With the growing use of chemical
additives in food in the 1930s, however, the
bulk of the regulatory oversight shifted to
FDA.  Despite this change in regulatory
power, two-thirds of the current U.S. food
safety budget still goes to USDA, while only
one-third goes to FDA, even though the 
latter agency is responsible for overseeing
80% of the food supply.151
The recent series of foodborne illness out-
breaks in the U.S. suggests the problem is
worsening and will continue to deteriorate
further without intervention.   
Outdated Priorities and Resource Allocation  
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Hospital Emergency
Preparedness Survey 3S E C T I O N
According to a new survey of U.S. infection control professionals, U.S. hospi-tals have made great strides in preparedness, but much remains to be done.
HOSPITAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SURVEY 2007
Improvements 
■ 76 percent of hospitals have plans to care
for patients at alternative care sites in the
event of a major health emergency.   
■ 53 percent of hospitals have plans to call up
additional staffing resources, such as retired
medical professionals, during an emergency.   
Concerns 
■ Only 43 percent of hospitals offer any
incentives to encourage healthcare work-
ers to continue to come to work in the
event of a major disaster.    
■ 20 percent of hospitals with emergency
preparedness plans to care for patients at
alternative care sites, do not have realistic
plans to staff these sites.   
This dissonance between planning for alter-
native care sites while failing to have per-
sonnel plans appropriate to a surge in
patients reveals major shortcomings in U.S.
hospital planning   
The 2007 Hospital Emergency Preparedness
Survey was conducted by the Association for
Professionals in Infection Control and
Epidemiology (APIC) of their members who
are experts in infection prevention in hospi-
tals.  Six hundred and thirty APIC members
responded to the survey developed by mem-
bers of APIC’s Emergency Preparedness
Committee Advisory Board and TFAH.    
Some highlights from the 2007 survey are
presented below.  For a detailed methodolo-
gy please see Appendix J:  Methodology of
APIC Survey.  (Note: In 2005, the Ready or
Not? report included a similar survey that
provided responses on a state-by-state basis.) 
THE ASSOCIATION FOR PROFESSIONALS IN INFECTION CONTROL
AND EPIDEMIOLOGY (APIC)  
APIC’s mission is to improve health and patient safety by reducing risks of infection and other
adverse outcomes.  The Association’s more than 11,000 members have primary responsibility
for infection prevention, control and hospital epidemiology in health care settings around the
globe, and include nurses, epidemiologists, physicians, microbiologists, clinical pathologists,
laboratory technologists and public health practitioners.  APIC advances its mission through
education, research, collaboration, public policy, practice guidance, and credentialing.  The
organization, based in Washington, D.C., is led by an elected board of members who volun-
teer their time and expertise.152
1. Alternative Care Sites:
Survey participants were asked: “In the event
of a major health emergency, has your hospital
established plans or been involved in state or local
planning efforts to care for a patient at a non-
healthcare/alternative facility, such as a commu-
nity center, sports arena, or hotel?” 
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According to the APIC survey, 76 percent of
respondents have either established plans
or been involved in state and local planning
efforts to prepare for a surge of excess
patients by planning to use alternative care
sites as overflow/temporary patient sites.    
Surge capacity is defined as a health care sys-
tem’s ability to expand quickly to meet 
an increased demand for medical care in the
event of bioterrorism or other large-scale pub-
lic health emergencies.153 An accurate estimate
of surge capacity is critical for preparedness
planning.154 Estimating surge capacity, howev-
er, is complicated since emergency planners
must anticipate how much surge is needed for
2 distinct scenarios.  The first is a time-limited
public health emergency, such as a terrorist
attack, an earthquake, or other natural disas-
ter, during which resources from unaffected
areas can be mobilized to assist those in need.
The second is a widespread, prolonged event,
such as pandemic influenza, during which all
resources will be used and rationing of scarce
supplies and staff is needed.155
During mass-emergency and infectious dis-
ease situations such as pandemic influenza,
many hospitals and healthcare delivery
providers will face surge conditions, for
which the demand for hospital beds and
equipment far surpasses the available sup-
ply.  In the event of a public health emer-
gency, it may be necessary to use alternative
care sites such as community centers,
churches, motels and sports facilities as tem-
porary, makeshift health centers.  Due to
the challenges associated with providing
care in these non-traditional sites, states,
and communities must address related plan-
ning procedures and legal and regulatory
concerns before the event occurs. 
ALTERNATIVE CARE SITES (ACS)  
The concept of providing medical care in a
non-hospital setting is not new.  In fact,
alternative care sites have been used at vari-
ous points in U.S. history, including during
the Civil War, the aftermath of the San
Francisco earthquake of 1906, the pandemic
flu of 1918-1919, and, more recently, the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the 2007
Southern California wildfires.  
Alternative care sites generally are defined as
“locations, preexisting or created, that serve to
expand the capacity of a hospital or communi-
ty to accommodate or care for patients or to
protect the general population from infected
individuals during mass casualty incidents.”156
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations lists 3 types of
alternative care sites:  
■ Facilities of opportunity, which are defined
as non-medical buildings which, because of
their size or proximity to a medical center,
can be adapted into surge hospitals;  
■ Mobile medical facilities, which are
mobile surge hospitals based on tractor-
trailer platforms with surgical and inten-
sive care capabilities; and  
■ Portable facilities, which are mobile
medical facilities that can be set up quickly
and are fully equipped, self-contained,
turnkey systems usually stored in a con-
tainer system and based on military med-
ical contingency planning.157 
Despite the clear need for alternative care sites
following a mass casualty event, there are sever-
al barriers to their successful roll-out, including: 
■ Unclear delineation of responsibilities and author-
ity among state, local and regional partners;
■ Need for cohesive coordination between
public and private healthcare practitioners
with differing allegiances to various agencies;   
■ Healthcare staff and administrators must be
willing and able to report to work and stay
at work during a public health emergency; 
■ Continued reliance on table-top exercises
instead of operational drills to test the
deployment of mobile units and the cre-
ation of alternative care sites; 
■ Licensing and liability concerns for health-
care workers and volunteers; liability con-
cerns for non-healthcare volunteers and
third-party entities that play host to alter-
native care sites; and  
■ Funding and compensation issues.158
In addition, emergency planners will need to
obtain, stockpile and store supplies, equipment
and medicines for use in the alternative care sites.
65
THE HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM (HPP)  
The Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 (PAHPA) transferred the National
Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program (NBHPP) from the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA) to the newly created office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR), and the NBHPP was renamed the Hospital Preparedness
Program (HPP).  In addition to the new name, the program’s focus expanded from bioterror-
ism to all-hazards preparedness.  Under PAHPA, the following capabilities must be prioritized:  
■ Interoperable communications system;  ■ Fatality management plans;  
■ Bed tracking system; ■ Hospital evacuation plans; and  
■ Emergency System for the Advance ■ National Incident Management System 
Registration of Volunteer Health (NIMS) compliance.  
Professionals (ESAR-VHP); 
If states had addressed the capabilities listed above, PAHPA allowed those states with ade-
quate funding to address the following issues during FY 2007: 
■ Alternate care sites (ACS); ■ Personal protective equipment; and  
■ Mobile medical assets; ■ Decontamination. 
■ Pharmaceutical caches;  
Surge Capacity Guidance 
Prior to the creation of ASPR, HRSA developed hospital surge capacity guidance that requires
states to create healthcare systems that, at a minimum, provide triage treatment and initial sta-
bilization above the current daily staffed bed capacity for the following patient populations
requiring hospitalization:  
■ 500 cases per 1 million population with infectious diseases; 
■ 50 cases per 1 million with chemical toxicity; 
■ 50 cases per 1 million with burns or trauma (blast); and 
■ 50 cases per 1 million with radiation injury.  
Many public health experts, however, find these requirements arbitrary and unhelpful.  According
to an October 2007 report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, “in a city of one million being served by
multiple hospitals, how is preparation for the 500 cases [with infectious diseases] distributed
among hospitals? Bed availability varies by region, and census fluctuates widely by time of day, day
of week, and month or season.”159
To help address this, the Agency for Health Research and Quality (AHRQ) commissioned a
report “to develop, implement and evaluate a real-time electronic hospital bed tracking/moni-
toring system that will serve as a demonstration management tool to assist in a system/region’s
ability to care for a surge of patients in the event of a mass casualty incident.”160 The initial pilot
project tested in the report ran into some difficulties, including reluctance on the part of some
hospitals to share bed availability data.  Overall, however, the report found that the project
“has demonstrated the feasibility and utility of a system that captures and integrates currently
accessible bed availability data from divergent systems in use across the country and coupling
those data with data from hospitals that do not currently participate in these systems to pro-
duce a large-scale picture of patient bed availability across the country.”161
Surge Capacity Funding 
In addition to concerns about the value of current ASPR/HRSA hospital surge capacity guidance,
resources are also a critical issue. Although the HPP has provided funding to hospitals of approx-
imately $500 million per year, this only comes to about $100,000 per year per hospital.162
According to the Center for Biosecurity, the minimum costs of developing and maintaining surge
capacity during a severe pandemic for an average size hospital are close to a $1 million one-time
investment coupled with $200,000 in annual maintenance costs.163
66
Survey participants were asked: “Does your
hospital’s emergency surge capability plan incor-
porate additional staffing resources, such as
retired medical professionals (doctors, nurses, etc.),
and/or contracts for temporary agency workers?” 
According to the Congressional Research
Service, surge workforce capabilities are a
key factor in public health preparedness:  
"Though there are federal and state efforts to
stockpile vaccines, drugs, ventilators, and other
supplies, the healthcare workforce is likely to
be the key limiting factor in ramping up health-
care service delivery during a pandemic.”165
Providing incentives to current medical staff
is one way to ensure workforce capacity is
available.  Another means to boost surge
workforce capacity is to rely on outside health-
care volunteers, such as retired practitioners
or practicing clinicians from out of state.  This
presents challenges as during a pandemic
out-of-state volunteers are likely to be working
in their home states, or, like others in the pop-
ulation, may be sick and unable to volunteer.   
Barely half of hospitals, only 52.9 percent of
respondents, reported that their hospitals
had plans in place to incorporate additional
staff in the event of an emergency.   
3. Surge Workforce
Survey participants were asked: “Does your hos-
pital currently have a plan or incentives to encourage
healthcare workers to continue to come to work dur-
ing a major infectious disease outbreak or disaster?” 
Workforce continuity is a critical compo-
nent of an effective response to a mass-
emergency event.  Hospitals may find that in
a public health emergency many of their
staffers may be unwilling to report to duty
either because of fear for their own safety or
for their family’s safety.  Incentives to
encourage healthcare workers to report for
duty, therefore, may be necessary to meet
surge capacity staffing levels.  Such incen-
tives might include priority receipt of coun-
termeasures or vaccines, paid time off (after
the outbreak), housing for family members,
other financial incentives, daycare and food
for staffers’ children and elderly relatives,
and shelter, food, and care for staffs’ pets.164
Only 43.3 percent of those surveyed, howev-
er, reported having incentives or provisions
to encourage health care workers to report
to work in the event of a mass-casualty event. 
2. Workforce Incentives 
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SURGE WORKFORCE FOR EMERGENCIES  
The Surgeon General’s Office and the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
have been working to establish strong volunteer networks of medical professionals to help
with emergencies and incorporating lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina.    
The Surgeon General’s Office manages the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) as part of the
national network of volunteers called the Citizen Corps to help with expert medical care surge
capacity during times of emergency.166 MRC’s mission “is to improve the health and safety of
communities across the country by organizing and utilizing public health, medical and other volun-
teers.”167 MRC volunteers include medical and public health professionals such as physicians, nurs-
es, pharmacists, dentists, veterinarians, and epidemiologists.  Across the country there are some
140,000 MRC volunteers linked with more than 700 units of the MRC as of November 2007.   
MRC units are funded by the federal government, as well as by state and local governments,
and in some cases through private funds such as foundations.  In September 2006 the
National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) signed a cooperative
agreement with MRC to strengthen the ties between the MRC program at all levels and the
nation’s public health system.  NACCHO will promote MRC to its members from local health
departments and offer capacity development grants to new and existing MRC units.168
In addition to the MRC program, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response (ASPR) manages a state-based program designed to secure a volunteer healthcare
delivery workforce in the event of an emergency.169 The Emergency System for Advance
Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) program helps states develop
standardized programs for registering volunteer health professionals in advance of emergencies.
Each state program collects verified information on the identity, licensure status, clinical privi-
leges, and professional credentials of volunteers. State ESAR-VHP systems are intended to be
the mechanism for recording the registration and credential information of all potential health
volunteers in a state.  They will provide a single, centralized volunteer information database to
facilitate intra-state, state-to-state, and state-to-federal transfer of volunteers.  These systems
should include information about volunteers involved in organized efforts at the local level (such
as the MRC units) and the state level.  The system also will serve a critical statewide role in
recruiting, registering, verifying credentials, and classifying health professionals willing to serve in
emergencies but not interested in being part of a trained, organized volunteer structure.    
By establishing ESAR-VHP registries in each state, ASPR hopes to eliminate the confusion and
bureaucracy that hampered volunteer healthcare workers’ efforts in New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina struck in August 2005.  In one case, a 35-car convoy of some 100 healthcare workers from
North Carolina was stopped at the Louisiana state line, where state officials refused to let them
enter the state to treat persons affected by the storm and subsequent flooding.170
ASPR is actively working to accelerate implementation and operation of these state systems
given that starting in FY 2009, participation in ESAR-VHP will be a pre-condition for receiving
federal preparedness funds.171
CALIFORNIA’S SURGE INITIATIVE  
California is no stranger to disasters.  Earthquakes, wildfires, and floods are among the natural
disasters that routinely strike the state.  Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that California has
emerged as a national leader in enhancing public health emergency preparedness for natural
disasters, terrorist attacks, and disease outbreaks -- the all-hazards approach.    
Over the past 2 years, California has invested $214 million to build emergency surge capacity for
potential disasters in the state through the purchase of 2,400 ventilators, 50 million N95 respira-
tors, 3 200-bed mobile field hospitals, and supplies and equipment for 21,000 alternate care site
beds.  The state has also bought its share of federally-subsidized antiviral medications (3.7 million
courses).  In addition, California is developing standards and guidelines for healthcare delivery
during surge events, and is updating hospital emergency and infection control regulations.172
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2007 DRAFT PLAN FOR PANDEMIC VACCINE PRIORITIZATION  
According to the U.S. Department for Health and Human Services, the groups to receive first
doses of vaccine under a draft federal prioritization scheme are:  
■ 700,000 deployed and critical military personnel; 
■ 6.3 million public health, hospital, outpatient, home health and long-term care workers; 
■ 2.1 million emergency medical services, police and firefighters, vaccine and antiviral manu-
facturers, key government leaders; and 
■ 13.4 million pregnant women and babies 6 to 35 months old.173
Once more vaccine becomes available, older children, and utility and telecommunications
workers could be added to the list.174
The draft plan was unveiled at an October 22-23, 2007 meeting of the National Vaccine
Advisory Committee.  While the plan is not yet finalized, the highest priority groups are
unlikely to change.175
Survey participants were asked: 
"Has your hospital worked with the state or 
local health department to plan for prioritizing
hospital workers to receive health agency-managed
vaccine or anti-infective therapy in the event of an
infectious emergency?” 
At the beginning of a major infectious 
disease outbreak, such as pandemic influen-
za, there is likely to be a shortage of vaccines
and medications to cover the entire 
population.  Priority setting to determine
which segments of the population will
receive scarce supplies based on potential
risk is an essential component of public
health preparedness.    
The majority of respondents (79 percent)
reported they had worked with state or local
health departments to ensure that hospital
workers would be on the priority list to
receive vaccine or antivirals.  Healthcare
workers and hospital staff are prioritized
high so that they remain healthy enough to
keep the rest of society functioning. 
4. Vaccine Prioritization for Healthcare Workers
Survey respondents were asked: “Does your hospi-
tal have an infection control professional available for
an immediate (within 15 minutes) verbal consultation
(via phone or face-to-face) on a 24 hour/7 days a week
basis with the hospital or public health personnel?” 
According to the World Health Organization,
39 new diseases have been identified over the
past 40 years, including HIV, Ebola, Marburg,
and SARS.  In addition, older diseases, such as
malaria and tuberculosis, have mutated and
developed drug resistance making them even
harder to treat.176 With airlines carrying more
than 2 billion passengers a year, diseases can
travel from one country to another in a mat-
ter of hours.177 The devastation wrought by
such disease outbreaks goes beyond the field
of public health.  For example, the 2003 SARS
outbreak cost Asian countries an estimated
$60 billion of gross expenditure and business
losses.178 A pandemic flu could cost the
United States an estimated $683 billion.179
Enhanced disease surveillance, rapid diagno-
sis and rapid response capabilities are essen-
tial components of emergency preparedness.
More than three-quarters of respondents
(78.4 percent) reported that their hospitals
have an infection control professional avail-
able for an immediate verbal consultation on
a 24 hour/7 days a week basis with the hospi-
tal or public health personnel. 
5. Infection Control Rapid Response
69
Survey participants were asked: 
"Has your hospital taken specific steps  to stock-
pile or have reserve medical supplies (including
linens, gowns, masks, and other supplies) needed
during an infectious disease emergency (such as
through ordering or contracting over and above
routine supply in the event that regular supply
chain deliverables become unavailable)?” 
The current U.S. hospital system relies on “just-
in-time inventory” strategies, which could be
problematic in the face of a public health emer-
gency that could diminish the efficiency of the
delivery system.  Emergency planners, there-
fore, need to consider how they will obtain addi-
tional supplies in advance of an emergency
from vendors, other healthcare facilities, and
the state and federal governments.180 Nearly
three-quarters (73.9 percent) of hospitals have
taken specific measures to stockpile or have
reserve medical supplies (including linens,
gowns, masks, and other supplies) that would be
needed during an infectious disease emergency.   
While a large majority of respondents indicat-
ed that their hospitals had taken specific meas-
ures to stockpile supplies, there were large dif-
ferences in the types of goods they reported
stockpiling.  For instance, the number of
respondents who indicated their hospitals had
stockpiled surgical masks was 46.2 percent,
while only 36.2 percent had stockpiled medical
equipment, such as ventilators, and less than
one-fifth (18.7 percent) had stockpiled linens.  
A much larger percentage (66.7 percent) said
their hospitals had stockpiled NIOSH-approved
N-95 respirators.  While much of what would be
needed during a pandemic or other public
health emergency will come from the SNS, 62.5
percent of respondents said their hospitals had
stockpiled or made agreements for accessing
additional supplies of medications in addition
to what they will receive from the SNS.  
6. Stockpiled Medical Supplies 
OTHER PREPAREDNESS TRAINING RELATED FINDINGS FROM 
THE 2007 APIC SURVEY  
■ 87.5 percent of hospitals participated in bioterrorism or infectious disease exercises in the past year.   
■ Of this group, 72.7 percent reported the exercise involved community participation. 
■ 84.9 percent of hospitals compiled ‘lessons learned’ from the exercises that were later
used to revise emergency response plans.   
■ Only 64.1 percent of these hospitals, however, then trained/educated hospital staff on
the revisions made to the emergency response plan. 
■ Just under a quarter (24.8 percent) of hospitals have “cross-trained” staffers to provide
patient care outside their routine area or specialty, in case staffers are re-assigned to 
primary care settings during disaster response. 
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U.S. Public Opinion Poll 4S E C T I O NAmericans have little confidence in preparations to handle a variety of potential threats or public health emergencies at national and local
levels.  A survey commissioned by TFAH found that, 6 years later, more than
half of all Americans believe the country is less safe now than before the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
While people believe they share a responsi-
bility with government to make sure they
can handle a natural disaster or public
health emergency, many indicate they have
not taken necessary steps to ensure their
homes and families are ready for such an
event.  A lack of concrete plans for commu-
nicating and planning with family members
stands out as a primary area where improve-
ment in preparedness is needed.  
The survey was designed and conducted by
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc.
Interviews were conducted by professional
interviewers.  The survey reached 1,020 adults
ages 18 and older.  The survey was conducted
October 18-22, 2007. The data were weighted
by gender, age, race, and region to ensure an
accurate reflection of the population.  The
sample size with these weights applied is 1,020
and is subject to a margin of error of +/- 3.1
percent at a 95 percent level of confidence.  
The following are key findings from the sur-
vey, followed by a more in-depth analysis.   
■ Fifty-four percent of Americans believe
the United States is less safe than prior to
September 11, 2001.  
■ People express little confidence in pre-
paredness for emergencies.  Large majori-
ties of Americans indicate the country and
their communities are not adequately pre-
pared to handle a large scale natural dis-
aster like Hurricane Katrina, a bioterror-
ism attack, or a pandemic flu.  
■ Americans recognize they have little control
over large-scale potential disasters and pub-
lic health emergencies, but remain con-
cerned about the possibility of such threats.
Past research showed that Americans tend
to avoid thoughts of issues they see as
beyond their control, like public health
threats of all forms, instead relying on gov-
ernment’s ability to handle these issues.
Americans still express worry, however,
about these crises and think more must be
done to prepare for them.  Some of the
most vulnerable segments of the popula-
tion, including older women, African
Americans, and Hispanics, express even
greater worry about each of these threats.  
■ While 82 percent of adults see preparing
for natural disasters and public health
emergencies as a shared responsibility
between government and individuals and
families, many have not taken steps to be
prepared in their own homes.  Four-in-
ten Americans do not currently maintain
a 2-week reserve of food, water, and med-
ical supplies to ready themselves for an
emergency.  In addition, majorities of
Americans have no plan for communicat-
ing or reuniting with family members if
separated during an emergency event. 
Just 44 percent of American adults believe the
United States is safer now than before the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001 while a
majority (54 percent) say the country is not as
safe as it was prior to September 11.  While
large blocs of nearly every demographic
group indicate the nation is not as safe, there
are some differences across gender, age,
racial, and geographic boundaries.    
■ African Americans are least likely to believe
the country is safer now. Nearly three-
quarters of African Americans say the
United States is not as safe now as it was
before 9/11, compared to 55 percent of
Hispanics and 52 percent of whites.  
■ Women are more likely than men to ques-
tion the level of safety in America. Fifty-
eight percent of women believe the coun-
try is less safe than before 9/11, while the
same metric reads 50 percent for men.
College-educated women (66 percent)
and women over the age of 50 (60 per-
cent) are among the least likely to believe
the country is safer now.  
■ Belief in country’s safety rises as income
increases. Americans making more than
$75,000 a year or more are most likely to
think the country is safer now than 6 years
ago.  Even among this group, however, just
a bare majority believes this.    
■ Majorities of Americans in every region
indicate the country is less safe now, but
those living in the South are most confi-
dent in the current level of safety in the
country (regional definitions are provided
in Appendix K).  
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1. AMERICANS SEE THE COUNTRY AS LESS SAFE NOW THAN
BEFORE 9/11 
Is America Safer Than Before September 11, 2001?
%Yes %No 
Total 44 54 
White 46 52 
African-American 27 73 
Hispanic 45 55 
Men 48 50 
Women 40 58 
Northeast 40 56 
Central 43 56 
South 47 51 
West 44 55 
Less than $30,000/yr household 39 60
$30,000-$50,000/yr household 42 56  
$50,000-$75,000/yr household 49 50  
More than $75,000/yr household 50 48   
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Not only do people feel less safe than they did
previously, but they also believe the country
and local communities are unprepared for
emergencies on a number of fronts.  Fifty-
nine percent say their communities would not
be ready to deal with a large scale natural dis-
aster similar to Hurricane Katrina, while 68
percent believe their communities would not
be prepared to handle a bioterrorism attack.
Sixty-six percent of Americans believe the
country is not prepared for an outbreak of
pandemic flu.  
2. PEOPLE EXPRESS LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN PREPAREDNESS
FOR NATURAL DISASTERS, OUTBREAKS OF DISEASE, OR 
TERRORIST ATTACKS
As with the view of the country’s overall safe-
ty, women are less likely to believe that the
country and their communities are prepared
to address these public health emergencies.
Minority populations -- including both
African Americans and Hispanic adults -- also
express less belief in the country’s prepared-
ness to respond to these situations. 
Americans see country as unprepared to handle emergencies
59
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Do you think your community
would be prepared to respond to
a natural disaster on the scale of
Hurricane Katrina?
Do you think the country is
prepared for the possibility of a
pandemic flu outbreak?
Do you think your community
would be prepared to respond to
a bioterrorism attack?
No Yes
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Worry about specific threats decreases with education level
(% extremely worried -- those rating 8 or higher on a 10-point scale)
Total High School  Some College College 
or less graduates 
Food contamination, like the recent 28 38 28 19 E.Coli outbreaks in ground beef 
A biological or chemical terrorism attack 25 36 25 16 
A pandemic flu outbreak 21 32 21 13 
A new major disease outbreak, like the 
drug-resistant strain of Tuberculosis 21 26 24 15 
A natural disaster, like Hurricane Katrina 19 29 14 14 
Americans who have a school-age child over-
whelmingly believe that their child’s school
has a plan in place to handle an emergency.
Eighty-eight percent say such a plan exists and
just 12 percent say the school either does not
have a plan (6 percent) or that the parent is
uncertain about the plan (6 percent).   
Parents also are confident their children are
adequately prepared to handle emergen-
cies.  Six-in-ten adults with school-age chil-
dren say their child knows what to do in case
of a public health emergency, while 37 per-
cent say their children are not prepared for
such an event. 
4. PARENTS INDICATE A HIGH LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN
THEIR SCHOOLS AND CHILDREN’S PREPAREDNESS
The possibility of terrorist attacks, natural
disasters, or other health crises is over-
whelming to many Americans, and they look
to government to ensure communities are
equipped to deal with these large-scale
issues.  They continue to express concerns,
however, about the possibility of these
events occurring.  On average, Americans
rate their level of worry about specific disas-
ters between a 4.2 and a 5.3 on a 0 to 10
scale.  The highest level of worry comes in
connection to food contamination (average
5.3 on a 0 to 10 scale), a threat that touches
everyday living. 
3. AMERICANS EXPRESS CONCERN OVER HEALTH THREATS
THEY VIEW AS BEYOND THEIR CONTROL
Level of worry about specific threats
Average rating on a 10 point scale
Food contamination, like the recent E.Coli outbreaks in ground beef 5.3 
A pandemic flu outbreak  4.9
A new major disease outbreak, like the drug-resistant strain of 4.8 
Tuberculosis 
A biological or chemical terrorism attack 4.8 
A natural disaster, like Hurricane Katrina 4.2
Some of the most vulnerable Americans,
including older women, African Americans,
and Hispanics, express greater worry about
each of these threats than other Americans do.
A huge divide also exists on a socioeconomic
level, as Americans with only a high school edu-
cation are far more likely to express concern
about these events than their college-educated
counterparts.  In nearly every case, the number
of high school graduates who rate their level of
worry as an 8 or higher on the 10-point scale is
more than double that of college graduates.
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Americans see preparing for natural disas-
ters and public health emergencies as a uni-
versal issue that both government and indi-
vidual Americans must work on together.
Eighty-two percent of adults think it is a
shared responsibility, compared to just 10
percent who say the responsibility for prepa-
ration for emergencies should lie primarily
with individuals, and 8 percent who task gov-
ernment with primary responsibility.  
Despite this desire to share responsibility,
however, many Americans have not taken the
necessary steps to ensure they and their fami-
lies are ready for a catastrophe.  Americans
are most likely to have stockpiled two weeks
worth of food and water supplies (59 percent)
and prescription and over the counter med-
ications (58 percent).    
At the same time, less than half of Americans
say they have made plans for reuniting with
other family members if separated during an
emergency (46 percent), and just 45 percent
of adults have an alternate plan to commu-
nicate with family members if cell phone
service is unavailable during an emergency.  
Some trends emerge:  
■ Americans under the age of 50 are much
less likely their older counterparts to have
stashed food and medical supplies in
their homes in case of emergencies.  This
is particularly true of prescription and
over the counter drugs; two-thirds of
Americans over 50 maintain a two-week
supply in their homes, while just under
half (49 percent) of those under the age
of 50 have stockpiled adequate amounts
of medicine.  
■ Americans with less than a college educa-
tion (55 percent) are less likely than col-
lege-educated Americans to keep an emer-
gency supply of medications in prepara-
tion for an emergency (64 percent).    
■ Those living in the Southern and Western
regions of the country are more likely
than Americans in the Northeast and
Central parts of the country to have plans
to communicate and reunite with their
families if an emergency should occur.  
5. BELIEF IN A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY ON PREPAREDNESS DOES
NOT LEAD TO ACTION TO ENSURE PREPAREDNESS AT HOME
Americans living in the Southern and Western regions most prepared 
to communicate with families in an emergency (% answering yes)
Northeast Central South West 
Does your family have a plan for
reuniting if you become separated 41 44 49 47
due to an emergency?  
If cell phone service is unavailable 
due to a catastrophic emergency, 42 37 49 49do you have a backup plan to 
communicate with your family?  
Nearly 9 out of 10 Americans say they would
abide by a voluntary quarantine and stay
home in the case of a pandemic flu.
Willingness to accept this type of quarantine
exists across the public at high levels.
Among the 10 percent who say they would
not adhere to the government’s request of a
voluntary quarantine, most indicate they
could not stay at home due to fears of losing
needed income (64 percent) or losing their
jobs altogether (39 percent). (Note:  Results
add to more than 100 percent as multiple respons-
es were accepted.) Fifty-four percent of those
who would not remain at home indicate
they work as essential personnel and would
still be required to work. 
6. AMERICANS WOULD SUBMIT TO QUARANTINE DURING A
PANDEMIC FLU OUTBREAK
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Additional Issues 
and Concerns 5S E C T I O N
1. PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE SHORTAGE 
The public health workforce is facing a shortage of crisis proportions that seriously threatens
our nation’s health. As the workforce ages, an inadequate number of new public health pro-
fessionals are coming into the system to replace them. A workforce shortage could debilitate
the system if a public health emergency were to occur.  According to a 2003 survey by the
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) and the Council of State
Governments (CSG), in nearly half of the states, 25 percent or more of the state public health
workforce will be eligible for retirement within the next five years.181 (Note: ASTHO expects
to release an updated version of this survey in 2008).  
The 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) included 2 programs
to address the current public health workforce shortage, but neither program received any
funding in FY 2007.  
The first program is a public health workforce demonstration project that will recruit
new employees to work in state health departments that provide a significant amount of serv-
ice and care to underserved populations and/or work with communities vulnerable to a public
health emergency.  New employees agree to serve for a minimum of 2 years and, in return,
the program pays back their student loans.182
The second program established under PAHPA is an expansion of the public health work-
force loan repayment program, which awards monies to states to operate their own loan
repayment programs and attract more employees into public health careers.183
Both programs fall under HRSA’s National Health Service Corps (NHSC), a 37-year-old program
initially created to address the healthcare worker shortage in rural areas.  Over the years the
NHSC has expanded its focus to included underserved urban neighborhoods as well.  Currently,
there are over 4,600 NHSC clinicians working in rural and urban communities nationwide, serving
5 million people.184
In 2007, U.S. Senators Charles Hagel (R-NE) and Richard Durbin (D-IL) introduced the
Public Health Workforce Development Act to help address the workforce crisis.  This bill
aims to widen the pipeline of qualified public health workers at all levels -- federal, state, local,
and tribal -- by offering scholarships and loan repayment as recruitment and retention incen-
tives for students who enter and stay in the field of public health. The bill also provides
opportunities for mid-career public health professionals to go back for additional training in
public health preparedness or biodefense.  This was the third year that Senators Hagel and
Durbin introduced the bill; however, as of November 2007, no action was taken.  
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Nursing Shortage
As one example of the impending public health workforce shortage crisis, the federal gov-
ernment estimates that by 2020 nurse retirements will contribute to a shortage of nearly
one million nurses.185 According to the American Hospital Association, the current national
hospital nurse vacancy rate is 8.5 percent.  There are several factors behind the present
and future nursing shortages, including increased job opportunities for nurses outside of
traditional healthcare settings and the impending retirement of tens of thousands of nurses
coupled with an increased demand for healthcare among the Baby Boomer generation.186
Currently, hospitals facing a workforce shortage rely on temporary nurses or international
recruitment of nurses and doctors to meet their staffing needs.  In 2005, 13 percent of all
newly licensed nurses were international nursing graduates.187 Relying on temporary
nurses and international recruits, however, is not a long-term solution.  Instead, experts
recommend a more sustainable long-term approach including:  
■ Changing the current healthcare model so that nurses are valued more; 
■ Improved working conditions in terms of merit-based pay and seniority-based pay,
flexible schedules, and more respect from patients and medical staff; 
■ Public-private partnerships to encourage nurses to stay in the workforce and to boost
numbers of nursing faculty; and 
■ Improved technology-based training for nurses.188
Public Health Workforce in Action
August 2007 -- Minneapolis Bridge Collapse
The Interstate 35W bridge collapse in Minneapolis during the evening rush hour on
August 1, 2007 left 13 people dead and sent more than 100 people to hospital emer-
gency rooms that night.  Despite the fatalities, the city and county response to the disas-
ter is seen as a model for how first responders and emergency medical personnel should
act.  According to the paramedics’ supervisor at Hennepin County Medical Center, all
injured people were transported to area emergency rooms in under 2 hours.189
Minneapolis Mayor R.T. Rybak attributed the quick response to the city’s investment of
some $50 million since 2001 in emergency preparedness, specifically, enhanced communi-
cation technology.190 It is unclear whether Minneapolis would be able to scale up this suc-
cessful operation to respond to a larger mass casualty event.    
August/September 2005 -- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
The hurricanes that struck the Gulf Coast in August and September 2005 left some 1,900
people dead and caused upwards of $100 billion in damages.191 In response to the devasta-
tion, the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps carried out the largest deploy-
ment in its history, deploying some 2,119 Corps officers to the region between August 26
and November 7, 2005.  Of these officers, 81 percent served on teams that provided
healthcare and other services directly to the affected communities, while 19 percent served
on emergency response teams or at local operations centers.192 The Commissioned Corps
is a uniformed service comprised of some 6,000 public health professionals who fill essential
leadership and service roles with the U.S. government.  During health emergencies, the
Corps is called upon to travel throughout the nation and world offering assistance.193
"As a rapidly deployable force of experienced health professionals, the Commissioned
Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service has a leadership role in crisis response. But living
up to its promise means the federal government must live up to its promises, including
adequate tools and resources and a manpower increase of at least 10 percent.” 
--Gerard M. Farrell, Captain, USN (Ret.), Executive Director,    
Commissioned Officers Association of the U.S. Public Health Service 
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2. VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS  
In emergency preparedness “at-risk individuals,” “vulnerable populations,” and “special needs
populations” are terms often used interchangeably to characterize groups whose needs are
not fully addressed by traditional health and social service providers.  They include people
with physical and intellectual disabilities, limited or non-English speakers, persons who are
geographically or culturally isolated, substance abusers and addicts, people who live in poverty
or rely on public assistance, people without private transportation or who rely on public
transportation, the homeless, the elderly and children.  
As the tragic events of Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, ignoring the needs of vulnerable pop-
ulations can have dire consequences.  It was mainly the poor residents of the city of New
Orleans who were unable to evacuate due to limited funds and lack of transportation.  In
addition, cultural barriers between low-income, minority residents and public officials con-
tributed to the disaster.194
The 2006 PAHPA legislation, drafted in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, specifically states that
the secretary for Health and Human Services is to take the needs of ‘at-risk individuals’ into
consideration when managing preparedness programs such as the SNS and federal grants to
states.  The legislation does not, however, specify how the secretary nor additional authorities
are to accomplish this.    
CDC’s Centers for Public Health Preparedness program sponsors a Vulnerable Populations
Collaboration Group that is tasked with identifying, reviewing and highlighting preparedness
education and information resources targeting special needs populations.  The review, initially
due out in 2007, is now scheduled to be published in early 2008.195
A review of 3 decades of literature on public health emergency preparedness and vulnerable
populations by Dennis Andrulis and colleagues at the Center for Health Equality at Drexel
University yielded the following recommendations:  
■ Tailor public health and risk communication messages for vulnerable populations and
use trusted messengers and appropriate channels; 
■ Ensure public health training includes disaster scenarios in at-risk populations’ neigh-
borhoods.  For example, evaluate how emergency responders would react to an event
in a neighborhood of primarily Spanish-speaking residents; 
■ Improve coordination among federal, state and local resources.  The complexity of
problems faced by special needs populations requires a multi-faceted response; and 
■ Engage community organizations and key leaders from the at-risk communities to fully
incorporate their perspectives and needs into emergency planning and response.196
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3. CARING FOR CHILDREN DURING DISASTERS  
Planning to care for the nation’s 73.6 million children and adolescents during a public health
emergency presents complex considerations and challenges.  Children are not “small adults”
and special consideration needs to be given to complicated issues ranging from child-appropri-
ate doses of medications and vaccines to caring for children if schools and childcare facilities
are closed for extended periods.  Parents and other caregivers may also become sick or
injured during a disaster, complicating their ability to care for children.  
Special Pediatric Considerations in Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness 
Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness has identified the following
issues of concern:  
■ Children are more vulnerable to chemical agents that are absorbed through the skin 
or inhaled; 
■ Children have special susceptibilities to dehydration and shock from biological agents; 
■ Children can not be decontaminated in adult decontamination units; 
■ Children require different dosages or different antibiotics and antidotes to many agents; 
■ Children are more susceptible to the effects of radiation exposure and require differ-
ent responses than adults; 
■ Children have unique psychological vulnerabilities, and special management plans are
needed in the event of mass casualties and evacuation; 
■ Emergency responders, medical professionals, and children’s health care institutions
require special expertise and training to ensure optimal care of those exposed to
chemical, biological, or nuclear agents; 
■ Children’s developmental ability and cognitive levels may impede their ability to 
escape danger; and 
■ EMS, medical, and hospital staff may not have pediatric training, equipment, or 
facilities available.197 
Children and Pandemic Influenza
A joint report by TFAH and the American Academy of Pediatrics found that current pandemic
preparedness does not fully account for the special needs of children.198 The gaps in planning
identified by the report include:  
■ There are currently only 6,000 regimens of pediatric antiviral suspension in the
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) to treat a potential flu pandemic for the nation’s
73.6 million children.199 For planning purposes the federal government has assumed
that antivirals would be needed for at least 25 percent of the population.  However,
government officials have not set any target for pediatric antivirals even though chil-
dren and adolescents are known to often be disproportionately affected by
contagious respiratory illnesses. 
■ Neither of the 2 antiviral drugs that have been shown effective against H5N1 is
licensed for children younger than one year. 
■ CDC recommends the public consider using N95 respirator masks in certain 
circumstances during a pandemic outbreak.  N95 respirator masks, however, are not
currently produced in children’s sizes. 
■ Approximately 30 million children rely on the National School Lunch Program for
meals each day and many rely on school nurses for health care.  If schools were closed
due to a pandemic, steps would need to be taken to ensure that children continue to
receive these services.  
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School Emergency Plans
There are 17,000 school districts in the United States responsible for some 49 million
public school students.  Although no federal laws exist requiring school districts to have
emergency management plans, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reports that “almost all school districts have taken steps to prepare for emergencies.”200
Other heartening findings from the GAO survey of state school districts include:  
■ 95 percent of all school districts have written emergency management plans with no
statistical difference between urban and rural districts.  
■ 93 percent of all school districts conduct inspections of their school buildings and
grounds to identify possible vulnerabilities in accordance with recommended practices.   
■ 87 percent of school districts that conduct physical plant inspections made security
enhancements to their school facilities and grounds as a result of these inspections.  
■ A majority of school districts with written emergency plans include steps to assist with
recovering from an incident, in accordance with recommended practices.   
Troubling findings include:  
■ Roughly 75 percent of all school districts have not included written procedures in their
plans for communicating with limited-English proficient parents and students. 
■ 28 percent of school districts with emergency management plans do not have specific
provisions for special needs students in their emergency management plans.  
■ Few school districts’ emergency plans contain procedures for continuing student edu-
cation in the event of an extended school closure, such as a pandemic outbreak.  
■ Fewer than half of school districts with emergency management plans involve communi-
ty partners such as the local head of government (43 percent) or the local public health
agency (42 percent), when developing and updating their emergency management
plans, as recommended by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
■ 27 percent of all school districts with emergency management plans have never trained
any first responders on how to implement the plans.  
Congressional Action
Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and Congresswoman Corrine Brown (D-FL) have
introduced bills to create the National Commission on Children and Disasters, a 10-
member bipartisan panel of experts in child welfare, family services, emergency manage-
ment, that would provide recommendations to plan for needs of children in disasters.201
The Commission would: (1) assess facts and causes relating to the needs of children
before, during, and after all public health emergencies; (2) evaluate existing laws relevant
to such needs; (3) evaluate lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and any other relevant disaster of the past 10
years; and (4) report to the president and U.S. Congress.  The Senate version also directs
the secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a National Resource Center on
Children and Disasters, which shall: (1) establish a clearinghouse for information and
resources on issues relating to such needs; and (2) develop and maintain a website and
related systems for disseminating information on such issues. As this report went to
press, the Senate bill (S.1970) remained in committee while the companion bill (H.R.
3495) was approved by the House of Representatives in November 2007. 
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4. MENTAL HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS  
The coordination and integration of mental health agencies’ plans into disaster responses is a
critical step for ensuring an effective and targeted response to all-hazard emergencies.
Studies on emergency preparedness and mental health, however, reveal that such interagency
coordination is severely lacking.  In fact, “respondents felt less prepared for mental health
issues than they did for preparedness issues in general.”202
This is especially worrisome given that “the available research literature suggests that in disas-
ters, individuals presenting acutely with psychologically-related complaints tend to outnumber
those presenting with physical symptoms directly stemming from the injury-causing agent or
event. This acute ‘mental health surge’ can rapidly overwhelm existing community mental
health resources, especially in the context of terrorism.”203
Mental Health and Hurricane Katrina
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, a CDC study found that half of
adults surveyed in New Orleans exhibited levels of emotional distress, indicating a poten-
tial need for mental health services.204 At the time of that survey, some 7 weeks after
Katrina, the majority of respondents remained without basic public utilities and services
such as water, electricity, gas, and garbage removal.  Even now, some 2 years into the
rebuilding and recovery process, calls to mental health hotlines remain high and psychia-
trists report being overbooked due an increased demand for mental health services.205
A 2007 Harvard Medical School study supports the anecdotal evidence.  Ronald C.
Kessler, lead author of the study and professor of health-care policy at Harvard Medical
School, told the Washington Post “it’s really stunning in juxtaposition to what these kinds
of surveys have shown after other disasters, or after people have been raped or mugged.
Typically, people have a lot of trouble the first night and the first month afterward. Then
you see a lot of improvement.”206 In this case, however, the Harvard scholars found that
the number of Katrina survivors in New Orleans reporting signs of severe mental illness,
suicidal thoughts and post-traumatic stress disorder increased between March 2006 and
the summer of 2007.  
An earlier Harvard study, part of the continuing examination into the after-effects of
Hurricane Katrina on residents’ health, found that mental health problems affected all
segments of the community across racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic lines.207
A 2006 study from Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness
found that children displaced by Hurricane Katrina were particularly vulnerable to mental
health issues.208 Children displaced by the storm were scattered around the country and
often removed from their traditional safety net of extended family, friends, and educators.
In the study, “nearly half of the parents surveyed reported that at least one child in their
households had emotional or behavioral difficulties that he or she didn’t have before the
hurricane, such as feeling sad or depressed, being nervous or afraid, or having problems
sleeping or getting along with others.”209
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5. ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANT BACTERIA  
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a form of the common staph bacteria that
has mutated and become resistant to certain first-line antibiotics such as penicillin.  While
MRSA frequently lives on the skin and in the nose of humans without causing any harm, if the
bacteria enters the body through a cut, or if the person’s immune system is compromised by
the flu or other causes, a MRSA infection can set in.  According to a recent CDC report,
there are some 94,000 invasive MRSA infections in the U.S. each year, and some 18,000
deaths were attributed to these infections.210
In October 2007, a rash of non-hospital MRSA cases was reported in the Washington, D.C.
metro area, including the death of one high school athlete as a result of the super bug.  This
news prompted officials to take extreme measures such as closing schools and sports facilities
for disinfection.211 Health experts, however, say simple measures such as proper hand wash-
ing techniques, covering open wounds with clean bandages, and not sharing personal items
such as towels and razors, can help protect people.212
Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis (MDR-TB)
According to the World Health Organization, one-third of the world’s population is currently
infected with the Tuberculosis (TB) bacillus and some 1.6 million deaths were attributed to TB
in 2005.213 While many people infected with TB have no symptoms and may not be conta-
gious, those who have an active form of TB can easily spread the disease to others through
coughing, sharing of utensils, and other forms of close contact.  
A dangerous development in the battle against TB has been the spread of MDR-TB.  This
strain is resistant to at least 2 of the best anti-TB drugs, isoniazid and rifampicin, and has
spread rapidly over the past 10 years, mainly because people fail to follow doctors’ orders to
take their TB medicines properly and finish the course of the drug therapy.214 Extensively
drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) is an even more drug-resistant form with a cure rate of
approximately 30 to 50 percent.    
While cases of MDR-TB and XDR-TB are relatively infrequent in the U.S. (less than one per-
cent of cases), they are a serious public health threat.215 According to CDC, “while drug-
resistant TB is generally treatable, it requires extensive chemotherapy (up to 2 years of treat-
ment) with second-line anti-TB drugs that are more costly than first-line drugs, and which
produce adverse drug reactions that are more severe, though manageable.”216 According to
Kenneth Castro, the U.S. Assistant Surgeon General and Director of CDC’s Division of
Tuberculosis Control, in-patient costs alone for XDR-TB can average $500,000 per case, while
the cost of treating MDR-TB is about $2,500.217 The cost of treating regular TB is a few hun-
dred dollars.218 The added cost of treating MDR-TB and XDR-TB may be too much for bur-
dened public health systems in developing countries.  The WHO has appealed to the world’s
wealthiest nations for a 4-fold increase in anti-TB funding to address the problem. 
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Important progress has been made since the
September 11, 2001 and anthrax tragedies,
and, in the past year, the passage of the 2006
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
(PAHPA) and updated federal directives were
important milestones in the effort to protect
the American people from major health dis-
asters. TFAH applauds the U.S. Congress for
enacting the PAHPA legislation and address-
ing many concerns raised in previous versions
of the Ready or Not? reports. PAHPA sets clear
goals toward building an all-hazards approach
to public health emergency preparedness.  
The passage of the legislation, however,
does not mean the changes called for have
been achieved.  In fact, this report shows
delays in the implementation of many of the
specified measures, and a continued lack of
accountability for ensuring the measures
are being carried out.  In addition, without
increased investment and political prioriti-
zation, even basic improvements needed are
unlikely to be achieved.  Americans deserve
basic protections in the event of health
emergencies, and, right now, many of these
protections are lacking, leaving Americans
vulnerable to unacceptable levels of risk.  
At the state level, there has been significant
progress in some areas of preparedness,
including critical laboratory capacity and
development of pandemic preparedness
plans, but significant work remains in such
areas as surge capacity, and legal protections
for volunteers working during emergencies.
Moreover, because the capacities and efforts
of states are not transparent -- so little data are
shared about what states are doing to meet
federal objectives of preparedness -- taxpay-
ers, state legislators, and the U.S. Congress
find it increasingly difficult to assess the
return on their investment in preparedness.    
To further strengthen emergency prepared-
ness, TFAH recommends action across the
following key areas:  
1. Transparency, accountability and oversight;
2. Funding; 
3. Surge capacity; 
4. Public health workforce; 
5. Research and development; 
6. Legal reforms; 
7. Health and sick leave benefits;   
8. Food safety reforms; 
9. Community resiliency. 
6S E C T I O NRecommendationsOverall, this report finds that that significant progress has been madein the nation’s preparedness to respond to public health emergen-
cies based on measures where state-by-state data are available.  Yet significant
work remains on critical issues of preparedness such as surge capacity, legal
protections for health care volunteers, and eliminating geographic disparities
in vital areas such as stockpiling antivirals for a flu pandemic or  plans to dis-
tribute emergency supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile.  Above all,
progress is threatened by diminishing federal support to states and localities
for their preparedness activities. 
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Recommendations for Strengthening Oversight and Accountability
Publish regular progress reports on  HHS should regularly provide publicly available updates on the progress made on 
the implementation of PAHPA benchmarks and deliverables under the PAHPA statute.
Develop new evidence-based benchmarks  In coordination with the research community and evaluation specialists, the new 
and objective standards objectives must be designed to gauge how well states respond to major public health 
emergencies.  The objectives should focus on outcome results from real-life drills and
exercises.  Benchmarks currently in use are more process-oriented and not clear 
predictors of how well a state will respond to an emergency.
Incorporate lessons learned into The use of real-life exercises and drills, in addition to table-top exercises, gives states
future planning the ability to accurately gauge how well they would perform in a public health emer-
gency.  The lessons learned from these evaluations, however, are only useful if they 
are demonstrably incorporated into revised and updated preparedness plans.
Collect performance data; assess the As required by PAHPA, HHS is in the process of developing a standardized reporting 
results; and, annually release the form for all states and hospital grantees.  The use of this form will allow HHS to rate the 
findings publicly on a state-by-state basis performance of the grantees and to assure the proper expenditure of funds.  Data from 
this form and other evaluations of states’ emergency preparedness should be reported
yearly on a state-by-state basis.  This allows Americans to appropriately assess their states’
progress and document how states have used taxpayer-supported preparedness funds.
Link performance with funding Performance measures related to public health emergency preparedness and pandemic 
preparedness should be linked to future receipt of federal preparedness grants.  HHS is
developing guidelines for funds to be withheld from awardees that fail to meet the 
benchmarks, performance measures, and plans for responding to pandemic influenza.
TFAH recommends completion and distribution of these guidelines in time for the FY
2008 awards.  HHS should develop a similar set of guidelines for funds to be withheld 
for failure to meet public health emergency preparedness benchmarks and 
objectives.  The federal government and the American taxpayer should be able to see
demonstrable results after 6 years and billions of dollars in funding. 
Transparency The federal government, in collaboration with the states, should share states’ 
pandemic preparedness plans and performance grades with the public to increase
transparency and build community resiliency. CDC, specifically, should share the 
states’ Strategic National Stockpile Technical Assistance Review scores on a state-
by-state basis, in addition to releasing the specific grading criteria it uses for awarding
points, and providing the public a basis for interpreting these scores.  The more 
people know about state and local preparedness, the better equipped they are to 
make their own family and household plans.
Continuous revision and strengthening   Federal and state agencies need to keep preparedness plans updated to account for 
of preparedness plans changes in the environment and advancements in scientific knowledge.
Clear, streamlined leadership National emergency response plans, such as the National Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza and the National Strategy for Public Health and Medical Preparedness, should
clearly designate the official in charge of public health preparedness and specify how
various departments, state and local officials, and first responders are to collaborate in
the event of a public health emergency.
The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act of 2006 not only demonstrated the
resolve of the U.S. Congress and the Bush
Administration to continue to address public
health emergency preparedness, but gave the
federal agencies, namely HHS, a series of
deliverables and deadlines to produce and
meet.  A November 2007 report from the
Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response detailed the
progress made to date in implementing
PAHPA.  While TFAH applauds the action
already taken, especially in light of personnel
and funding constraints, much remains to be
done.  To ensure HHS fully complies with
PAHPA and does so in an open and transpar-
ent manner, pursuant to the provisions of the
statute, the U.S. Congress should use its over-
sight powers to ensure full implementation
and execution of PAHPA. 
1. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING
TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT
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Recommendations for Funding
Fully fund public health emergency Programs dedicated to bioterrorism and public 
preparedness activities health emergency preparedness capabilities, 
specifically programs intended to support upgrading
state and local capabilities and hospital readiness,
should be restored to FY 2005 levels of $919
million.  These funds are used to develop core
boots-on-the-ground support for disaster response
and any reduction in funding leaves the country at
unnecessary levels of risk. 
Increase pandemic influenza funding The U.S. Congress should fund pandemic 
preparedness at $1.2 billion, the level set by the 
president’s FY 2008 budget request. 
Provide a transparent accounting of  Nearly $5 billion of FY 2006 pandemic influenza 
pandemic influenza funding funding was designated as ‘no-year funding,’ meaning
HHS was able to spend that money as needed over
the next several years.  This approach enables HHS
to contract with pharmaceutical manufacturers to
advance the development of new-line vaccines and
medications and bolster production capacity over
several years.  According to the House of
Representatives’ Conference Report 410-124
accompanying H.R. 3043, however, $1.8 billion
in appropriated funds for pandemic influenza
have not been spent.  HHS should provide a 
clear plan for how the remaining funds will be spent.  
The federal government should provide con-
sistent, predictable, and sustained funding
for preparedness activities to state and local
health departments, including funding for
activities in the event of a pandemic flu.
Public health preparedness is a shared
responsibility between the federal govern-
ment and the states.  State-generated rev-
enues invested in public health should,
therefore, increase as well.  As demonstrated
in this report, federal funding has been
inconsistent -- limiting the ability of states to
build the kind of response capacity that is
needed to be prepared for everything from a
pandemic to natural disasters to terrorist
attacks.  The variation in critical state invest-
ment in public health also reflects a signifi-
cant variation in capacity geographically.
Where a person lives should not determine
how well protected he or she is. 
2. FUNDING
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Recommendations for Surge Capacity
Regional coordination of healthcare Hospitals, local health departments and emergency 
facilities, including alternative care management agencies should build regional consortiums 
sites, with public health and to organize and plan for public health emergencies.  Such 
emergency management regional collaboration can lead to more efficient use of
resources among hospitals and health departments, includ-
ing personnel, and facilitate the sharing of promising prac-
tices. (Regional efforts could be within a locality or across
county and/or state lines depending on the size of the 
communities involved.) 
Alternative care sites Despite the clear need for alternative care sites following 
a mass casualty event, there are several barriers to their
successful roll-outs.  To address these barriers, TFAH 
recommends the following measures:  1) Increase local,
state, and regional planning with clear delineation of
responsibilities and authority;  2) Foster public-private 
partnerships among healthcare practitioners; 3) Employ
operational drills to test the deployment of mobile units
and the creation of alternative care sites; and, 4) Address
licensing and liability concerns for healthcare workers and
volunteers and liability concerns for non-healthcare 
volunteers and third-party entities that play host to 
alternative care sites.  In addition, emergency planners will
need to obtain, stockpile, and store supplies, equipment
and medicines for use in the alternative care sites.
Enhance communication systems  Hospitals must develop communication systems that allow
healthcare facilities and public health departments to talk to
each other and collectively manage an emergency response. 
Designation of a disaster coordinator Strong leadership is essential to mounting and sustaining 
for each hospital a successful public health emergency response at the 
national, state, and local levels.  This applies to hospitals as
well, which should designate a strong leader, respected and
trusted by staff, to serve as a disaster coordinator.  The 
person who fills this role will be required to assure that
many difficult decisions are made, including the use of
altered standards of care, alternate care sites, limited
resources, and the call-up of volunteer medical personnel.  
Surge workforce Barely half of U.S. hospitals have plans in place to incorpo-
rate additional staff in the event of an emergency, and less
than half report having incentives or provisions to encourage
health care workers to report to work in the event of a
mass-casualty event or major infectious disease outbreak.
Public and private healthcare organizations should develop
means to boost staff during a public health emergency, 
either through the use of incentives for current staff or
through the use of volunteers or non-traditional staff, such 
as emergency medical technicians and medical and nursing
students.  The surge workforce should be recruited in
advance in order to ensure licensing and accreditation issues
are resolved before an emergency strikes.  
Surge capacity remains the largest threat to
the nation’s ability to respond to a major
catastrophe such as a pandemic influenza.
Although Congress has significantly
increased federal funding to improve state
and local and hospital emergency prepared-
ness since 2001, much remains to be done to
ensure that the U.S. healthcare system is able
to function in a mass-casualty event.    
3. SURGE CAPACITY
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Recommendations for Public Health Workforce
Fund and implement PAHPA  The U.S. Congress should appropriate and allocate the necessary funds to implement 
workforce provisions the HHS demonstration project.  The student loan repayment project is intended for 
individuals who: 1) are eligible for the National Health Service Corps loan repayment 
program and 2) also agree to serve in a state health department that provides service to 
a significant number of health professional shortage areas or has areas that are at risk of 
a public health emergency.  The U.S. Congress should also appropriate and allocate
monies necessary to execute the second PAHPA workforce provision, which allocates
grants to states to assist in operating state loan repayment programs. 
Enact and fund comprehensive public  The U.S. Congress should establish and fully fund public health workforce scholarship 
health workforce scholarship initiatives and loan repayment programs as recommended by the American Public Health
Association.219 Such initiatives should include financial incentives that will assist in 
recruiting and retaining public health professionals.  It is essential this nation has in place 
a workforce not only qualified to conduct important ongoing surveillance and monitoring
activities but also has sufficient capacity to be able to immediately respond to public 
health emergencies.
Renewed investment in HRSA’s Public The FY 2008 funding request for this program was zero, a $7.9 million decrease from 
Health Workforce Development programs FY 2007.  Congress should restore the FY 2003 program level of $10 million 
or more in FY 2009.  HRSA’s Public Health, Preventive Medicine, and Dental Public
Health Programs award grants to eligible entities to support the education and training 
of the public health workforce to deal with anticipated and new problems, with 
emphasis on placing public health professionals, preventive medicine specialists, and 
public health dentists in medically underserved areas, and improving the racial and 
ethnic diversity in the workforce.220 Reinvesting in these programs would strengthen 
and diversify key public health workforce positions.
Expand HRSA’s scholarship and loan The U.S. Congress should increase funding for HRSA’s Nursing Scholarship Program 
repayment programs for registered nurses and the Nurse Education Loan Repayment Program (NELRP).  According to HRSA’s 
own estimates, by 2020 nurse retirements will contribute to a shortage of nearly one 
million nurses.221 Yet, in the most recent Nursing Scholarship Program application cycle,
HRSA only accepted 172 of the 11,225 applicants, a rejection rate of 98.5 percent.222
At the same time, HRSA rejected 85 percent of all applicants to the Nurse Education
Loan Repayment Program.  HRSA received 4,222 eligible applications and only made 
373 initial (2-year) awards and 242 amendment (3-year) awards.223 Both programs 
would do much to bolster nursing staff numbers in critically underserved areas.   
Expand internship and fellowship The federal government must not neglect its own public health workforce at federal 
opportunities at federal health agencies, agencies including HHS, CDC, NIH, and FDA, among others.  The impending 
as well as state and local agencies retirement of tens of thousands of federal government employees from the Baby
Boomer generation threatens these agencies and the important work they do.  
Federal funding for internships, fellowships, and other training initiatives will not only
help attract the next generation to the public sector, but help ensure that mid-career
professionals remain in their federal government jobs.  Similar efforts, with federal
financial support, are needed to address the same challenges being experienced by
state and local governments. 
Streamline the registration and The expansion of the Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer 
accreditation of emergency Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) and the mandatory participation in the program in 
healthcare volunteers order to receive preparedness funds is a major step in the right direction.  HHS 
should integrate other healthcare volunteer systems such as the Medical Reserve
Corps and the National Disaster Medical System into ESAR-VHP in order to 
eliminate confusion among participants.  Healthcare volunteers enrolled in these 
systems should participate in federal, state and local emergency drills. 
The growing workforce shortage in the
health care and public health fields threatens
U.S. emergency preparedness.  America’s
response will be severely limited unless the
workforce challenges the public health sys-
tem faces are addressed.  PAPHA contained 2
key provisions related to workforce develop-
ment whose implementation TFAH supports.
But much more remains to be done to
address the public health workforce crisis.
4. PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE
90
Recommendations for Research and Development
Enhance research and development Basic technology and tools of public health must be 
of vaccines and public health technologies modernized to adequately protect the American 
people.  This includes research and development of
vaccines and new technologies; and improved 
chemical laboratory testing capabilities. Collaboration
with the private sector as envisioned under BARDA
and Project BioShield will be essential. 
Bring BARDA online at full capacity HHS should continue to press ahead with BARDA
staffing.  In order for BARDA to operate at full 
capacity, however, the U.S. Congress must 
substantially boost funding from FY 2008.  In light of
current capacity, TFAH urges the U.S. Congress to
fund BARDA at $500 million or more for FY
2009.  As BARDA builds its own capacity, funding 
levels should rise commeasurately.
Clarify requirements and deliverables  ASPR should coordinate with NIH, FDA and CDC 
under Project BioShield contracts to ensure future BioShield requests for proposals and
procurement contracts for new countermeasures
have clearly articulated requirements, expectations,
and deliverables. 
Replenish and augment the Ensure the SNS contains enough supplies and 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) dosage recommendations for adults and children.
In addition, future federal appropriations cycles
must take into account the need to replenish 
currently stockpiled countermeasures that pass their
expiration dates.
Complete purchases of HHS should obligate the remaining $660 million for 
antiviral medications the purchase of antiviral medications.  The 7 states
that have not purchased any of their shares of 
subsidized antiviral medicines should work with 
state legislators to fund those purchases.  
Expand the Shelf Life Extension Program The U.S. Congress should extend the Shelf Life 
Extension Program to include states’ antiviral 
medications. 
Modernize disease surveillance systems Every health department and health agency should
be part of a 21st century surveillance system that
meets national standards and is interoperable
between jurisdictions and agencies to ensure rapid
information sharing.  Surveillance systems should 
be able to detect infectious disease outbreaks or a
bioterrorist attack.  Plans should ensure adequate
laboratory surveillance of influenza and other 
infectious diseases, as well as testing for pathogens
such as E. Coli, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA), and extensively drug-resistant
Tuberculosis (XDR-TB).  
The basic technology and tools of public
health need to be modernized.  Too often
front-line healthcare professionals are rely-
ing on outdated diagnostic tests and medica-
tions.  As new tests and therapies are devel-
oped and older ones become obsolete, the
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) should be
replenished. 
5. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
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Recommendations for Legal Reforms 
Liability protection Liability concerns are a growing challenge to 
emergency preparedness officials.  Volunteers and
private entities have expressed reluctance to 
participate in response and recovery efforts for 
fear that their actions may make them liable.  
There are several steps to be taken to remedy this
including: 1) the federal government should issue a
clear ruling on what liability protections are offered
to volunteers and third-party entities under the
Stafford Act; 2) state legislatures should adopt the
Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners
Act (UEVHPA) which has been approved by both
the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Bar
Association; and 3) state legislatures should 
consider extending Good Samaritan liability 
protections to those non-healthcare volunteers 
and business and non-profit entities that provide
emergency assistance. 
This report has identified several areas where
the legal underpinnings of public health
response must be modernized to reflect
demands on and authorities needed by public
health officials to respond to major threats to
the public health.  It is fortunate that, in many
cases, model legislative approaches have been
identified.  It is critical that all states have con-
sistent approaches and authorities. 
6. LEGAL REFORMS 
Recommendations for Health and Sick Leave Benefits
Establish an emergency health benefit The federal government should establish an emergency health benefit, which would 
allow hospitals and healthcare centers to keep functioning during a prolonged public 
health emergency, while not denying care to uninsured and underinsured individuals 
affected by the crisis. 
Set up emergency sick leave The federal government should clarify whether the Department of Labor’s Disaster 
policies and procedures Unemployment Assistance Program as currently set up would cover workers 
without sick leave who self-quarantine in the event of a pandemic flu.    
The U.S. Congress should consider legislation that would require employers with 15
or more employees to offer a minimum of 7 paid sick days each year, to be used to
deal with individual medical needs or to care for sick family members.
Assure the ability of individuals in The federal government should issue clarifying guidance to states that beneficiaries 
public insurance programs to create under Medicaid can fill prescriptions for a personal stockpile of routine medications 
stockpiles of medications, as in accordance with CDC guidelines.  Similar directives should be applied to SCHIP, 
recommended by CDC Medicare, and the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program. 
A public health emergency will create financial
hardships for individuals and the healthcare
system.  Because compliance with recommen-
dations to seek immediate care and/or self-
isolate or quarantine may be critical to con-
taining the spread of influenza or a terrorist-
introduced organism, TFAH believes the fed-
eral government should take steps to assure
that lack of health insurance or sick leave do
not prevent compliance with public health 
recommendations.  
7. HEALTH AND SICK LEAVE BENEFITS  
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Recommendations for Food Safety Reforms 
Unified and prevention-oriented statutory The U.S. Congress should enact legislation that 
mandate and organizational structures paves the way for a single, unified food safety 
agency to carry out a prevention-focused, 
integrated food safety strategy, including mandatory
implementation of preventive controls by producers
and processors.  The single food safety agency 
should include: FSIS; the food regulatory functions of
FDA, including CFSAN, the Center for Veterinary
Medicine, and the food portion of FDA’s field
resource; and the food safety aspects of EPA’s 
pesticide program.
Increased resources for research,  A modernized food safety system will require 
standard-setting, inspection and additional resources for (1) research and data 
enforcement, and education collection on the incidence and causes of foodborne
disease, new food safety technologies and 
prevention strategies, and consumer behavior, (2)
setting food safety performance standards 
establishing a mandatory standard of care for pre-
venting food safety problems, (3) inspection and
enforcement to ensure standards are consistently
met by both domestic and foreign producers and
processors, and (4) food safety education of 
commercial food handlers and consumers.  
Risk-based resource allocation The federal government should direct its resources
for food safety research, regulation, and education in
the manner most likely to maximize reduction in
foodborne disease. This would require repealing the
current FSIS inspection mandate and substituting a
modernized mandate for the entire farm-to-table 
food safety system that would ensure an adequate
resource base for inspection, but require the inspec-
tion and other resources be applied in the manner
most likely to contribute to disease reduction.
Reforms are needed to make the U.S. food safety system preventive instead of reactive.
8. FOOD SAFETY REFORMS 
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Recommendations for Strengthening Community Resiliency
Engage communities in planning Federal, state and local governments must engage 
communities in local emergency and pandemic 
planning.  Too often emergency planners just look 
to their grantees and ignore other key stakeholders,
such as volunteer organizations, religious organiza-
tions, and schools and universities.  Planners must
proactively approach these diverse groups and 
bring them to the table. 
Communicating effectively with  Federal, state, and local officials must design 
at-risk individuals culturally competent risk communication campaigns
that use respected, trusted, and culturally competent
messengers.  Current research and best-practices
regarding emergency preparedness communication
strategies for at-risk populations should direct the 
creation and dissemination of these messages.  
Children are not small adults Children are inherently vulnerable as they depend
upon adults for food, shelter, supervision and 
guidance.  As such, their needs should be taken 
into account in all public health emergency and 
pandemic preparedness efforts.  Child advocates,
such as teachers and pediatricians, should be 
consulted as plans are made.  Preparedness plans
should be clearly communicated to parents, 
schools, and daycare facilities. 
Mental health considerations Disasters have far reaching mental health 
consequences.225 Federal and state emergency 
planners should, therefore, coordinate with mental
health agencies to ensure effective response to 
all-hazard emergencies.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive
(HSPD 21) identifies community resilience as
one of “the 4 most critical components of pub-
lic health and medical preparedness,” along
with mass casualty care, mass distribution, and
biosurveillance.  The U.S. government defines
“community resiliency” as the ability of a com-
munity to cope and recover from a disaster or
public health emergency.  A CDC-funded
study states that, in order “for a community to
be resilient, its members must put into prac-
tice early and effective actions, so that they can
respond to adversity in a healthy manner.”224
Taking this into account, preparedness
plans need to consider the diverse needs of
the U.S. population, in particular, “at-risk,”
“special needs,” and “vulnerable” popula-
tions.  Only by effectively reaching out to all
segments of the U.S. population can the
country appropriately be prepared to sur-
vive and overcome crises.  
9. COMMUNITY RESILIENCY 
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BIOTERRORISM FUNDING BY SOURCE AND YEAR
FY 2006 FY 2007 % Change 
State CDC HRSA Total State CDC ASPR* Total FY 06–FY 07
Alabama $11,332,549 $7,154,927 $18,487,476 Alabama $10,228,439 $6,330,289 $16,558,728 -10.4%
Alaska $5,176,673 $1,458,182 $6,634,855 Alaska $5,015,000 $1,349,441 $6,364,441 -4.1%
Arizona $15,468,991 $8,753,827 $24,222,818 Arizona $14,284,449 $8,317,173 $22,601,622 -6.7%
Arkansas $8,513,998 $4,531,309 $13,045,307 Arkansas $7,533,981 $4,063,403 $11,597,384 -11.1%
California $54,396,954 $38,325,286 $92,722,240 California $52,023,574 $34,106,620 $86,130,194 -7.1%
Colorado $12,343,549 $7,221,888 $19,565,437 Colorado $11,234,142 $6,525,958 $17,760,100 -9.2%
Connecticut $9,872,607 $5,651,890 $15,524,497 Connecticut $9,112,072 $4,943,121 $14,055,193 -9.5%
Delaware $5,511,936 $1,709,476 $7,221,412 Delaware $5,000,000 $1,737,218 $6,737,218 -6.7%
D.C. $6,702,385 $1,823,510 $8,525,895 D.C. $9,129,492 $1,581,970 $10,711,462 25.6%
Florida $34,945,845 $25,638,227 $60,584,072 Florida $33,289,391 $23,432,938 $56,722,329 -6.4%
Georgia $19,557,241 $13,330,420 $32,887,661 Georgia $18,230,415 $12,370,869 $30,601,284 -7.0%
Hawaii $6,130,741 $2,345,600 $8,476,341 Hawaii $5,296,353 $2,129,653 $7,426,006 -12.4%
Idaho $6,389,623 $2,521,506 $8,911,129 Idaho $5,439,853 $2,359,069 $7,798,922 -12.5%
Illinois $20,613,241 $14,951,481 $35,564,722 Illinois $19,245,542 $13,163,842 $32,409,384 -8.9%
Indiana $14,502,083 $9,660,723 $24,162,806 Indiana $13,406,349 $8,503,785 $21,910,134 -9.3%
Iowa $8,810,613 $4,846,845 $13,657,458 Iowa $7,832,164 $4,280,453 $12,112,617 -11.3%
Kansas $8,724,480 $4,525,854 $13,250,334 Kansas $7,709,812 $4,004,077 $11,713,889 -11.6%
Kentucky $10,860,671 $6,585,429 $17,446,100 Kentucky $9,905,373 $5,832,130 $15,737,503 -9.8%
Louisiana $11,478,386 $7,139,266 $18,617,652 Louisiana $10,536,471 $5,935,695 $16,472,166 -11.5%
Maine $6,321,437 $2,434,432 $8,755,869 Maine $5,381,949 $2,175,388 $7,557,337 -13.7%
Maryland $13,970,053 $8,645,984 $22,616,037 Maryland $12,815,412 $7,619,177 $20,434,589 -9.6%
Massachusetts $15,512,606 $9,983,770 $25,496,376 Massachusetts $14,418,081 $8,660,567 $23,078,648 -9.5%
Michigan $23,221,202 $15,395,465 $38,616,667 Michigan $21,555,319 $13,298,463 $34,853,782 -9.7%
Minnesota $13,134,147 $7,983,328 $21,117,475 Minnesota $12,587,653 $7,050,445 $19,638,098 -7.0%
Mississippi $8,738,914 $4,759,591 $13,498,505 Mississippi $7,797,260 $4,189,754 $11,987,014 -11.2%
Missouri $14,402,196 $8,951,388 $23,353,584 Missouri $13,236,793 $7,906,932 $21,143,725 -9.5%
Montana $5,616,551 $1,856,928 $7,473,479 Montana $5,026,488 $1,697,530 $6,724,018 -10.0%
Nebraska $6,897,069 $3,067,393 $9,964,462 Nebraska $5,966,406 $2,741,751 $8,708,157 -12.6%
Nevada $8,660,838 $3,818,014 $12,478,852 Nevada $7,662,442 $3,663,636 $11,326,078 -9.2%
New Hampshire $6,252,371 $2,404,444 $8,656,815 New Hampshire $5,308,479 $2,166,921 $7,475,400 -13.6%
New Jersey $18,894,214 $13,269,518 $32,163,732 New Jersey $17,584,884 $11,560,312 $29,145,196 -9.4%
New Mexico $8,351,763 $3,276,757 $11,628,520 New Mexico $7,249,926 $2,977,887 $10,227,813 -12.0%
New York $24,409,091 $16,937,704 $41,346,795 New York $22,935,076 $14,561,258 $37,496,334 -9.3%
North Carolina $17,877,794 $12,948,887 $30,826,681 North Carolina $16,570,173 $11,727,581 $28,297,754 -8.2%
North Dakota $5,147,111 $1,435,800 $6,582,911 North Dakota $5,028,972 $1,306,102 $6,335,074 -3.8%
Ohio $24,190,050 $17,397,207 $41,587,257 Ohio $22,745,252 $15,050,914 $37,796,166 -9.1%
Oklahoma $9,732,169 $5,681,308 $15,413,477 Oklahoma $8,871,195 $5,037,444 $13,908,639 -9.8%
Oregon $10,251,502 $5,767,951 $16,019,453 Oregon $9,192,614 $5,191,530 $14,384,144 -10.2%
Pennsylvania $26,235,793 $18,776,677 $45,012,470 Pennsylvania $24,743,362 $16,271,242 $41,014,604 -8.9%
Rhode Island $5,981,291 $2,089,651 $8,070,942 Rhode Island $5,048,931 $1,853,432 $6,902,363 -14.5%
South Carolina $10,852,835 $6,632,258 $17,485,093 South Carolina $9,972,754 $5,978,140 $15,950,894 -8.8%
South Dakota $5,339,585 $1,630,322 $6,969,907 South Dakota $5,000,000 $1,491,255 $6,491,255 -6.9%
Tennessee $13,759,228 $9,138,647 $22,897,875 Tennessee $13,009,292 $8,155,520 $21,164,812 -7.6%
Texas $46,595,417 $33,177,278 $79,772,695 Texas $44,570,881 $30,301,320 $74,872,201 -6.1%
Utah $8,023,438 $3,978,558 $12,001,996 Utah $7,174,066 $3,732,769 $10,906,835 -9.1%
Vermont $5,144,876 $1,415,048 $6,559,924 Vermont $5,039,717 $1,290,942 $6,330,659 -3.5%
Virginia $18,466,632 $11,387,068 $29,853,700 Virginia $17,109,122 $10,189,048 $27,298,170 -8.6%
Washington $15,353,518 $9,562,647 $24,916,165 Washington $14,168,202 $8,608,090 $22,776,292 -8.6%
West Virginia $6,994,949 $3,176,132 $10,171,081 West Virginia $6,026,051 $2,805,313 $8,831,364 -13.2%
Wisconsin $13,246,911 $8,588,953 $21,835,864 Wisconsin $12,667,934 $7,544,102 $20,212,036 -7.4%
Wyoming $4,917,055 $1,241,982 $6,159,037 Wyoming $5,000,000 $1,152,882 $6,152,882 -0.1%
Grand Total 
CDC Total  HRSA Total Grand Total CDC Total ASPR* Total Grand Total % Change 
FY 06** FY 06** FY 06** FY 07** FY 07** FY 07** FY 06 - FY 07
$693,825,172 $424,986,736 $1,118,811,908 $645,917,558 $378,925,351 $1,024,842,909 -8.4%
Appendix A:  
CDC AND ASPR PREPAREDNESS GRANTS BY STATE
*The 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act transferred oversight of the grant program from the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) to the new
HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR).  **Note that totals do not include funds for 3 major U.S. metropolitan areas, Chicago, L.A.
County, and New York City, U.S. Territories, such as Puerto Rico and Guam, and Freely Associated States of the Pacific, such as the Marshall Islands.  *** Note that totals do
not include pandemic influenza preparedness funds.  Sources:  (1) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Provides $430 Million to States to Enhance Hospital and
Other Health Care Facilities Preparedness for Public Health Emergencies, June 28, 2007 News Release. http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2007pres/06/pr20070628a.html (2) Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Guidance Document for Continuation of the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreements, September 21, 2007.
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/coopagreement/pdf/fy07announcement.pdf  (3)  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Announces $1.2 Billion In Funding To States For
Bioterrorism Preparedness, June 7, 2006 News Release. http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20060607.html
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INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUG PURCHASES BY STATES AND ENTITIES
State Population Initial Total  Total All Antivirals Percent of 
Allocation* Subsidized Unsubsidized Purchased Allocation 
(06/30/06) Purchase Purchase by Entity Purchased as 
of 11/13/07
Alabama 4,503,726 472,860 472,860 27,107 499,967 106%
Alaska 648,280 68,065 28,576 11,164 39,740 58%
Arizona 5,579,222 585,780 67,717 0 67,717 12%
Arkansas 2,727,774 286,397 286,398 0 286,398 100%
California** 25,591,206 2,686,899 2,686,899 35,582 2,722,481 101%
Colorado 4,547,633 477,470 0 0 0 0%
Connecticut 3,486,960 366,107 0 0 0 0%
Delaware 818,166 85,902 85,902 35,262 121,164 141%
District of Columbia 557,620 58,546 0 45,000 45,000 77%
Florida 16,999,181 1,784,796 0 0 0 0%
Georgia 8,676,460 910,968 474,022 0 474,022 52%
Hawaii 1,248,755 131,111 131,111 41,376 172,487 132%
Idaho 1,367,034 143,529 8,567 0 8,567 6%
Illinois** 9,779,966 1,026,829 512,228 0 512,228 50%
Indiana 6,199,571 650,912 650,912 0 650,912 100%
Iowa 2,941,976 308,887 308,887 0 308,887 100%
Kansas 2,724,786 286,084 286,084 0 286,084 100%
Kentucky 4,118,189 432,381 216,224 0 216,224 50%
Louisiana 4,493,665 471,804 471,804 0 471,804 100%
Maine 1,309,205 137,457 137,457 0 137,457 100%
Maryland 5,512,310 578,754 210,727 0 210,727 36%
Massachusetts 6,420,357 674,093 0 0 0 0%
Michigan 10,082,364 1,058,578 1,058,578 18,372 1,076,950 102%
Minnesota 5,064,172 531,703 117,287 0 117,287 22%
Mississippi 2,882,594 302,652 0 0 0 0%
Missouri 5,719,204 600,477 600,477 0 600,477 100%
Montana 918,157 96,400 8,174 0 8,174 8%
Nebraska 1,737,475 182,423 70,102 0 70,102 38%
Nevada 2,242,207 235,416 3,465 132,049 135,514 58%
New Hampshire 1,288,705 135,305 135,305 0 135,305 100%
New Jersey 8,642,412 907,393 831,600 0 831,600 92%
New Mexico 1,878,562 197,236 68,930 0 68,930 35%
New York** 11,126,683 1,168,225 1,168,225 109,664 1,277,889 109%
North Carolina 8,421,190 884,167 560,380 0 560,380 63%
North Dakota 633,400 66,503 0 0 0 0%
Ohio 11,437,680 1,200,877 1,089,789 187,981 1,277,770 106%
Oklahoma 3,506,469 368,155 49,390 0 49,390 13%
Oregon 3,564,330 374,230 13,300 0 13,300 4%
Pennsylvania 12,370,761 1,298,844 974,081 0 974,081 75%
Rhode Island 1,076,084 112,981 0 0 0 0%
South Carolina 4,148,744 435,589 325,020 24,479 349,499 80%
South Dakota 764,905 80,310 24,575 55,735 80,310 100%
Tennessee 5,845,208 613,706 47,124 0 47,124 8%
Texas 22,103,374 2,320,701 838,556 67,584 906,140 39%
Utah 2,352,119 246,956 50,668 0 50,668 21%
Vermont 619,343 65,027 52,021 0 52,021 80%
Virginia 7,365,284 773,304 785,521 30,791 816,312 106%
Washington 6,131,298 643,744 293,073 0 293,073 46%
West Virginia 1,811,440 190,189 95,095 15,000 110,095 58%
Wisconsin 5,474,290 574,763 152,979 0 152,979 27%
Wyoming 502,111 52,718 52,718 0 52,718 100%
State Subtotal: 269,962,607 28,344,203 16,502,808 837,146 17,339,954 61%
Other Entity
American Samoa 57,884 6,077 0 0 0 0%
Chicago 2,869,121 301,238 200,545 0 200,545 67%
Fed States of Micronesia 108,143 11,354 0 0 0 0%
Guam 163,593 17,176 0 0 0 0%
LA County 9,871,506 1,036,440 1,036,440 0 1,036,440 100%
Marshall Islands 56,429 5,925 0 0 0 0%
New York City 8,085,742 848,947 30 0 30 0%
Northern Marianas Islands 76,129 7,993 0 0 0 0%
Palau 19,717 2,070 0 0 0 0%
Puerto Rico 3,877,881 407,151 407,151 0 407,151 100%
Virgin Islands 108,814 11,425 0 0 0 0%
Entity Subtotal 25,294,959 2,655,796 1,644,166 0 1,644,166 62%
TOTAL 295,257,566 30,999,999 18,146,974 837,146 18,984,120 61%
Appendix B:  
INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUG PURCHASES BY STATES AND ENTITIES
* “Initial allocation” is for subsidized treatment courses only; 25% federal subsidy per treatment course.  ** California, Illinois and New York States’
population does not include residents of Los Angeles County, Chicago, and New York City.  These 3 entities received their own allocation of feder-
ally-subsidized antivirals based on their populations.  Zero = no intent to purchase.  Source:  Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response, updated November 13, 2007.
The use of law to incentivize desired person-
al conduct is a common approach to social
policy in the U.S.  Law can be used to reward
behavior as well as shield individuals from
sanctions that might otherwise apply in the
absence of special legal protections.
Contracts that provide economic rewards to
health care professionals whose perform-
ance meets quality benchmarks is an exam-
ple of the use of law to incentivize desired
behavior through the creation of an enforce-
able expectation of financial reward when
certain measurable standards are satisfied.  
State laws that create liability shields for “Good
Samaritans” (that is, health care professionals
or other individuals who come to the aid of
another at the scene of an emergency) pro-
vide an example of the use of law to induce
desirable private conduct through the use of a
liability shield.   The Good Samaritan doctrine
is a basic concept in American law, a part of
the “common law” on which the entire
American legal system rests.226 States may vary
in certain respects in the degree of protections
they accord to health professionals, but Good
Samaritan statutes are universal.   
Good Samaritan laws are limited in two fun-
damental respects.  First, they generally pro-
vide a very specific shield that focuses on
emergency assistance rendered at the scene of
an emergency.  As a result, once assistance
passes beyond the immediate emergency
stage or the scene of assistance moves out-
side an emergency location, the shield may
end. Second, Good Samaritan laws provide
an affirmative defense to a liability claim by
permitting the defendant to show that his or
her conduct merits a shield because of the
emergency nature of the intervention, (typ-
ically) the absence of any expectation of
compensation, the absence of objection to
the treatment, and the absence of gross neg-
ligence, willful and wanton conduct, or
intentional injury.227 That is, one’s status as
a Good Samaritan must be proved by the
person who claims the shield as part of a
defense to a negligence claim.  Rather than
being prospective, therefore, Good
Samaritan laws are retrospective in nature.   
The limitations of  the Good Samaritan doc-
trine create challenges during a declared
public health emergency when government
officials, no matter how well-equipped, may
determine there is a need to augment  pub-
lic services with private assistance, not only
during the immediate emergency but also
in the aftermath as normal conditions slow-
ly return.  The California wildfires offer a
recent example of a situation in which the
period of immediate post-emergency recov-
ery may last for weeks or months beyond the
last extinguished wildfire, as the state deals
with the long-term economic, social, and
physical and mental health needs of victims.
Furthermore, because the number of unin-
sured Americans is at an all-time high, the
need to continue volunteer health care
assistance beyond the end of the acute
phase of the emergency may be particularly
pressing in the case of health care.   
The limited nature of Good Samaritan
statutes has prompted public health law
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Appendix C:  
STATE LAWS EXTENDING COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL LIABILITY
PROTECTIONS TO PROFESSIONAL HEALTH CARE VOLUNTEERS
DURING PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Authors:  Mary Elizabeth Harty, MPH, JD anticipated 2009; Jennifer Sheer, MPH anticipated
2008, and Sara Rosenbaum, Hirsh professor and chair, Department of Health Policy, The
George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services. 
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experts to recommend enactment of more
expansive shield laws that both create a
prospective system for extending liability
shields in advance of necessary health care
services and that protect organized volun-
teer actions more broadly than does the
restrictive coverage available under Good
Samaritan doctrine.   
Methods   
Findings   
This statutory analysis was intended to stratify
states in relation to the structure of their statu-
tory emergency protections for health care
volunteers.   Researchers, including an experi-
enced attorney with extensive experience in
legal analysis and statutory and legal interpre-
tation, used standard legal research tech-
niques and tools to identify all state statutes
governing the subject of volunteer health pro-
fessional services during emergencies.  An
electronic file was created for each state in
order to permit both in-state and cross state
comparisons.  The search identified states
whose statutory codes clearly and unambigu-
ously establish comprehensive legal emer-
gency-related legal protections for health care
volunteers that surpass the protections avail-
able under the Good Samaritan doctrine.  
In view of the limitations of the doctrine, the
search focused on two critical elements that
would serve to separate state statutes from
longstanding Good Samaritan doctrine:    
1. The existence of an authorized process to
allow medical and other health profes-
sionals to become designated as voluntary
health care workers acting under specific
emergency response protocols; and   
2. A shield that is tied to a declared emergency.   
Table 1: State by State Comparison Table: Healthcare
Volunteer Liability Protection is available on
TFAH’s website, http://www.healthy
americans.org/reports/bioterror07.
Good Samaritan Statutes  
Complete results are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that, as of Fall 2007, all states had
codified the Good Samaritan doctrine, with
certain variations visible, such as the range of
conduct that falls outside the scope of protec-
tion; the range and specificity of medical and
health professionals protected; and the nature
of the qualifications on the defense (i.e., the
exclusion from the shield of certain types of
conduct such as gross negligence, willful or
wanton conduct, or intentional injuries).  In all
states, therefore, physicians are given an affir-
mative defense if sued for ordinary negligence
in connection with emergency care rendered
at the scene of an emergency.    
Additional Liability Protections  
Table 1 also shows that, as of Fall 2007, 29
states and the District of Columbia had
statutes that reach beyond their Good
Samaritan protections and recognize addi-
tional protections from liability during peri-
ods of publicly declared emergencies.
These statutes vary considerably.  
Seventeen states and the District of
Columbia,228 identified by a ✓+, maintain
statutes that meet both key criteria. That is,
the laws in these states provide both for
immunity of health care volunteers during
emergencies and anticipate the establishment
of a formal prospective designation process.  
An additional 12 states,229 designated as ✓L,
meet the second prong of our test. That is,
these state laws allow for the extension of
immunity for health care professionals during
emergencies. However, nothing in these laws
indicates the existence of a prospective desig-
nation system. Such a system would need to
be specified in regulation or through an
authoritative state ruling.  
A final group of 21 states,230 identified by an
“A,” maintain statutory schemes that either
are silent on the issue of protections for vol-
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untary health care workers during emer-
gencies or are sufficiently ambiguous so that
no such prospective immunity arrangement
can be inferred in the absence of compre-
hensive implementing regulations or a rul-
ing from an authoritative state official.  
State laws extending prospective and com-
prehensive protections for healthcare vol-
unteers during periods of declared emer-
gencies vary significantly in statutory scope
and clarity.  Some statutes provide discre-
tion to public officials to determine the
types of health care professionals and emer-
gency workers who will receive qualified
immunity;231 allow officials to set the condi-
tions that must be met to qualify for a vol-
untary worker designation; and give officials
considerable latitude in determining the
duration of the immunity.     
Statutes also vary with respect to the scope of
the immunity granted (i.e., covering all con-
duct or only conduct not grossly negligent,
willful and wanton, or intentionally injurious).
Because the immunity shield may be limited
in scope, these statutes are not absolute.  That
is, an injured person could allege liability on
the ground that the worker’s conduct fell
below the level of care necessary to qualify for
the immunity shield.  The most comprehen-
sive of these laws would also provide for the
defense of volunteers as employees of the state
in the event that conduct falls below the
immunity threshold, while not condoning will-
ful, wanton, or reckless behavior.  
Discussion   
This review of state statutes suggests that
approximately one-third of all states have
enacted immunity protections for health
care volunteers that are linked to formal
emergencies and contemplate some sort of
prospective designation process in order to
clarify the immunized status of the worker
rather than requiring the worker to raise an
affirmative defense at trial.  An additional 20
percent of all states have statutes that specify
emergency immunity, but the presence of a
prospective designation system can not be
inferred from the statute itself.  Finally,
about 40 percent of all states either have not
addressed the issue or else have done so in
an ambiguous fashion that requires further
regulatory and interpretive clarification.    
Of course, even the clearest emergency
health care volunteer immunity statutes
would require additional guidance, since
creating a prospective designation process,
as well as the development of emergency
operational protocols, present complex
implementation challenges.  Further study
of the implementation experiences in states
with comprehensive statutes is warranted, as
is further study of those states that have not
enacted such laws.  Such a study might shed
light on the implementation challenges that
arise, the response rates among private
health professionals, and the  actual or
anticipated operation of states’ qualified
immunity statutes.  Additional research
might also reveal whether in the event of
suits against designated volunteers alleging
ultra vires conduct, additional state tort
claims act protections also might apply.  
It is not immediately clear why more states
have not acted to put such protections in
place.  One hypothesis is that liability
reforms in these states would be understood
as obviating the need for further immunity
action. The presence of emergency immuni-
ty statutes, however, in states such as Indiana
and California, both known for their expan-
sive tort reform efforts, suggests otherwise. 
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TFAH contracted with ANSER/Analytic
Services, Inc. to survey State Army and Air
National Guard units.  The survey was con-
ducted by initiating an email data request
from the Office of the Chief Surgeon,
National Guard Bureau Joint Staff to the
State Surgeon and State Air Surgeon within
each state Army and Air National Guard.
The survey is comprised of the National
Guards of the 50 states and the District of
Columbia. The survey was initiated to help
gauge the level of effort towards building
civil-military integration and surge capacity
in the event of a catastrophic health event.
The question posed was:  “During 2007, did
your (Army or Air Guard) unit participate
(or intend to participate) in any scenario-
based exercise (pandemic, bioterrorism,
other) with members of your state’s public
health department?”   
A state received one full point if an exercise
(any type such as tabletop, full scale, etc.)
was conducted, or scheduled to be conduct-
ed, in the 2007 calendar year given evidence
of collaborative participation, or attempts at
collaboration, between the state health
department and the Army or Air National
Guard.  No point was awarded if the state did
not conduct, or is not scheduled to conduct
an exercise, during the 2007 calendar year.    
Due to a high non-response rate (29 per-
cent), TFAH contacted state health officials
via an email request sent out by the
Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials (ASTHO).  State health officials
were asked the same question posed to the
State Army and Air National Guard and were
given until November 21, 2007 to respond.
Using both survey requests, TFAH was able
to obtain a 100 percent response rate.
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METHODOLOGY FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILLS
In order to measure community resiliency,
TFAH considered the number of volunteers
signed up to participate in the Medical
Reserve Corps (MRC).  The Office of the
Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve Corps
provided TFAH with the total number of
MRC units and volunteers per unit as of
October 22, 2007.  This information was ver-
ified by TFAH by using information provid-
ed on the Medical Reserve Corps website,
http://www.medicalreservecorps.gov/Find
MRC.asp and tallying MRC volunteer totals
on October 22, 2007.  The numbers are
based on self-reported data from MRC units
posted on their profiles on the MRC web
site.  The number of volunteers from each
program was totaled by state and used to cal-
culate a volunteer per 100,000 persons fig-
ure.  See below for a complete spreadsheet
of volunteers by state.
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Medical Reserve Corps Volunteers per 100,000 persons
State 2006 Census Total Number of MRC Volunteers  
Population Estimates MRC Volunteers per 100,000
Alabama 4,599,030 3342 73
Alaska 670,053 330 49
Arizona 6,166,318 2841 46
Arkansas 2,810,872 158 6
California 36,457,549 6562 18
Colorado 4,753,377 845 18
Connecticut 3,504,809 5605 160
D.C. 581,530 874 150
Delaware 853,476 214 25
Florida 18,089,888 3600 20
Georgia 9,363,941 2437 26
Hawaii 1,285,498 452 35
Idaho 1,466,465 2643 180
Illinois 12,831,970 4160 32
Indiana 6,313,520 3991 63
Iowa 2,982,085 181 6
Kansas 2,764,075 581 21
Kentucky 4,206,074 2539 60
Louisiana 4,287,768 228 5
Maine 1,321,574 42 3
Maryland 5,615,727 6833 122
Massachusetts 6,437,193 13948 217
Michigan 10,095,643 618 6
Minnesota 5,167,101 4496 87
Mississippi 2,910,540 291 10
Missouri 5,842,713 469 8
Montana 944,632 79 8
Nebraska 1,768,331 637 36
Nevada 2,495,529 243 10
New Hampshire 1,314,895 248 19
New Jersey 8,724,560 4754 54
New Mexico 1,954,599 449 23
New York 19,306,183 11356 59
North Carolina 8,856,505 1281 14
North Dakota 635,867 2859 450
Ohio 11,478,006 5961 52
Oklahoma 3,579,212 3572 100
Oregon 3,700,758 540 15
Pennsylvania 12,440,621 1785 14
Rhode Island 1,067,610 537 50
South Carolina 4,321,249 687 16
South Dakota 781,919 0 0
Tennessee 6,038,803 21706 359
Texas 23,507,783 9131 39
Utah 2,550,063 516 20
Vermont 623,908 207 33
Virginia 7,642,884 8809 115
Washington 6,395,798 753 12
West Virginia 1,818,470 1252 69
Wisconsin 5,556,506 326 6
Wyoming 515,004 68 13
Source: Office of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve Corps, Office of the Surgeon General <http://www.med
icalreservecorps.gov/FindMRC.asp>
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Data for this analysis were obtained from
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System dataset (publicly available at
http://www.cdc.gov/brfss).  BRFSS is an
annual cross-sectional survey that measures
behavioral risk factors in the adult popula-
tion (18 years of age or older) living in
households.  Data are collected from a 
random sample of adults (one per house-
hold) through a telephone survey.  The
BRFSS currently includes data from 50
states, D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Virgin Islands.  The 2006 statistics are the
most recent data available.   
To conduct the analyses, TFAH contracted
with Daniel Eisenberg, Ph.D., assistant profes-
sor, and Edward N. Okeke, MBBS, Health
Service Organization and Policy Doctoral
Student, at the Department of Health
Management and Policy of the University of
Michigan School of Public Health.
Researchers weighted the data using sample
weights provided by the CDC in the dataset
and then merged data on the FLUSHOT vari-
able from 2003-2006.  The FLUSHOT variable
is the question, “During the past 12 months,
have you had a flu shot?”  Respondents who
answered “I don’t know” or refused to answer
were dropped from the analysis, though this
accounted for less than 0.3 percent of the
data.  Three-year rolling averages were then
calculated for individuals ages 65 and older, by
state.  Hypothesis testing, to determine if there
were significant changes from 2003-2005 to
2004-2006, was then carried out.  There were
211,291 observations from 2003-2005, and
246,773 observations from 2004-2006.  
According to information CDC provided to
TFAH, each state conducts its own survey for
BRFSS.  States conduct interviews each month
in accordance with a standardized prescribed
protocol and enter results into computer-
assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) com-
puter files.  States edit and correct completed
interviews each month using an editing pro-
gram provided by CDC.  Data are submitted to
CDC on a monthly basis, after which the data
undergo rigorous data quality checks.  While
the system has existed since 1984, all states
have participated since 1994.  Data are collect-
ed and analyzed using standardized method-
ology and results are released annually. 
Appendix F:  
METHODOLOGY FOR FLU VACCINATION RATES
102
TFAH conducted an analysis of state spending
on public health for the last 2 budget cycles,
fiscal years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007.  For
those states that only report their budgets in
biennium cycles, the 2007-2009 period (or the
2006-2008 and 2007-2008 period for Virginia
and Wyoming respectively) was used, and the
percent change was calculated from the last
biennium, 2005-2007 (or 2004-2006 and 2005-
2006 for Virginia and Wyoming respectively).   
This analysis was conducted from August to
October of 2007 using publicly available budg-
et documents through state government web
sites.  Based on what was made publicly avail-
able, budget documents used included either
executive budget documents that listed actual
expenditures, estimated expenditures, or final
appropriations; appropriations bills enacted
by the state’s legislature; or documents from
legislative analysis offices.  
In response to feedback received from previ-
ous editions of TFAH’s Ready or Not? report,
TFAH defined “public health” to broadly
include all health spending with the exception
of Medicaid, CHIP, or comparable health cov-
erage programs for low-income residents.
Federal funds, mental health funds, addiction
or substance abuse-related funds, WIC funds,
services related to developmental disabilities
or severely disabled persons, and state-spon-
sored pharmaceutical programs also were not
included.  In a few cases, state budget docu-
ments did not allow these programs, or other
similar human services, to be disaggregated;
these exceptions are noted.  For most states,
all state funding, regardless of general rev-
enue or other state funds (e.g., dedicated rev-
enue, fee revenue, etc.), was used.  In some
cases, only general revenue funds were used in
order to separate out federal funds; these
exceptions are also be noted.  
Since each state allocates and reports its budg-
et in a unique way, comparisons across states
are obviously difficult.  This methodology may
include programs that, in some cases, the state
may consider a public health function, but the
methodology used was selected to maximize
the ability to be consistent across states.  As a
result, there may be programs or items states
may wish to be considered as “public health”
that may not be included in order to maintain
the comparative value of the data.  
Finally, to improve the comparability of the
budget data between FY 2005-2006 and FY
2006-2007 (or between biennium), TFAH
adjusted the FY 2006-2007 numbers for infla-
tion (using a 0.97 conversion factor based on
the U.S. Dept. of Labor Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Consumer Price Index Inflation
Calculator at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/).  
Appendix G:  
METHODOLOGY FOR STATE PUBLIC HEALTH 
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Key Deliverables and Due Dates under P.L. 109-417
Deliverable Why the Deliverable is Important Due Date Met?
Section 201 (g) (1) -- Achievement of
measurable evidence-based bench-
marks and objective standards.  Not
later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act, the HHS
secretary shall develop or where
appropriate adopt, and require the
application of, measurable evidence-
based benchmarks and objective
standards that measure levels of
preparedness.  In developing such
benchmarks and standards, the secre-
tary shall consult with and seek com-
ments from state, local and tribal offi-
cials and private entities, as appropriate.
Where appropriate, the HHS secre-
tary shall incorporate existing
objective standards.
This demonstrates the federal govern-
ment’s ability to develop clear, evi-
dence-based performance metrics to
evaluate federal and state emergency
preparedness.  
June 2007 Yes.  HHS is using
“existing objective
standards” until it is
able to develop new
ones, currently sched-
uled to be written at
the close of the cur-
rent budget period.232
Section 201 (g) (2) -- Criteria for pan-
demic influenza plans.  Not later than
180 days after the date of enactment of
the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act, the HHS secretary
shall develop and disseminate to 
the chief executive officer of each
state criteria for an effective state
plan for responding to 
pandemic influenza. 
This demonstrates the federal govern-
ment’s ability to provide clear direc-
tion and guidance to state emergency
planners and keep variation among
states pandemic plans to a minimum.   
June 2007 Yes.  HHS sent a letter
with criteria and guid-
ance to states on
January 26, 2007.233
A revised set of criteria
for state pandemic
influenza plans will be
developed by HHS 
and submitted for 
state review. 
Section 202 (d) (2) -- Public Health
Situational Awareness.  Not later than
180 days after the date of enactment
the Pandemic and All- Hazards
Preparedness Act, the HHS Secretary
shall submit to the appropriate commit-
tees of the congress a strategic plan
demonstrating the steps the HHS 
secretary will undertake to develop,
implement, and evaluate the 
interoperable network of systems
for real-time disease detection 
and surveillance. 
This reflects federal commitment to a
near real-time electronic surveillance
system, which is necessary to quickly
identify and track disease outbreaks
and biological and chemical incidents
(accidental or intentional). 
June 2007 No.  In progress. 
Appendix H:  
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Key Deliverables and Due Dates under P.L. 109-417
Deliverable Why the Deliverable is Important Due Date Met?
Section 301(a) (C) (2) -- Joint review
and medical surge capacity strategic
plan. Not later than 180 days after date
of enactment of the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act, the HHS
secretary, in coordination with the sec-
retary of Homeland Security, secretary
of Defense, and secretary of Veterans
Affairs, shall conduct a joint review
of the National Disaster Medical
System. Such review shall include an
evaluation of medical surge capacity.
This demonstrates the ability of HHS
to lead and coordinate with other key
federal agencies on issues of concern
for public health preparedness, such as
medical surge capacity. 
June 2007 Yes. The Department
has completed a joint
review with the
Departments of home-
land security, defense,
and veterans affairs of
the National Disaster
Medical System
(NDMS).
Section 201(j) (1) -- Annual reporting
requirements.  Each entity shall prepare
and submit to the HHS secretary annual
reports on its activities under this sec-
tion and section 319C-2 of the Public
Health Service Act. Each such report
shall be prepared by, or in consultation
with, the health department. In order to
properly evaluate and compare the per-
formance of different entities assisted
under this section and section 319C-2
and to assure the proper expenditure of
funds under this section and section
319C-2, such reports shall be in such
standardized form and contain such
information as the HHS secretary
determines and describes within
180 days of the date of enactment
of the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act. 
This demonstrates the federal govern-
ment’s commitment to tracking the
use of federal preparedness dollars. 
June 2007 No.  In progress. 
Section 303(a) -- Not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of the
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act, the HHS secretary, in collaboration
with state, local, and tribal officials, shall
build on state, local, and tribal pro-
grams in existence on the date of
enactment of such Act to establish
and maintain a Medical Reserve
Corps to provide for an adequate sup-
ply of volunteers in the case of a
Federal, State, local, or tribal public
health emergency. The corps shall be
headed by a director who shall be
appointed by the HHS secretary and
shall oversee the activities of the corps
chapters that exist at the state, local,
and tribal levels. 
This reflects the federal government’s
ability to set forth a nationally recog-
nized certification process for health-
care volunteers who serve in emer-
gency public health events and recruit
said volunteers. 
June 2007 Yes.  The department
expanded the Medical
Reserve Corps (MRC)
to provide for an ade-
quate supply of volun-
teers in the case of a
federal, state, tribal,
territorial, or local
public health emer-
gency. 
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Key Deliverables and Due Dates under P.L. 109-417
Deliverable Why the Deliverable is Important Due Date Met?
Section 401 -- Not later than 6 months
after the date of enactment of the
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act, the HHS secretary shall develop
and make public a strategic plan to
integrate biodefense and emerging
infectious disease requirements
with the advanced research and
development, strategic initiatives for
innovation, and the procurement of
qualified countermeasures and qualified
pandemic or epidemic products.  
This illustrates the federal govern-
ment’s ability to set a national strategy
for research and development, innova-
tion support, and procurement of
countermeasures to chemical, biologi-
cal, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
agents and emerging infectious dis-
eases. 
June 2007 Yes.  On July 7, 2007,
Secretary Michael
Leavitt published a
Draft BARDA Strategic
Plan for Countermeasure
Research, Development
and Procurement, to
guide and facilitate the
research, develop-
ment, innovation, and
procurement of med-
ical countermeasures
and build upon estab-
lished national strate-
gies and directives. 
Section 303(b) -- Not later than 12
months after the date of enactment of
the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act, the HHS secretary
shall link existing state verification
systems to maintain a single nation-
al interoperable network of
systems, each system being maintained
by a state or group of states, for the
purpose of verifying the credentials and
licenses of health care professionals who
volunteer to provide health services
during a public health emergency.  
This reflects the federal government’s
ability to set forth a nationally recog-
nized certification process for health-
care volunteers who serve in emer-
gency public health events. 
December
2007 
In progress.  ESAR-VHP
guidelines are currently
being finalized.
The department has
written compliance
requirements for state
participation in the
ESAR-VHP program.
Starting in FY 2009
participation in ESAR-
VHP will be a manda-
tory requirement to
receive grant dollars
from the PHEP. 
Section 402 -- The HHS secretary shall
establish the National Biodefense
Science Board to provide expert
advice and guidance to the HHS secre-
tary on scientific, technical and other
matters of special interest to the
Department of Health and Human
Services regarding current and future
chemical, biological, nuclear, and radio-
logical agents, whether naturally occur-
ring, accidental, or deliberate.  
This illustrates the federal government’s
ability to convene leading experts from
government, private sector and research
institutions to come together to guide
the national strategy for research and
development, innovation support, and
procurement of countermeasures to
chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) agents and emerging
infectious diseases. 
December
2007 
In progress.   On May
24, 2007, Secretary
Leavitt established and
issued a call for nomi-
nations to the National
Biodefense Science
Board (NBSB).    To
date, none of the 13
members have been
appointed.234
Section 402(A) -- Not later than one
year after the date of enactment of the
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act, the HHS secretary shall hold
the first meeting of the National
Biodefense Science Board. 
This illustrates the federal government’s
ability to convene leading experts in
government, private sector and
research institutions to come together
to guide the national strategy for
research and development, innovation
support, and procurement of counter-
measures to chemical, biological, radio-
logical, and nuclear (CBRN) agents and
emerging infectious diseases. 
December
2007 
In progress.  The
PAHPA Implementation
Progress Report states
the first NBSB meeting
will be December 17-
18, 2007. 
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Key Deliverables and Due Dates under P.L. 109-417
Deliverable Why the Deliverable is Important Due Date Met?
Section 102(d) -- Amends the Public
Health Service Act by inserting Section
2814(1). The HHS secretary shall over-
see the implementation of the national
preparedness goal of taking into
account the public health and med-
ical needs of at-risk individuals in
the event of a public health emer-
gency.  Not later than one year after
the date of enactment of the Pandemic
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the
HHS secretary shall prepare and sub-
mit to the U.S. Congress a report
describing the progress made on
implementing the duties described in
this section. 
This benchmark reflects how well the
federal government is implementing
plans to reach at-risk populations,
including the elderly and other special
needs individuals. 
December
2007 
Yes.  The Pandemic
and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act
Progress Report
released in November
2007 describes the
progress made toward
implementing duties
related to at-risk indi-
viduals. 
Section 201(g) (5) -- Withholding of
amounts from entities that fail to
achieve benchmarks or submit 
influenza plans. 
This component of the bill links fund-
ing with accountability, which moti-
vates states to meet preparedness
benchmarks. 
October
2008 
(FY 2009) 
In progress. The
department is develop-
ing guidelines for funds
to be withheld from
awardees that fail to
meet the benchmarks,
performance meas-
ures, and plans for
responding to pandem-
ic influenza. Policies
will be applied and
funds withheld from
the existing prepared-
ness grants programs if
deemed appropriate
by FY 2009. 
Section 202 (d) (1) -- Public Health
Situational Awareness.  Not later than 2
years after the date of enactment of the
Pandemic and All- Hazards Preparedness
Act, the HHS secretary, in collaboration
with state, local, and tribal public health
officials, shall establish a near real-
time electronic nationwide public sit-
uational awareness capability
through an interoperable  network
to share data and information to
enhance early detection of rapid
response to, and management of,
potentially catastrophic infectious
disease outbreaks and other public
health emergencies that originate
domestically or abroad. Such network
shall be built on existing state situational
awareness systems or enhanced systems
that enable such connectivity. 
This reflects federal commitment to a
near real-time electronic surveillance
system, which is necessary to quickly
identify and track disease outbreaks
and biological and chemical incidents
(accidental or intentional). 
January
2009 
In progress. 
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Key Deliverables and Due Dates under P.L. 109-417
Deliverable Why the Deliverable is Important Due Date Met?
Section 103 -- Amends the Public
Health Service Act and adds Section
2802(a) (1).  Preparedness and response
regarding public health emergencies.
Beginning in 2009 and every four years
thereafter, the HHS secretary shall
prepare and submit to the relevant
committees of  the congress a coor-
dinated strategy (to be known as
the National Health Security
Strategy) and any revisions thereof,
and an accompanying implementa-
tion plan for public health emer-
gency preparedness and response.  
This quadrennial review of public
health emergency preparedness illus-
trates the importance of the issues and
the need to keep continually updating
and revising preparedness plans. 
2009 In progress.  The frame-
work for the National
Health Security Strategy
is currently under 
development and the
department is in the 
initial phases of reaching
out to non-governmen-
tal stakeholders and
determining plans for
routine engagement at
appropriate and 
meaningful intervals. 
Source: Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response.  Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
Progress Report.  Washington, DC:  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, November 2007.
http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/conference/pahpa/2007/pahpa-progress-report-102907.pdf
(accessed October 31, 2007), except where noted. 
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Methodology  
TFAH’s state estimates are based on models
of a severe pandemic outbreak.  These esti-
mates are similar to assumptions made by the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and White House
Homeland Security Council for a severe pan-
demic resembling the pandemic flu of
1918.235,236 The state-specific estimates of ill-
ness and death rates in each state used the
same assumptions of a 30% attack rate and a
2.5% case-fatality rate. Under this scenario
the national death rate would be 0.75%. The
rates were calculated using the Flu Aid com-
puter modeling program developed by CDC,
which also considers the age and health risk
factors of state population.  Note that Flu Aid
is limited in its ability to account for density
issues, such as how close people live together
in cities versus rural areas.  
The estimated mortality and morbidity rates
for the uninsured U.S. population are based
on the assumption that the percent of peo-
ple who contract influenza would be evenly 
distributed among those with and without
insurance.  Scientists note that people with
compromised immune systems, such as the
elderly, the very young, and people with pre-
existing medical conditions, are more likely
to get seasonal flu.237 It is likely, therefore,
that those same people would be more likely
to get a more aggressive and/or contagious
flu.  To remain conservative, however, TFAH
does not factor this into its calculations.  
■ Population Data: TFAH used 2006 U.S.
Census data for state population estimates.238
■ Illness and Fatality Data: TFAH used CDC’s
Flu Aid to generate state illness and fatality
projections.  Factors taken into account in
the model include age, attack rates, mortal-
ity rates, and health risk.  CDC makes health
risk and mortality assumptions based on
age in each state.  To determine state-spe-
cific calculations, the 2006 U.S. Census age
data was entered into the Flu Aid program.   
■ Health Insurance Coverage: TFAH used
2006 U.S. Census data for health insurance
coverage status by state.239
The numbers are rounded to the thou-
sandths place for clarity and presentation
in the Table: Estimated Mortality and
Morbidity for a Severe Pandemic and Impact on
Uninsured Population.
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ESTIMATED MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY FOR A SEVERE PANDEMIC AND IMPACT ON UNINSURED POPULATION
State 2006 Census Mortality % Morbidity % 2006  2006  2006 Census 2006 Estimated 2006 Estimated 
Population Estimated Estimated % Uninsured Mortality for Morbidity for 
Estimates Mortality Morbidity Estimates Uninsured Uninsured
Alabama 4,599,030 0.80% 29.20% 37,000 1,343,000 15.20% 5,600 204,100
Alaska 670,053 0.56% 29.44% 4,000 197,000 16.50% 700 32,500
Arizona 6,166,318 0.64% 29.36% 39,000 1,811,000 20.90% 8,200 378,500
Arkansas 2,810,872 0.79% 29.21% 22,000 821,000 18.90% 4,200 155,200
California 36,457,549 0.69% 29.31% 252,000 10,685,000 18.80% 47,400 2,008,800
Colorado 4,753,377 0.64% 29.36% 30,000 1,396,000 17.20% 5,200 240,100
Connecticut 3,504,809 0.82% 29.18% 29,000 1,023,000 9.40% 2,700 96,200
Delaware 853,476 0.73% 29.27% 6,000 250,000 12.10% 700 30,300
D.C. 581,530 0.86% 29.14% 5,000 169,000 (B) (B) (B)
Florida 18,089,888 0.82% 29.18% 149,000 5,278,000 21.20% 31,600 1,118,900
Georgia 9,363,941 0.62% 29.38% 58,000 2,751,000 17.70% 10,300 486,900
Hawaii 1,285,498 0.81% 29.19% 10,000 375,000 8.80% 900 33,000
Idaho 1,466,465 0.65% 29.35% 10,000 430,000 15.40% 1,500 66,200
Illinois 12,831,970 0.76% 29.24% 98,000 3,752,000 14.00% 13,700 525,300
Indiana 6,313,520 0.77% 29.23% 49,000 1,845,000 11.80% 5,800 217,700
Iowa 2,982,085 0.86% 29.14% 26,000 869,000 10.50% 2,700 91,200
Kansas 2,764,075 0.80% 29.20% 22,000 807,000 12.30% 2,700 99,300
Kentucky 4,206,074 0.78% 29.22% 33,000 1,229,000 15.60% 5,100 191,700
Louisiana 4,287,768 0.76% 29.24% 32,000 1,254,000 21.90% 7,000 274,600
Maine 1,321,574 0.82% 29.18% 11,000 386,000 9.30% 1,000 35,900
Maryland 5,615,727 0.73% 29.27% 41,000 1,644,000 13.80% 5,700 226,900
Massachusetts 6,437,193 0.84% 29.16% 54,000 1,877,000 10.40% 5,600 195,200
Michigan 10,095,643 0.79% 29.21% 80,000 2,949,000 10.50% 8,400 309,600
Minnesota 5,167,101 0.74% 29.26% 38,000 1,512,000 9.20% 3,500 139,100
Mississippi 2,910,540 0.75% 29.25% 22,000 851,000 20.80% 4,600 177,000
Missouri 5,842,713 0.80% 29.20% 47,000 1,706,000 13.30% 6,300 226,900
Montana 944,632 0.79% 29.21% 7,000 276,000 17.10% 1,200 47,200
Nebraska 1,768,331 0.80% 29.20% 14,000 516,000 12.30% 1,700 63,500
Nevada 2,495,529 0.55% 29.45% 14,000 735,000 19.60% 2,700 144,100
New Hampshire 1,314,895 0.73% 29.27% 10,000 385,000 11.50% 1,200 44,300
New Jersey 8,724,560 0.80% 29.20% 70,000 2,548,000 15.50% 10,900 394,900
New Mexico 1,954,599 0.69% 29.31% 14,000 573,000 22.90% 3,200 131,200
New York 19,306,183 0.80% 29.20% 155,000 5,637,000 14.00% 21,700 789,200
North Carolina 8,856,505 0.71% 29.29% 63,000 2,594,000 17.90% 11,300 464,300
North Dakota 635,867 0.89% 29.11% 6,000 185,000 12.20% 700 22,600
Ohio 11,478,006 0.83% 29.17% 95,000 3,348,000 10.10% 9,600 338,100
Oklahoma 3,579,212 0.79% 29.21% 28,000 1,045,000 18.90% 5,300 197,500
Oregon 3,700,758 0.76% 29.24% 28,000 1,082,000 17.90% 5,000 193,700
Pennsylvania 12,440,621 0.89% 29.11% 111,000 3,621,000 10.00% 11,100 362,100
Rhode Island 1,067,610 0.85% 29.15% 9,000 311,000 8.60% 800 26,700
South Carolina 4,321,249 0.72% 29.28% 31,000 1,265,000 15.90% 4,900 201,100
South Dakota 781,919 0.83% 29.17% 6,000 228,000 11.80% 700 26,900
Tennessee 6,038,803 0.75% 29.25% 45,000 1,766,000 13.70% 6,200 241,900
Texas 23,507,783 0.63% 29.37% 148,000 6,904,000 24.50% 36,300 1,691,500
Utah 2,550,063 0.56% 29.44% 14,000 751,000 17.40% 2,400 130,700
Vermont 623,908 0.78% 29.22% 5,000 182,000 (B) (B) (B)
Virginia 7,642,884 0.72% 29.28% 55,000 2,238,000 13.30% 7,300 297,700
Washington 6,395,798 0.72% 29.28% 46,000 1,873,000 11.80% 5,400 221,000
West Virginia 1,818,470 0.91% 29.09% 17,000 529,000 13.50% 2,300 71,400
Wisconsin 5,556,506 0.78% 29.22% 44,000 1,623,000 8.80% 3,900 142,800
Wyoming 515,004 0.74% 29.26% 4,000 151,000 14.60% 600 22,000
Notes:  The estimated mortality and morbidity rates for the uninsured U.S. population are based on the assumption that
the percent of people who contract pandemic flu would be evenly distributed among those with insurance and those with-
out.  Scientists note that people with compromised immune systems, such as the elderly, the very young, and people with
pre-existing medical conditions, are more likely to get seasonal flu.  Therefore, it is likely that those same people would be
more likely to get pandemic flu.  However, to remain conservative, TFAH does not factor this into its numbers.  Estimated
mortality and morbidity figures are rounded for presentation.  
(B) = base less than 75,000
Source:  (1) U.S. Census Bureau, “Current Population Survey, 2007 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Health Insurance
Coverage Status by State for All People,” (U.S Government: Washington, DC, 2007),
<http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032007/health/h06_000.htm>  Accessed October 5, 2007.  (2) U.S Census Bureau,
“Population Estimates Program, 2006 Population Estimates, generated by Serena Vinter using American FactFinder,” (U.S.
Government, Washington, DC: 2006) <http://factfinder.census.gov>; Accessed October 5, 2007.
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Infection Control Professionals (ICP) who
are members of the Association for
Professionals in Infection Control and
Epidemiology (APIC) from all U.S. hospitals,
regardless of size, location, or for-profit sta-
tus, were invited to complete a survey; the
sample, therefore, was non-random.  The
only exclusion criterion was hospital location
outside the U.S.  The database was assessed
for respondents who completed multiple sur-
veys (defined by having the same APIC iden-
tification number); none were found. A
respondent who did not indicate the state in
which his hospital was located was excluded.
The final database contained 630 subjects.
All data were anonymous and included no
identifiers within the database that could link
an ICP or hospital to the data.  
Responses were received from participants
in all U.S. states except Delaware. There was
a higher response rate in the Midwest
(33.5%) and South (32.5%) than in the
West (18.4%) or Northeast (15.61%) (χ2 =
65.9, p < .001) .  There are differences
among hospital distributions across the U.S.
in relation to geographical region, but the
response distribution for this study is slight-
ly different than would be expected given
the hospital locations according to the U.S.
Census data.240 This sample contained a dis-
proportionately higher number of respon-
dents from hospitals located in the Midwest
and Northeastern states than would be
expected (χ2 = 93.33, p < .001).   
The Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences 14.0 was used for all analyses
(SPSS). All items were dummy coded
because they consisted of nominal data.241
Hospital locations were categorized into
four regions (Midwest, Northeast, South,
and West) based on U.S. Census divi-
sions.242,243 Descriptive statistics by region
were computed for each question and used
to describe surge capacity and other 
infectious disease emergency preparedness
issues such as ICP participation in a hospital
disaster preparedness committee; around-
the-clock infection control support; partici-
pation in disaster exercises; and plan for
healthcare worker vaccination/antiviral 
prioritization. A series of Kruskal Wallis 
one-way analyses of variance tests were used
to evaluate the relationship between a 
hospital’s geographic region (independent
variable) and its ability to care for an influx
of potentially infectious patients in relation
to various surge capacity and infectious 
disease emergency preparedness measures
(dependent variables).  Non-parametric
tests were conducted because the questions
provided nominal level data.244 Significant
findings were followed by Mann-Whitney U
post hoc tests. Items that were answered “I
don’t know” were coded as missing data and
excluded from analyses for the Kruskal
Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests.  A series of
Chi Square Goodness of Fit tests were used
to evaluate whether there were significant
differences between the proportion of
respondents from the U.S. Census regions
and those from hospitals of varying sizes.
The survey was developed, administered, and
analyzed by members of the APIC
Emergency Preparedness Committee,
chaired by Terri Rebmann, PhD, RN, CIC,
associate director for Curricular Affairs and
assistant professor, Institute for Biosecurity,
Saint Louis University, School of Public
Health.  Other members of the committee
include: Sharon Alexander, Barbara
Citarella, Michael Cloughessy, Bill Coll, Sue
LaPointe, Diane Moroz, Michael Oleson,
Barbara Russell, Veronica Urdaneta, Bill
Wagner, and Rita Wilson.  Denise Graham
and Mary Schantz also assisted in this process
as representatives from APIC Headquarters. 
Appendix J:  
METHODOLOGY FOR APIC SURVEY
Author:   Terri Rebmann, PhD, RN, CIC, APIC Emergency Preparedness Committee
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Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania.  
Central: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska.  
South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, West Virginia.  
West: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, Alaska,
California, Oregon, Hawaii, Washington.
Appendix K:  
REGIONAL DEFINITIONS USED IN PUBLIC OPINION POLL
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Appendix L:  
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACRONYM FULL NAME
ACIP CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
ACS Alternative Care Sites  
AHRQ Agency for Health Research and Quality 
APHL Association of Public Health Laboratories 
APIC Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology 
ARC American Red Cross  
ASPR Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response  
ASTHO Association of State and Territorial Health Officials  
AVA Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed 
BARDA Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority   
BENS Business Executives for National Security  
BRFSS Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear  
CCAP Community Continuity Atlanta Partnership  
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CERT Community Emergency Response Team  
CFSAN Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition 
COPTER Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response  
CRI Cities Readiness Initiative  
CRS Congressional Research Service  
DOD Department of Defense 
DTPA Diethylenetriamine pentaacetate (Pentetic acid) 
eLRN Environmental Laboratory Response Network  
EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact  
EPA Environmental Protection Agency  
ERL Electronic Laboratory Results  
ESAR-VHP Emergency System for the Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals  
FDA Food and Drug Administration 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
H5N1 An extremely virulent strain of the Avian Influenza Virus 
HAN Health Alert Network  
HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
HRSA Health Resources and Services Administration 
HPP Hospital Preparedness Program 
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
IOM Institute of Medicine  
KI Liquid Potassium Iodide  
LRN Laboratory Response Network  
MDR-TB Multi-drug Resistant Tuberculosis  
MRC Medical Reserve Corps  
MRSA Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus  
MVA Modified Vaccinia Ankara  
NACCHO National Association of County and City Health Officials  
NAS National Academy of Sciences  
NBHPP National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program 
NCCUSL National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws  
NDMS National Disaster Medical System
NEDSS National Electronic Disease Surveillance System 
NELRP Nursing Scholarship Program and the Nurse Education Loan Repayment Program
NHSC National Health Service Corps 
NIH National Institutes of Health  
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
NPIs Non-pharmaceutical Interventions 
PAHPA Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
PHEMCE Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise 
PHIN Public Health Information Network  
PPV Pneumococcal Polysaccharide Vaccine 
rPA Recombinant Protective Antigen 
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
S-CHIP State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
SLEP Shelf Life Extension Program  
SNS Strategic National Stockpile 
TB Tuberculosis 
TFAH Trust for America’s Health  
UEVHPA Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act  
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 
XDR-TB Extensively Drug-resistant Tuberculosis 
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